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Based on 10 months’ qualitative fieldwork and the filming of a documentary 
conducted on the islands of Lampedusa and Fuerteventura, this thesis examines 
ground-level Europeanisation, concentrating on two well-established Communitarian 
policy frames -- the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) and the management of the external 
border of the Schengen space of free movement of people – and two populations of 
artisanal fishers who were exposed to them. It analyses how governmental logics 
operated on the ground through individuals’ engagement with Communitarian 
policies, and it reconstructs the major transformations that the two islands’ fishing 
industries underwent in the duree of more than fifty years of European integration. 
While until less than thirty years ago the economy of the Italian island of 
Lampedusa was centred on bluefish fishing and canning industries, on the Spanish 
island of Fuerteventura most islanders lived from agriculture for centuries. Following 
the European integration of Italy and Spain, both islands turned into major tourist 
destinations and the centres of frequent European migration crises. By focusing on 
these two territories, this investigation explores how EU governance contributed to 
transforming the local sociocultural and economic fabric and the islanders’ everyday 
life.  
Following the overview of how both policies were played out on the ground, I 
analyse the effects that the CFP produced on the two islands, and those that the 
management of the European external border generated in Lampedusa. Giving 
centrality to the marine element, I push the study of Europeanisation towards the sea 
and reveal how European policies had reconfigured the islanders’ relation with the 
seawaters surrounding them. Concurrently, by exploring the ways in which individuals 
interacted with EU governmentalities, I also unearth the several unintended 
consequences of Communitarian governance – as conservation policies aiming at 
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recovering overfished fish stocks actually generated the conditions for increasing and 
uncontrolled overexploitation, while border policies for the securitisation of the 
European space de facto de-securitized life in Lampedusa.
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GLOSSARY 
Hand/Pole-lines: ‘A pole and line consists of a hooked line attached to a pole. This 
method is common to sport fisheries (angling) but it is also used in commercial 
fisheries. Fishing rods/poles are made of wood (including bamboo, also constructed 
of split cane) and increasingly of fiberglass’ (FAO, 2014). ‘Traditional deep-sea fishing 
involved one hook per line, and one line per person, much as it is the case with 
[recreational and small-scale] fishing today’ (De Sombre and Barkin, 2011: 42). 
Purse-seine: ‘A purse seine is made of a long wall of netting framed with floatline and 
leadline (usually, of equal or longer length than the former) and having purse rings 
hanging from the lower edge of the gear, through which runs a purse line made from 
steel wire or rope which allow the pursing of the net’ (FAO, 2014a). It is ‘used to 
encircle a school of fish; the net is then pulled closed and the catch hauled in’ (De 
Sombre and Barkin, 2011: 41). Schools of pelagic fish of any size – from sardines to 
tunas – are the main target of fishers using this fishing gear. 
Set-gillnets: This fishing gear ‘consists of a single netting wall kept more or less vertical 
by a float line and a weighted ground line. The net is set on the bottom, or at a certain 
distance above it and kept stationary by anchors or weights on both ends’ (FAO, 
2014b). These nets target fish all across the water column, depending by how deep 
the net is positioned (De Sombre and Barkin, 2011) so that fishers using them target 
‘pelagic, demersal and benthic species [whose] size distribution [depends] on the 
mesh size’ (FAO, 2014b). 
Set-longlines: This fishing gear consists of ‘long fishing lines to which baited hooks are 
attached from subsidiary lines that hand from the main line’ (De Sombre and Barkin, 
2011: 41). Longlines ‘may be of considerable length [and] each line hanging from 
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[floats] at the surface. [Longliners target] pelagic species [such] as tuna and swordfish’ 
(FAO, 2014c). 
Trawls: ‘A bottom trawl is constructed like a cone-shaped net that is towed […] on the 
bottom. It consists of a body ending in a codend, which retains the catch. Normally 
the net has two lateral wings extending forward from the opening. […] Bottom contact 
with the gear is needed for successful operations’ (FAO, 2014d). Moving vessels drag 
‘the net across the sea floor, in search of groundfish species’ (De Sombre and Barkin, 
2011: 41).  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Italian and the Spanish islands of Lampedusa and Fuerteventura are both located 
at the geographical periphery of the European Union (EU), closer to Africa than to any 
other European territory (see Figure 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1: Lampedusa and Fuerteventura (@ European Commission - elaborated by the author) 
 
Placed somehow at the core of the Mediterranean, over the centuries, Lampedusa 
served as a natural safe port for seamen navigating the seawaters surrounding it. 
More recently, across the 1950s and the 1990s, the island became a major fishing 
centre for the fishing and canning of bluefish. As for Fuerteventura, islanders 
sustained themselves through agriculture and stockbreeding for centuries, even after 
the Spanish conquered the Canary Islands archipelago and turned it into a major hub 
for trade and fishing across the colonies and mainland. Only a few Fuerteventurans 
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worked at sea and they fished almost for sustenance as they often combined fishing 
with agricultural work on land. 
Today, however, Lampedusa is mostly known in Europe and outside of it as one of 
the most symbolic places where the EU’s fight against undocumented migration takes 
place (Cuttitta, 2013). Similar to Lampedusa, between 1999 and 2011 more than 
100.000 boat migrants reached the Canary Islands from the sea (Cuttitta, 2012). Yet, 
despite the islands becoming the stages of several major European migrant crises, 
both Lampedusa and Fuerteventura’s economies are today centred on tourism, which 
has become the main local industry. For example, each year an average of more than 
60,000 tourists spend their holidays on the tiny Italian island that counts less than 
6,000 registered residents (Contino, 2013). In 2014, the island’s most popular beach 
– the Rabbits beach – was picked as the second most beautiful beach in the world by 
the US television channel CNN.1 As for Fuerteventura, the tourist industry contributes 
to 80 per cent of the entire local economy with over one and a half million tourists 
visiting the island’s beaches and its extinguished volcanos every year (Pérez 
Fernández, 2008). 
Among the many global as well as local factors that contributed to transforming 
life in Lampedusa and Fuerteventura, the European integration of Italy at the end of 
the 1950s and that of Spain in the 1980s certainly played a role. European fishers’ 
work has been regulated from Brussels since the 1958 Treaty of Rome when fish were 
included among the agricultural goods whose production and market was regulated 
and subsidized within the frame of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Since the 
1980s, then, Brussels’ institutions designed five different reforms of the Common 
Fishery Policy (CFP) and implemented them in all European seawaters and ports – 
                                                          
1 http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/28/travel/100-best-beaches/index.html [Accessed on August 9, 2015] 
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including those of the two islands (Gray and Hatchard, 2003). Moreover, when Italy 
and Spain joined the Schengen area of free movement of people across the 1980s and 
1990s, both Fuerteventura and Lampedusa became isolated spots integral to the 
European external border. Since then – but occasionally also before - thousands of 
boat migrants and asylum seekers started arriving on the two islands from the sea, 
aiming to enter the EU.  
This research looks at the local effects that EU governance produced on these two 
isolated European territories. Throughout the following pages, I disentangle the 
several local social, cultural and economic dynamics that specific European policies – 
i.e. the CFP and the EU external border management – activated on the islands. Given 
the maritime geography of Lampedusa and Fuerteventura, the attention concentrates 
on local fishers in order to show how Europeanisation – as the collection of all the 
changes and opportunities that European citizens experience as a direct effect of the 
implementation of European policies, norms, and regulations - contributed to pushing 
fishers away from their profession and turn to the tourism industry, consequently 
transforming everyday life on the islands, as well as the islanders’ perception and 
experience of the maritime environment they inhabited.  
Looking at EU governance from this bottom-up angle – as local fishers’ biographies 
and everyday experiences constitute the core source of data – I examine how 
Communitarian governance mutated islanders’ everyday lives and the islands’ 
sociocultural fabrics as a consequence. By comparing the two case studies, I 
demonstrate how EU policymaking generated similar pressures on the two 
communities of fishers, but produced diametrically different outcomes for the small-
scale fisheries on the islands. If today professional fishery is disappearing in 
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Lampedusa, on the Spanish island, fishers had organized and achieved economic and 
environmental sustainability. 
Due to the relatively small size of Fuerteventura and Lampedusa, and the locals’ 
exposure to European policies, the two islands constitute accessible and contained 
settings from which to develop a ground-level assessment of the local impact of the 
implementation of EU policies. Looking at the EU from this angle means to push the 
academic study of the EU – that is largely the realm of European studies – somehow 
‘downward’ so as to concentrate on the individuals through which Communitarian 
policies are implemented.  
 Efforts to analyse the working of the EU at national and regional levels have 
tended indeed to concentrate principally on the process through which European 
member states incorporate European norms, regulations and directives (Favell and 
Guiraudon, 2011; Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001). When they do involve 
individuals, mainstream European studies’ literature tends to focus on European and 
national or regional elites and policy makers (Checkel, 2001; Christiansen, et al., 1999; 
Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Favell and Guiraudon, 2009; Medrano, 2008). As a 
sociology of the EU, my study instead concentrates on ‘ordinary’ European citizens - 
the fishing communities of Lampedusa and Fuerteventura – in order to put ‘a human 
face to the process of EU integration’ (Favell and Guiraudon, 2011: 11-13). That is why 
I decided to analyse European governance by concentrating on ‘real individuals 
experiencing and living out the micro-level consequences of macro-level regional 
integration on an everyday, social level’ (Favell and Guiraudon, 2009: 564).  
Moreover, as my study concentrates on the maritime environment, I concurrently 
expand sociological perspectives over an only marginally explored sociocultural and 
geographical ground - the sea. To do this, I assign centrality to maritime ways of living, 
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and frame and structure my analysis by using participants’ categories of 
understanding. For island communities, the sea was not just one of the many 
elements composing the environment in which they lived. For people living in small 
islands, the sea structures everyday life and, with it, local economies and sociocultural 
fabrics. In the minds of people working at sea, often there is no clear divide between 
land and sea: both grounds are socially experienced and lived. Yet, policies designed 
in the continental centre – in Brussels – interacted with such pre-existing ways of 
living, and local social and economic structures. Unavoidably, as a sociology of the EU 
that concentrates on fishers, this is also a sociology of the sea, which puts the 
maritime element at the core of the investigation. 
Moving from this maritime perspective, the investigation unearths the several 
unintended consequences of Communitarian governance – as conservation policies 
aiming at recovering overfished fish stocks actually generated the conditions for 
increasing and uncontrolled overexploitation, while border policies for the 
securitisation of the European space had de facto de-securitized life in Lampedusa. By 
questioning some fundamental elements of the  EU enterprise, the thesis thus 
demonstrates how governmentality (Foucault, 1979) constitutes a valuable 
conceptual tool to examine how EU governing operates, but also illustrates how it 
offers only a limited explanatory framework for understanding the ways in which 
governance is produced and reproduced by individuals in their everyday lives. 
 
Outline of the thesis 
The thesis consists of nine chapters. In chapter one, I specify the main theoretical 
coordinates of my study. I start by describing how the study of European fisheries 
contributes to the development of a maritime sociology that concentrates on the sea 
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as a social space and a key element shaping everyday life in coastal communities. 
Shifting focus to the EU, I explain why I frame it as a multi-level system of governance, 
and employ governmentality (Foucault, 1979) as an analytical tool to investigate the 
EU’s role in the transformations of the Islands’ economic and social fabric. Once these 
theoretical coordinates are presented, I move to an analysis of the main features and 
historical development of both the CFP and the European external border 
management system. At this point, I also explain the choice of border as an analytical 
focus for this study in my attempt to unravel the micro-social foundations of the 
changes in the island. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a brief description of 
Lampedusa and Fuerteventura’s geography, demography and fishery.  
In chapter two I discuss the data collection techniques I used during almost 13 
months of fieldwork. I first describe the diverse governance levels – European, 
regional, local – within which I conducted my investigation, and I provide a description 
of the different stakeholders I addressed which were divided into four major 
categories - institutional actors, members of the civil society, workers of the local 
fishing-related industry, and fishermen. Once the mapping of the fieldwork is drawn, 
I move deeper into discussing the diverse data collection techniques I deployed in the 
field – structured and semi-structured interviews, focus groups, participant 
observation, and the shooting of a documentary that comes attached to this thesis. I 
thus describe how I planned the use of some of these data collection techniques 
before beginning fieldwork, while others were the outcome of a series of unexpected 
conditions that I had to deal during my fieldwork. I close the chapter with reflections 
on the main limitations of my study and the major ethical issues that I dealt with. 
Chapter three provides the pre-EU history of the two fishing communities. In 
particular, I look at the maritime pasts of both Lampedusa and Fuerteventura, and at 
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the structure of local fishery as it was organized through time. First, I describe 
Lampedusa’s past as a safe port for people navigating the stretch of Mediterranean 
between Sicily and North Africa. I then plot the latter 19th century transformation of 
the island into an agricultural colony before finally turning to fishery following the 
Second World War, when Lampedusa became known as the ‘mackerel island’ because 
of its flourishing bluefish canning industry. As for Fuerteventura, I review the island’s 
ancient agricultural past, outlining how the Canary Islands were turned into a hub for 
the trade of slaves, goods and fish between Africa, Latin America and Spain. Describing 
how the local population remained somehow at the margins of these major 
transformations, I then explain how Fuerteventura’s economy centred for centuries 
on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism – a development quite different to that in 
Lampedusa. The chapter concludes by bringing the discussion to the 20th century 
where Fuerteventura was turned into a tourist destination and a centre for the 
production and export of tomatoes – especially in the port village of Gran Tarajal 
where I conducted my fieldwork. In this way, I provide a view of everyday life on the 
two islands before they became part of the EU in order to better understand the 
changes brought by the local implementation of Communitarian governance. 
In chapter four, I concentrate on the European governance of fishery. Since the 
1958 Treaty of Rome, fish were included among those goods regulated within the 
frame of the CAP. In this first phase of Communitarian management of fishery, the EU 
subsidized, either directly or indirectly, the expansion and modernisation of the 
European fishing fleet. With several big industrial vessels being built and launched all 
over Europe, local small-scale fishers who had hardly left their islands before, 
embarked on huge fishing vessels that went fishing all over the ocean and which took 
the Islanders away from their families and communities for consecutive months. In 
the 1980s, many European industrial fishing firms started hiring a non-European 
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cheaper workforce to labour on their vessels or they started operating from outside 
the EU. Here, most of Lampedusa and Fuerteventura’s fishers returned to their islands 
after having earned substantial amounts of money. While they finally had the financial 
resources to buy themselves a boat and go fishing as captains, following decades of 
industrial (over-)fishing, they found their fishing grounds extremely impoverished.    
As EU subsidies increased the productivity of the European fishing fleet, this soon 
led to the decline of several commercial fish stocks, and with the ensuing introduction 
of the first CFP in 1983, European authorities started concentrating on tackling 
overfishing. As I explain in chapter five, since the 1990s, the CFP’s structural policies 
began financing the reduction of the number of vessels for professional fishery, small-
scale fishery included, turning EU policies into one of the major incentives for 
fishermen to abandon their profession and reinvest subsidies into tourism-related 
enterprises. The last section of this chapter introduces the CFP’s conservation policies 
as they gained centrality within the frame of Communitarian governance of fishery. 
Because of their design, conservation measures also turned into one of the main 
obstacles for professional small-scale fishers to keep their work activity profitable and 
environmentally sustainable - especially in the case of Lampedusa, which had a less 
organized fishing industry compared to Fuerteventura. 
In chapter six I move to focus on the European external border in Lampedusa. I 
start with a view of the island’s marginality as unrelated to the local implementation 
of any EU policy. In this way, it became easier to appreciate the changes that the 
establishment of Europe’s border generated there. Following an initial and detailed 
genealogy of this border as it was marked in the middle of the Mediterranean, I 
describe how the EU external border worked both at sea and on the island. I examine 
border functions in Lampedusa and its surrounding seawaters to show how they 
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operated and how locals – and in particular fishers – interacted with them. Finally, I 
move my attention to the mediatisation of the island as it became possibly the most 
iconic spot of the European external border and EU migration policies. The permanent 
staging of migrants’ emergencies from the tiny island was in fact a major and 
pervasive element of Lampedusans’ everyday experience of the border, as it also 
profoundly reformulated islanders’ self-perception. 
After mapping the major transformations that EU policies had on fishery and the 
management of the border, in chapter seven I explore how the sociocultural fabrics 
of these two fishing communities were transformed. Following a description of how 
today the two fisheries worked and were organized, I analyse locals’ responses to the 
steering constraints of the EU governance by discussing the reasons that led fishers in 
Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal to react so differently to the decades-long 
Communitarian governance. If today in Lampedusa small-scale fishery seemed 
destined to disappear, in Gran Tarajal, thanks to a highly organized fishermen’s 
association, the local fishery had reached substantial economic as well as 
environmental sustainability. As I highlight by comparing the two cases, the reasons 
for such diverging trajectories could be found in the history, economy and 
sociocultural fabrics of these two European marginal port villages. Finally, I conclude 
the chapter with a close look at the major and most significant EU-driven 
transformations of Lampedusa’s sociocultural fabric as the fishing Mediterranean 
island of the past had turned into today’s touristic destination at the core of Europe’s 
outer border. 
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2. INVESTIGATING THE EU FROM A MARITIME PERSPECTIVE 
‘…the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea…’ (Foucault, 1997: 336)  
Focusing on the ground-level study of the working of two specific European Union 
(EU) policies –the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) and the European external border 
management – and the outcomes they produced on two small-scale fishing island 
communities, in this first chapter I provide a theoretical framework and an 
introduction to both policies and the two islands that are the object of my study.  
Yet, before discussing my theoretical framework for a sociology of the EU, it is 
imperative to discuss the central aspect of my fieldwork – the maritime element. 
Moreover, as no clear or exhaustive definition of what the EU is exists, I clarify how 
and why throughout my analysis I understand this constantly transforming 
institutional construct as a multi-level system of governance. As such, since my focus 
is on individuals and local communities inhabiting the margins of Europe, I explain why 
I examine their interaction with two major Communitarian policies through a 
governmentality lens, and across multiple marginalities. Given the countless areas of 
European policymaking and the complexity characterizing EU regulatory frameworks 
(Kellow and Zito, 2002), I thus specify the main characteristics of the two policy areas 
I selected. Finally, I provide some geographical as well as demographical descriptions 
of the two islands, accompanied by some introductory data concerning the two small-
scale fisheries I concentrated upon.  
 
2.1 Entering an underexplored ground of social enquiry 
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In the globalized era of liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000) where over 90 per cent of 
world trade travels by boat (Valentine et al., 2013), the sea is central in shaping human 
life on dryland. Despite this, the maritime environment ‘remains generally a stranger 
to contemporary sociology’ (Cocco, 2013: 5). Put in other words, ‘social sciences 
haven’t constructed a strong rudder to navigate the big blue’ (Brstilo, 2013: 27). 
Although a variety of sociological and anthropological works concentrate on maritime 
communities (Gillis, 2004; Gillis, 2012; Horden and Purcell, 2010; Steinberg, 2013; 
Steinberg, 2001; Malinowski, 1948; Acheson, 1981) the sea remains often perceived 
and imagined as a space where only limited social life takes place, representing the 
unexperienced and unknown for those whose social lives are grounded on dryland 
(Schmitt, 1997). However, seawaters directly structure everyday life for a multitude 
of individuals such as fishers, sailors, seafarers, coastal communities, and islanders for 
instance. For those living close to the sea and often earning a living from it, social life 
exists and is structured and constructed over and around the maritime element: the 
sea is ‘a real, experienced social arena’ (Steinberg, 2013: 156). Seawaters are the 
location of social interaction for those crossing them, living from them, and 
experiencing them on a daily basis (Ben-Yehoyada, 2011). Spending life on and at sea 
implies a specific maritime understanding and experience of the interaction between 
dryland and the sea (Thompson et al., 1983). This is one in which the shores separating 
the safe dryland from the perilous seawaters blurs, and it is thus formulated and 
understood by individuals in a specific maritime way. 
Putting the maritime element at the centre of analysis contributes to pushing the 
spatial limits of sociology outside the land-space, beyond the coastline and across it 
(Ballinger, 2013; Ballinger, 2006). In this way, studying fishers implicitly de−constructs 
‘the images of a neat separation between the sea and the land. [From fishers’ eyes] 
the sea might be understood as a real social and lived space’ (Cocco, 2013: 17). For 
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fishers, the complex interplays of land and maritime social and physical environments 
is not necessarily perceived and interiorized as a dichotomy but, rather, as continuous, 
and ensuing social life develops and structures across it accordingly. Evaluating the 
local effects of EU policies on fishing communities means moving the  maritime 
element to the centre as it unavoidably influences fishers’ adaptation to the steering 
of EU governing technologies (Deleuze, 2002). 
 
2.2. The EU as a system of multi-level governance and governmentality  
Approaching the study of the effects that a certain political entity produces on 
individuals, the first analytical step is to frame or at least indicatively define what the 
political organisation under examination is. Concerning the EU, this is certainly not an 
easy task, as confirmed by the enormous body of literature providing multiple and, at 
times, contrasting views. It is in fact not uncommon to perceive the EU as a sort of 
institutional labyrinth (Cronin, 2013). Visions over the EU diversify according to the 
observed policy area(s) and how Communitarian institutions design, approve, reject 
and/or emend specific rules and directives. As if this was not complicated enough, the 
EU has also transformed over time according to various treaties and agreements, 
expanding and deepening its areas of intervention, relying on new European agencies 
and including an increasing number of member states.  
Given this picture, looking at the EU as a system of multi-level governance might 
facilitate the task of assessing the effects that Communitarian rules, directives and 
regulations have for the lives of individuals inhabiting the European space (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2001). Analysing the EU from a specific multi-level governance angle 
allows framing the European policies and regulations as a system of dispersed levels 
and mechanisms of authority according to overlapping jurisdictions that involve 
14  
 
‘actors and institutions operating at different territorial scales’ (Shore, 2011, 296). In 
other words, this perspective involves the blurring of distinctions between the 
national, the regional, the local and the European levels so as to view each of these 
levels of governance concurring inside the same economic, social and political project 
(Marks et al., 1996). 
Shifting the focus on European citizens, the concept of governmentality developed 
by Foucault (1979) becomes extremely significant as it explains EU governance 
rationalities by highlighting the ways in which governance applies and works on 
individuals by shaping their practices of self-government and, with them, their 
everyday lives. Developing from the notion of governance (Rose, 1999), from the 
governmentality perspective ‘the concept of government is broader than 
management by the state’ (Mitchell, 2006: 389). It refers to the governing of 
populations by means of multiple institutions, strategies and technologies, and it 
ranges between the government of others and the government of the self. Different 
from viewing states’ sovereignty as a system of authority exerted over a specific 
territory, governmentality sees individual citizens’ strategies of self-government to be 
constructed alongside and according to dominant governing rationalities. Here, the 
governed individual is not simply governed: indeed, s/he governs her/himself 
(Foucault, 1982) in a circular relation, where government and subjects mutually 
constitute each other (Mitchell, 2006). Governmentality thus helps to understand EU 
governance rationalities as entrenched in the ways governed individuals are ruled 
(Nadesan, 2008; Walters and Haahr, 2001: 5). 
As a consequence, my analysis focuses on the study of the ground-level effects of 
the local implementation of EU regulations and norms at two levels. First, I consider 
EU political and governing technologies as they were played out locally, on the 
15  
 
ground. Second, I analyse the ways individuals interacted with and made sense of 
these governing technologies through their daily experiences, conducts and 
interpretations. Through doing this, it became possible to grasp elements of governing 
rationalities as they were eventually interiorized, challenged or adapted to by 
individuals (Barysh et al., 2008). From this angle it becomes clear that the 
governmentality concept provides the ability to move the analysis downward –from 
the EU to fishers – as well as upwards – from fishers to the EU. Consequently, the daily 
lives of individuals became the core of my analytical interests (Larner, 2000; O’Malley, 
1996; Frankel, 1997) and they allow me to bring to light the actual processes by which 
governmental logics operated (Read, 2009).  
Next, I describe and analyse the two EU policies under examination in my research 
in order to offer an initial overview of how they were structured through time. 
 
2.3. The CFP and the European external border management 
Here I offer a top-down outlook of both the CFP and the European external border 
management, discussing how both policies must be considered as well-established 
European governance frameworks, designed in Brussels and implemented locally by 
a variety of actors and institutions. 
 
2.3.1. The CFP: historical development and main regulatory frameworks 
The CFP constitutes one of the oldest areas of the direct implementation of 
Communitarian governance. Today fishery is one of the economic sectors most strictly 
regulated and largely subsidised by the EU. Elaborated within a time span covering 
more than 50 years of European history, this regulative framework includes more than 
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700 sets of norms (Lutchman et al., 2009). Even if the CFP officially substituted 
national fishery policies across the 1970s and the 1980s (Lequesne, 2004), the first 
steps towards a European coordinated policy in the area of fishery were already 
activated in 1957 within the broader frame of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
With fish included among agricultural goods, fish production and markets began being 
regulated at the European level when Communitarian institutions started addressing 
European fishers’ activities inside as well as outside the seawaters (Karagiannakos, 
1995). Indeed, since its embryonic stages, EU fishery governance regulated diverse 
branches of the fishing industry, making the CFP a well-established and pervasive 
European regulative frame for the whole European fishing industry and market. 
Initially, the explicit goals of the policy were twofold. On the one hand, to increase 
the productivity of the European fishing fleet through technological development and 
the rationalisation of the use of and access to marine resources. On the other hand, 
several other measures developed in order to maintain stable fish market prices and 
ensure a reasonable living standard for agricultural and fishing communities as well 
as fair prices and availability of supplies for consumers (Karagiannakos, 1995). In 
practice, since its initial steps, the CFP worked on multiple levels of the activity of 
fishing, the fish market, the living standards of fishers, and the conservation of fishing 
resources. When the official CFP appeared first as separate from the CAP in 1983, it 
explicitly included all these four integrated strands of the fishing industry (Holden, 
1994).  
Since then, the CFP passed through four main reforms determining a progressive 
extension and transformation of EU direct competences on fishing activities, with the 
policy focus shifting towards conservation policies in order to counter-balance the 
rapid decrease of several commercial fish stocks all over European seawaters 
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(Karagiannakos, 1995). Thus within the regulative measures that the EU introduced 
with the 1983 CFP, the principle of the total allowable catches (TACs) as a system of 
quotas for fish stocks that each European fishery is allowed to fish per year, 
represented the main innovation (Franchino and Rahming, 2003; Mansfield, 2004).  
Less than ten years later, in 1992, the first reformed CFP emphasised the relation 
within member states’ fleets’ productivity on the one side, and the available fishing 
opportunities on the other. The new key concept of ‘fishing effort’ was formulated, 
combining a series of technical parameters concerning the vessel’s engine power and 
the length of the hull, as well as the fishing gears: the function of this index was in fact 
to limit and then regulate the time fishing boats could spend at sea. Moreover, the 
rationalisation of the European fleet began with the implementation of the second 
structural policy that aimed to reduce the impact of EU fisheries on already declining 
fishing stocks. While Communitarian financial aid had supported for decades the 
building of new vessels and the renewal of existing ones, with the second wave of 
structural policies, the greater portion of financial flows started addressing the 
progressive reduction of the fishing fleet by economically assisting those who decided 
to dismantle their old vessels and/or revoke their professional fishing licenses 
(Lequesne, 2004).  
Another key element introduced with this first reform of the CFP was the 
construction of the European fishing fleet’s two major categories: small-scale artisanal 
and big-scale industrial fisheries. From a regulative perspective, the difference 
between these two fleets varies amongst member states as it is based on a complex 
calculation whose parameters include the length of the vessel’s hull, its engine power, 
the gear used to fish, and the geographic area where the vessel works. The European 
Parliament ‘recognises the importance of small-scale fisheries but does not provide a 
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definition [of them]’ (Macfadyen et al., 2011: 20). Yet, in line with the 1992 
recommendations, the ‘Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 on the [European 
Fishery Fund – EFF] - specifies small-scale fishery as ‘vessels in small-scale coastal 
fisheries being less than [12] meters long and not using towed gear’ (Macfadyen et 
al., 2011: 14). Thus although only approximately – as Communitrian sizes were applied 
differently depending on each member state fishing fleet’s main features - small-scale 
coastal fishing include vessels shorter than 12 meters operating in inshore areas - 
within 12 miles from the coastline (Martín, 2012; Karagiannakos, 1995). On the other 
hand, all other boats – longer than 12 meters and fishing beyond the 12 miles limit – 
are classed as industrial fishing vessels.  
In practice, small-scale fishery is a labour-intensive fishery that uses ‘relatively 
small crafts (if any) and little capital and equipment per person-on-board. Most often 
family-owned, [it is] commercial or for subsistence’ (FAO, 2014e). Industrial fishery on 
the other hand, is ‘capital-intensive [and uses] relatively large vessels with a high 
degree of mechanisation and that normally have […] high production capacity’ (FAO, 
2014f). Despite these differences, structural policies were applied equally to both 
industrial and small-scale fishing vessels.  
Ten years later, with the 2002 reform of the CFP Communitarian regulative effort, 
policy shifted consistently towards the development of more effective – and pervasive 
- conservation policies meant to protect the future as well as the present of European 
seas (Lutchman et al., 2009). First, the TACs system, until then designed on a yearly 
basis, was reformulated into a multi-annual plan so that fishers could organise better 
their mid-term fishing strategies. At the same time, although financed and regulated 
by the EU, the responsibility for controlling the structural policy of reduction of the 
European fishing (over-)capacity was given to member states so that they could work 
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more closely with their respective national fisheries. An initial – and mostly formal – 
regionalisation of fishery governance thus began in the early 2000s through the 
creation of Regional Advisory Councils – RACs – to involve stakeholders at the 
European level through constant meetings for all the parties to exchange ideas and 
projects while cooperating in the development and implementation of the CFP (Gray 
and Hatchard, 2003). This timid shift towards an increasing regionalisation of the CFP 
represented instead a major concern for the following and last reform that entered 
into force since January 2014 - subsequent to my fieldwork.  
Both CFP’s structural and conservation regulations and strategies –the main areas 
of Communitarian intervention within the management of European fisheries – were 
thus transformed through time. However, as I have said, these were not the only EU 
competences within the CFP. Concerning EU regulation of the fish-markets, 
Communitarian measures aimed at determining the market price of fish and the 
quantities of it coming to market. Moreover, within the frame of guiding principles of 
the EU Common Market, duties to trade fish products among member states were 
abolished (Leigh, 1983; Lequesne, 2004). Finally, another area of CFP’s intervention 
that was significant for peripheral fisheries – like those that are the basis of this study 
- was the exclusive competence of the EU to sign international fishing agreements 
with third-countries. Agreeing to negotiate as a single – European - polity, member 
states delegated to European institutions their powers to negotiate bi-lateral fishery 
agreements with non-EU member states in order to establish any dialogue from a 
much stronger standpoint (Lequesne, 2004). 
Summarizing this complex policy frame, the CFP can be seen to operate across four 
main areas: limitation of the environmental impact of fishing for the conservation of 
sea resources; structural policies for a more efficient management of the European 
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fishing fleet; Communitarian organisation of the market; and relations with third 
countries (Raakjær, 2009). Yet, through the years, the CFP developed into a very 
complex and, according to many, incoherent policy whose implementation developed 
through a variety of institutional actors – at the European, national, regional and local 
levels - regulating almost every aspect of fishing and its related economic activities - 
as summarized in the table below (Table 2.1).  
 
CFP REFORMS REFORMS’ PRIORITIES & (INNOVATIONS) CFP AREAS OF INTERVENTION   1958 (CAP) Modernisation of the fleet & increase its productivity  
   Fishing activity and fish market   Fishermen living standard   Conservation Policies   Relation with non-EU third countries 
 1983 Harmonisation & standardisation EU fisheries (TACs)   1992 Fishing fleet efficiency (structural policies)   2002 Conservative policies & regionalisation (fishing fleet reduction & RACs)   2014 Conservation policies, further regionalisation & the socio-cultural value of fishery 
Table 2.1: CFP reforms, their focus and the most significant innovation introduced as well as the main areas of policy intervention over the last 60 years 
 
The existing literature depicts the CFP as highly politicised and underpinning 
significant social damages within EU fishing communities in terms of both 
unemployment and impoverishment (Cooper, 1999). Within the crucial distinction 
between small- and big-scale fisheries, critics see the CFP as inadequate and unable 
to cope with the most concrete needs of the numerous EU local fishing communities. 
The policy’s most criticized incoherencies seem to have served for years the interests 
of European industrial fisheries. Generally, EU fishers perceive the policy as a set of 
ever-changing rules and an unnecessary complication of the already intricate working 
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of fishery and the fish markets, not allowing planning any long-term strategy – 
including effective conservation policies (Daw, 2005; Daw and Gray, 2004; Cooper, 
1999).  
What is of interest for my study are thus the small-scale fisheries, as, arguably, it 
was this group that was suffering the major effects of the CFP. European – as well as 
non-European - small-scale fishing communities are indeed little socio-cultural 
realities pushed into a permanent struggle to not disappear, crushed as they are by 
the more competitive industrial fisheries who irreversibly impoverish the fishing 
grounds of small fishers (Festing, 1977; Lövin, 2012). It is not just the case of fishing 
communities moving increasingly away from fishery as a profession - and often 
towards the most secure, less tiring and profitable tourist sector (Jentoft et al., 2009). 
Rather, coastal communities are socio-cultural environments in which small-scale 
fishing does not represent only the main local economic activity and resource: rather, 
fisheries play an important role beyond economy, being also a central element for 
socio-cultural identification (Thompson et al., 1983; Festing, 1977; Raakjær, 2009). 
Thus I argue that small-scale fisheries are likely to experience more directly – and 
profoundly - the marks of the effects of EU governance. 
 
2.3.2. European external border management: historical development and major 
regulatory frameworks  
European external border management developed through an apparently more 
consistent route than the CFP (Wolf, 2008; Neal, 2009; Van Houtum and Pijpers, 
2007). Since the signing of the Schengen agreement in 1985, five member states - 
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands - of what was then the 
European Economic Community (EEC) - approved the dismantling of internal borders 
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while simultaneously demarcating an external edge to create an inner zone of free 
movement of people, goods and capital. Later, in 1990, the Schengen Implementation 
Agreement, signed by the same five countries, enforced the former pact. The 
arrangement defined the main areas of intervention and the policy’s main goals: 
harmonisation of the national policies on visa and the rights of non-Europeans; 
international police cooperation and information exchange; and creation of the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) to archive and share information of non-EU 
citizens present in the Schengen territory. Since then, the space of free movement of 
people expanded into an integrated system developed inside the frame of a common 
immigration and asylum policy that is shared today by 26 European countries 
(Warwick, 2008; Rigo, 2007).  
Accordingly, internal national boundaries progressively disappeared so that 
European citizens - whose European citizenship was formalized with the 1992 Treaty 
of Maastricht – started inhabiting a new political and borderless space and community 
whose external boundaries needed to be established (Eder, 2006; Kostakopoulou, 
2005; Shaw, 1998; Ugur, 1995). In other words, through this process of progressive 
national de-territorialisation, the EU itself became a territorial unit defined by a clear 
boundary (Walters and Haahr, 2005; Tesfahuney, 1998), where, after ‘the opening of 
the internal borders of the EU, the political and policy attention shifted more and 
more, and swiftly so, to the protection of the external borders of the EU’ (Van 
Houtum, 2010: 960). In 2002, as international politics increasingly securitized 
following the tragedy of 9/11 in New York,  the European Commission (EC) explicitly 
remarked on the significance of this external boundary as necessary to guarantee 
European security as well as to boost ‘the citizen’s sense of belonging to a shared area 
and destiny’ (EC, 2002: 2).  
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In practice, such an external border was, to some degree, delocalized, fragmented 
and multiplied into several territorial as well as non-territorial border functions, within 
a wider project aiming at regulating the access of non-EU citizens to the Schengen 
space of free movement of people (Cuttitta, 2007; Mezzadra, 2004; Bigo and Guild, 
2004; Andrijasevic, 2006). Thus by progressively including an increasing number of 
European citizens, the European citizenship project was, in fact, based simultaneously 
on a selective exclusion of non-Europeans. Such an exclusive dimension also took form 
through the creation of a geographical external boundary isolating Europe from the 
East and the South: a line descending from Finland to Cyprus, passing after that 
through Gibraltar, to then move down to reach and surround the Canary Islands 
(Tsianos and Karakayali, 2010) – see Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1: An indicative line corresponding to the European external border including Lampedusa and Fuerteventura (@ Google Map - elaborated by the author) 
 
As it stands today, the norms related to the Schengen agreement represent an 
essential part of the communitarian body of law that any candidate country must 
incorporate in order to access the EU – the Schengen aquis. As I have said, Europe’s 
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external border governance relies on a complex interplay of various technologies and 
border functions scattered inside as well as outside the European territory, making its 
frontiers into a system of barriers rather than a geographically linear border. However, 
EU efforts consistently concentrated around the consolidation of the traditional 
national territorial borders when coinciding with the external edge of the EU (Geddes, 
2005). Indeed, given the nature of the Schengen space of free movement of people, 
once a third-country national gains the right to reside even in the most detached and 
marginal spot of this area, s/he gains the right to circulate in the whole area of the EU 
(Black, 1996). Consequently, a big part of the surveillance and control activities that 
were previously carried out at the borders of every Schengen member state had come 
to accumulate along the external boundary. Peripheral EU member states thus 
became central for determining migrants’ strategies to enter Europe: they 
transformed into the gates through which to access the entire Schengen territory 
(Orsini and Schiavon, 2009). 
While EU borders relocated previously national borders, EU border policies also 
extended beyond the EU itself. Indeed, a broad range of diverse projects are financed 
and organized by the EU and its member states with EU neighbouring countries such 
as Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, with the aim of externalizing the control of migratory 
trajectories outside the territory of the EU. Given this complex border system, those 
migrants and asylum seekers unable to get a Schengen visa remain with few options 
other than perilous and illegal trajectories to reach Europe. As a direct outcome, 
undocumented border crossing started concentrating on limited, remote and more 
accessible portions of the external EU boundary (Cuttitta, 2007). With this border 
regime in place, the vast majority of undocumented border crossing to enter the EU 
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appears to happen by land,2 as in the case of the Greek border with Turkey and the 
Spanish one with Morocco – with the two enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla attracting 
third-country nationals willing to enter the EU by crossing its border(s) without the 
required documents. However, also during this time, much more dangerous sea 
routes including those connecting Lampedusa and Fuerteventura respectively with 
North and Northwest Africa, started being crossed by undocumented migrants and 
asylum seekers (Orsini and Schiavon, 2009; Pastore et al., 2006; de Haas, 2008). This 
is a development that has come under increasing media interest worldwide (Friese, 
2012). 
The EU response to these migratory pressures was articulated into a quasi-
militarisation of the frontier (Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006; Barrero and de Witte, 2007; 
Paoletti, 2011) and, in 2004, by the creation of the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of member states – 
FRONTEX (Neal, 2009). Within such a frame, border areas in both the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean, as well as those enclosing the seawaters surrounding Lampedusa and 
Fuerteventura, became the ground to test European external sea-border patrolling 
missions coordinated by FRONTEX, which was also in charge of the training and 
financial support of member states’ police and army forces involved in border control 
(Spijkerboer, 2007; Carrera, 2007). Alongside this increasing securitisation of the 
frontier, numerous migrant detention centres were opened over the whole European 
space and particularly along the external border, in order to temporarily detain 
migrants and thus to control their movements (Tsianos and Karakayali, 2010).  
                                                          
2 ‘Although official data are lacking because of the clandestine nature of these crossings, the largest part of undocumented residents [in the EU consists] either of persons who have crossed the land (and not the sea) borders irregularly or (to a much greater extent) of persons who have entered EU territory legally with a valid visa, and then overstayed its expiry date’ (Cuttitta, 2014: 206) 
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These transformations had a profound impact on border communities. As for 
small-scale fishers, the boundaries of territorial waters as the spatial limits for their 
fishing activities were increasingly militarized and securitized, crossed as they are by 
migrants’ boats and rescue boats, as well as by patrolling forces. Despite it developing 
later than the CFP, the European external management is by no doubt a well-
established and a core body of EU legislation. When concentrating on isolated 
communities living along it, the local effects of such a frontier become extremely 
visible. Yet, the scope of locating this study at the border of Europe is not limited to 
analysing the working of the EU external border management on the ground. As I 
explain in the following section, the border here worked also as a privileged viewpoint 
from where to observe the European governance system and consider how it affected 
ordinary European citizens’ daily lives.    
 
2.4. The centrality of Europe’s edges 
Studying the local impact that EU governance has on individuals by locating the 
investigation at the geographical, political, sociocultural and/or economic margins of 
Europe facilitates the investigative effort. Marginal populations are expected to be 
particularly affected by EU policies as they are designed at and for the centre. 
Accordingly, individual and community’s interactions with governance’s structures 
are expected to be more visible at the margins of the polity – the EU - than they are 
at the core of it. Moreover, trying to understand the nature of EU governance from a 
bottom-up angle, making the margins visible can aid better understanding of what is 
contained inside of them. 
It is the search for this specific border perspective that pushed me to locate this 
study along and across multiple marginalities (Sharp, 2009). First, fishery constitutes 
27  
 
a marginal European economic sector (Cooper, 1999). Yet, within the context of EU 
fishery, small-scale artisanal fisheries – as different from big-scale industrial fisheries 
– are those experiencing major economic difficulties given the sector’s substantial 
marginality within the frame of EU policymaking on fishery (Jentoft et al., 1998).  
Both islands that are the object of this study are located at the margins of the EU 
and, more precisely, along its external border: a useful and valid geopolitical location 
from a governmental perspective. Indeed, one of governance’s ‘essential technical 
means [are] apparatuses of security’ (Foucault, 1991: 102) and the external border of 
the Schengen space of free movement of people is certainly one of the – if not the – 
major security apparatus within the frame of the EU multi-level system of governance. 
Thus, from a governmental angle, Europe’s border certainly constitutes a privileged 
space from where to look at the EU. What happens at the margins – or peripheries – 
is fundamental in shaping what is generally understood as the centre. To locate myself 
at the border – or the margin - becomes then an operational choice and a favourite 
viewpoint, ‘a point d’entrée [...] to better understand the nature of the entity - the 
European Union itself - that the internal and external border delineate’ (Warwick, 
2008: 5). 
Before moving to the discussion of the data collection techniques that I used during 
my investigation, I first outline necessary background information about the two 
islands in order to help better locate my fieldwork. I start from Lampedusa since I 
focused my analysis mainly there. Then I will move to Fuerteventura and the island’s 
main fishing port of Gran Tarajal.  
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2.5. Introduction to the islands and their local fishing industries 
Here I provide key information concerning the islands’ geographies and their 
demography. I also outline a schematic view of the local fisheries. 
 
2.5.1. Lampedusa: a rock in the middle of the Sicilian channel 
Lampedusans often call their island ‘the rock’. This tiny Italian atoll appears as an 
isolated piece of land emerging from the middle of the Sicilian channel – the breach 
of open seas linking the Southern coast of Sicily with Tunisia and Libya. Lampedusa is 
almost 26 square kilometres and it is the major island of the archipelago of the Pelagie 
that includes Linosa3 and the desert atoll of Lampione.4 All 6.299 registered residents 
live in Porto Lampedusa, the only village on the island. 
Geologically part of the African continent, Lampedusa is much closer to the coasts 
of Tunisia than it is to Sicily - as its closest Italian territory besides the tiny island of 
Pantelleria.5 The Sicilian port town of Porto Empedocle is 205 kilometres – 110 
nautical miles - north from Lampedusa. Yet, the island is only 167 kilometres away 
from the Tunisian port of Ras Kaboudja. Figure 2.2 below provides a visualisation of 
Lampedusa’s main geographic and demographic features  
                                                          
3 Located 57.5 kilometres – 21 nautical miles - north, inhabited by less than 500 inhabitants living over an area of five square kilometres. 
4 Located 18.5 kilometres – ten nautical miles - southwest, it covers an area of one square kilometre.  
5 Located 159 kilometres – 86 nautical miles - west, counting more than seven thousands and 500 inhabitants living over an area of 83 square kilometres. 
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Figure 2.2: Lampedusa distances from mainland Sicily and Tunisia, population and surface (@ Google Map - elaborated by the author) 
 
Local fishery: as for the rest of Sicilian fisheries, in Lampedusa the majority of local 
vessels were relatively small. According to the 12 meters long vessel’s hull threshold, 
there were several small-scale fishing vessels for artisanal fishery operating in 
Lampedusa. When I conducted my fieldwork there, of those vessels equipped with a 
professional fishing license, 80 were matriculated in Lampedusa and 46 of these were 
shorter than 12 meters –– see Chart 2.1. In terms of fishing techniques, the vast 
majority of vessels used set-longlines and hand- or pole-lines. Only three vessels 
fished with nets such as set-gillnets. Four other boats used purse seine as their main 
fishing gear. On the other hand, almost all big-scale fishing vessels operating locally 
used towed nets such as bottom otter trawls which are those seen as  most heavily 
affecting fish stocks and sea bottoms (Pauly et al., 2002).  
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Chart 2.1: Officially registered local big-scale and small-scale fishing vessels operating in Lampeudsa (data of the European Fishing Fleet Register - EFFR6 - crossed with the numbers I collected locally) 
 
Similarly to what happened to the rest of Mediterranean small fishing ports, the 
local fishery in Lampedusa was significantly segmented in terms of both vessel size 
and fishing techniques. 
 
2.5.2. Fuerteventura: a Spanish piece of Saharan desert off the coasts of Morocco 
and Western Sahara 
The Spanish island where I developed the second part of my fieldwork is much bigger 
than Lampedusa, covering an area of 1,655 square kilometres, inhabited by an overall 
population of more than 100,000 people. On the island I concentrated my data 
collection in the fishing village of Gran Tarajal. With a population of little more than 
                                                          
6 Accessible online (http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/index.cfm) this register managed by the DG MARE of the European Commission is a database including all the fishing vessels flying any EU member state flag that, according to CFP provisions, are obliged to register. 
Small-scale (<12m), 46
Big-scale (>12 m), 34
LAMPEDUSA: FISHING FLEET
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8,000 inhabitants, this was indeed the island’s biggest fishing community and the 
closest port to the Moroccan and Western Saharan coasts (González Rodríguez, 2004). 
Geographically, the nearest continental Spanish and European land is situated 
1,400 kilometres – 756 nautical miles – north of Fuerteventura - see Figure 2.3. 
Although the island is geologically separated from the African continent, 
Fuerteventura is just 95 kilometres – 51 nautical miles - west from the Western 
Saharan coastal town of Tarfaya (Morales Matos, 2001).   
 
Figure 2.3: Fuerteventura and Gran Tarajal’s distances from mainland Spain and Morocco, population and surface (@ Google Map - elaborated by the author) 
 
Local Fishery: out of the three fishing villages on the island – Morro Jable, Gran Tarajal 
and Corralejo from south to north– Gran Tarajal was the most important one – in 
terms of both the fleet size and its productivity. Differently from Lampedusa, its local 
fishery was somewhat homogeneous, as often happens for Atlantic fisheries: given to 
the size of the catches indeed, fishermen harvest a minor number of species so that 
they tend to use similar fishing gears. In Gran Tarajal - as well as on the rest of the 
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island - no big-scale industrial fishing vessel operated: all 41 locally registered vessels 
were small-scale ones and they exclusively used set-longlines. 
Both Lampedusa and Fuerteventura are located at the geographical periphery of 
Europe, much closer to the African continent than they are to their corresponding 
mainland. Inhabited by a few thousands of people, both the port villages of Porto 
Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal’s small-scale fisheries counted on less than 50 vessels 
each. However, as I later describe, and as it appears from the data concerning the 
distribution of fishing gears, the organisation of the two fisheries differed profoundly.    
 
2.4. Conclusion 
Governance theory structures my study of the ground-level effects that EU policies 
produced on individuals. Given the specificity of this particular investigation - one 
focusing on fishermen and two detached island communities -the geographical as well 
as sociocultural maritime element is a central feature of my analysis as far as it played 
a pivotal role in constructing fishers’ daily lives, as well as the pre-EU histories of the 
two islands. In these terms, then, my fieldwork involved providing centrality to a 
relatively underexplored field – or, paradoxically, to ‘ground’ my  enquiry in the sea, 
so as to bring to light the major features characterizing social life for the coastal and 
island communities living at as well as from the sea.  
In addressing EU policies and individuals simultaneously from a ground/sea-level 
perspective, my goal is to observe the Communitarian governance system where EU 
rules and regulations encounter ordinary citizens inhabiting the European space. From 
this angle, governmentality provides a useful theoretical tool that enabled me to draw 
together micro and macro dimensions of life in the EU and call individual citizens into 
the picture simultaneously as both subjects and agents of the EU governance project, 
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highlighting how specific governance system(s) steer individuals’ (in-)actions as much 
as those same governing rationalities were in fact reframed and/or adapted on the 
ground.  
In approaching the EU from this top-down-bottom-up angle, the geographical as 
well as socio-political margins of the EU are turned central and seen as constituting 
the rupture of the European governance space as it differentiates from the outside of 
itself – revealing most visibly its nature. Yet, on the other hand, this bottom-up look 
allowed me to focus on communities and individuals exposed to the changes 
generated from the major and distant political project that is the EU. Now, before 
moving to the discussion of the data, I present the array of techniques I deployed to 
collect data over more than one year of fieldwork.   
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3. METHODOLOGY: APPROCHING COMPLEXITY IN THE FIELD 
‘Are you a biologist or a journalist?’ (Mariano, Lampedusan fish trader); ‘Actually, I am a sociologist’ (Me); ‘A what?’ (Mariano)  
In this chapter I chart the data collection techniques I used in my fieldwork, which 
included ethnographic and participant observations, structured and semi-structured 
interviews, focus groups, informal talks and the filming of a documentary. I describe 
how I identified and approached more than 55 stakeholders on the islands and at the 
European Union (EU) institutional level, both in Brussels and Warsaw. I then discuss 
the qualitative data collection techniques that I employed, with a view to introduce 
an understanding of the physical spaces where my fieldwork took place and my level 
of engagement with informants. The chapter ends with a description of the main 
challenges encountered in the field, together with a critical account of the strategies 
I implemented to overcome them and an overview of the main limitations and ethical 
issues characterizing this study. 
 
3.1. Collecting data for a multi-layered investigation 
My investigation gathered two main sets of data. First, I analysed the working of both 
the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) and the European external border management ‘on 
the ground’, and I examined how EU provisions translated onto the territories of and 
seawater surrounding the two islands. Parallel to these sets of data, I also analysed 
whether and how the diverse ground-level manifestations of EU governing 
technologies had any tangible impact on local fishermen’s everyday life. At this level, 
observations and questions focused individual experiences and narratives rather than 
specific or significant facts and events or official sets of data. As I will discuss, to gather 
data among and across these two analytical levels, I addressed stakeholders from very 
different social and spatial settings. 
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3.1.1.  The socio-spatial dimensions of a multi-sited study 
Over the 12 months I spent in Lampedusa and Fuerteventura between September 
2012 and July 2013 and then later in September of 2014, I collected data from more 
than 50 individuals. As a multi-sited ethnography, I expanded my observations at 
several relevant social and spatial levels (Marcus, 1995). In order to provide an 
effective overview of how I conducted the investigation across these various field(s), 
I have divided this section of the chapter into three major parts, tracing the research 
process as it concretely took place at various European, regional and local levels. 
 
The EU level: before my participant observation in Lampedusa and Fuerteventura I 
conducted preliminary investigative work in Brussels. For example, In May 2012, I 
attended a public hearing for the reform of the CFP, organized by the European 
Parliament Fishery Committee - EPFC.7 For the occasion, Members of the European 
Parliament - MEPs, European Commissioners of the Directorate-General for Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries – DG MARE, representatives of European fishermen and fishing 
vessel owners associations and fishing industries, as well as national institutional 
stakeholders, met to discuss the CFP reform that entered into force in January 2014. 
Here I was able to observe how these actors negotiated at the EU level while also 
increasing my familiarity with the main issues and priorities concerning the policy. 
Additionally, when I had finished my fieldwork on the Islands in July 2013 and, 
following a lecture that I delivered in Krakow, I joined an official visit to the FRONTEX 
headquarters in the Polish capital of Warsaw. I also continued to collect data following 
my main period of fieldwork by participating at relevant meetings, seminars and 
conferences, and by getting in touch with local policy experts and EU policy makers. 
                                                          
7 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/pech/home.html [Accessed on May 03, 2015] 
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The regional level: before my fieldwork in Lampedusa, I also spent almost one month 
at the University of Palermo officially enrolled as an Erasmus visiting student in the 
Faculty of Political Science. As for Fuerteventura, at the beginning of my stay in the 
Canary Islands archipelago, I spent a few days at the Political Sciences and the 
Anthropology departments of the University of la Laguna on the island of Tenerife. 
In both these academic centres I interviewed a number of local experts who came 
to be valuable gatekeepers, providing me several contacts on both islands. 
Furthermore, while residing in Lampedusa, I flew back to Palermo twice and, meeting 
with fellow local academics, I revised in-depth the data I had collected.  
 
The Island level: I collected most of my data on the islands. In Lampedusa I resided 
continuously for over six months between October 2012 and March 2013, and, after 
this, I went back to the island on three occasions. The first of these latter visits was in 
April of 2013 to film part of the documentary I produced about the island which I 
worked on together with Lorenzo Sibiriu - a friend and movie director. I returned again 
to Lampedusa in July to take part in a local movie festival LampedusaInFestival8 
organized by the local association Askavusa9, as I did again one year later in 
September 2014 when I helped organize the sixth edition of that same festival. As for 
Fuerteventura, I was only once on the island where I resided in the fishing village of 
Gran Tarajal for three months between April and late June 2013.  
                                                          
8 http://www.lampedusainfestival.com/ [Accessed on July 04, 2014] 
9 The name of this local grassroots cultural association Askavusa comes directly from Lampedusan dialect and literarily means “barefoot”. Appearing in 2009, following locals’ protests in defence of migrants’ rights, this association aims to drive the attention of locals as well as national, European and international public opinions towards the condition of migrants in their countries of origin, as well as on the transit countries they cross before reaching Lampedusa. 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, there were multiple reasons why I 
concentrated most of my data collection in Lampedusa. As I was looking at both the 
CFP and the management of the European external border, before approaching the 
islands I was already aware of the major salience that this second European policy had 
in Lampedusa compared to Fuerteventura. As for 2012, if Lampedusa had never 
stopped serving the EU institution as the border island par excellence, boat migrants’ 
arrivals to Fuerteventura and, in general, to the Canary Islands, had massively 
decreased since 2006 to almost a stop. As the biggest migrant detention centre of 
Spain, against a maximum capacity of more than 1,000 detainees, the Fuerteventura 
holding centre of El Mattoral closed down at the beginning of 2012 (Godenau and 
López-Sala, 2013). From this perspective then, when I started my investigation, 
Fuerteventura was somehow less ‘at the border’ than Lampedusa. Moreover, from a 
practical point of view, at the end of the first six months in Lampedusa, I had already 
collected very rich and detailed information. Consequently, I felt that to undertake a 
similar investigative effort in Fuerteventura would have led to an excessive 
accumulation of data. I thus decided to develop the fieldwork in Feurteventura as a 
largely comparative one where the data from the Spanish island concentrated mostly 
– if not exclusively – on the local impact of the implementation of CFP provisions. This 
was done in order to provide me with a better understanding about what was 
happening in Lampedusa. 
 
Working at these different levels and in different sites, I accessed relevant individuals 
from diverse professional as well as social environments, which is described in the 
next section.  
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3.1.2. Stakeholders: a composite landscape 
Here I divide interviewees into four groups, in light of their major function in relation 
to the policy areas I was investigating: institutional actors, members of the civil 
society, workers of the local fishing-related industry, and actual fishers. Yet, several of 
the stakeholders who provided me information could be included in two or more of 
these indicative categories. 
  
Local Institutions: this group was composed of members of relevant local, regional, 
national or European institutions – e.g. coastguard and law enforcement officials, the 
local mayor or the provincial authority on fishery, and MEPs, for instance. In 
Lampedusa I interviewed and gathered data from the mayor, the vice-mayor, two 
former mayors, the municipal assessor for fishery and the one for local migrants’ 
integration and first assistance policies, the only employee of the local Marine 
Reserve, a former member of the coastguard, and other law enforcement officials. In 
Fuerteventura, I interviewed the provincial councillor for fishery and agriculture as 
well as a member of the regional police for fishery. In Brussels I exchanged ideas and 
impressions with the former vice-president10 of the EPCF and members of his cabinet. 
Following my fieldwork, I was also in touch with several experts working in Brussels 
who were in close contact with EU policymakers. Moreover, in Warsaw in July, 2013, 
I had a short but extremely informative short interview with a FRONTEX 
spokesperson.11  
Depending on each stakeholder’s specific institutional role(s), I gathered official 
accounts over the policymaking process and the more technical aspects of the local 
                                                          
10 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/97020/GUIDO_MILANA_home.html [Accessed on May 02, 2014] 
11 http://frontex.europa.eu/contact [Accessed on May 02, 2014] 
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implementation of the policies under examination, collecting at the same time 
available official documents and reports. Although my intention was to address 
members of this group with structured interviews, due to contingent and unexpected 
situations – such as, for example, the Coastguard and law enforcement officials in 
Lampedusa refusing any official and recorded interview - I often resorted to the use 
of informal talks. Unable to access the high commands as almost all of them were 
unwilling to pass me any information, I approached their subordinates in public spaces 
other than the police or Coastguard stations - such as Lampedusa’s bars and squares 
– and I observed officials’ everyday interactions with the rest of the population. 
 
Local Civil Society: differently from Fuerteventura where I had only few contacts with 
members of the local, national or international civil society, in Lampedusa I collected 
information from the local priest, a British artist and activist working on the island, a 
local historian curator of the only historic archive of Lampedusa, and members of the 
Askavusa association. The main goal of my gathering data from members of the civil 
society was to open up official narratives (Steinmetz, 1992). Since not one member of 
this group refused to answer my queries, I collected this data through structured 
interviews, with questions that were to an extent symmetric with the ones I asked 
institutional actors. I also gathered data through ethnographic observations in order 
to better appreciate how different activists permeated the local sociocultural and 
political landscape. 
 
Local Fishing-Related Industry: I interviewed 14 individuals in Lampedusa involved in 
the local fishing-related industry. I interviewed four employees – two active and two 
retired – of the local bluefish canning industry, and the owner of one of the two 
factories still operating on the island. I also interviewed the employee and the owner 
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of a local fish warehouse, the retired owner of that same warehouse, a bankrupted 
fish trader, a retired shipwright, and the owner of the only local aquaculture 
enterprise and one of his employees. Last but not least, I also interviewed the owner 
of a local fish restaurant and his son and business partner. 
I treated the stakeholders from this group as fishers and did not limit my analysis 
exclusively to the mere local implementation of specific European normative 
provisions. Rather, I tried to deepen my gaze in order to grasp life histories and 
personal feelings or impressions over the most significant local socio-cultural 
transformations experienced by islanders over the recent decades of European 
integration. This is why I used life history interviews (Thompson, 1978) accompanied 
by several semi-structured interviews, focus groups and participant observations. All 
of this was accompanied by countless informal conversations. 
 
Local Fishermen: in Lampedusa I collected data by directly involving 18 fishermen – 
two from an industrial fishery and 16 artisanal fishermen. As for Fuerteventura, I only 
gathered information from six small-scale artisanal fishermen. Since they constituted 
the core group of informants within my investigation on both islands, personal 
accounts and narratives were explored in depth. As for interviewees from the fishing-
related industry, data collection techniques varied between life history and semi-
structured interviews, focus groups, participant and ethnographic observations and 
informal talks. I thus spent the major part of fieldwork on the islands with fishers, 
trying to be present, as much as I could, in the individual’s everyday lives. Figure 3.1 
visualises these various stakeholders that were involved in my fieldwork. 
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Figure 3.1: A visual summary of the main research locations (Graphic elaboration of the author). 
 
Addressing relevant individuals from all of these very diverse professional, as well as 
social environments, I used of a variety of qualitative data collection techniques which 
I describe in the next section. 
 
3.1.3. Disentangling a set of qualitative research strategies 
While in the field, I used a series of data collection technique according to the specific 
investigative purposes related to the governance level I was looking at, as well as 
depending on the individuals I was addressing with my questions and observations. 
Below I list the qualitative data collection techniques I deployed and I specify how and 
where I used them, and I explain the reasons that pushed me to choose these rather 
than other techniques. 
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Structured interviews: since my main concern was to gather data concerning specific 
technical aspects of policy implementation, my structured interviews with 14 
individuals from the institutional and civil-society level focused on the more 
operational aspects of the CFP and the management of the European external border 
at the sea. My goal was to get descriptive information and figures – e.g. the 
organisational structure of local fishery, the management of boat migrants’ arrivals, 
the working of local facilities assigned to their reception, migrants’ identification and 
assistance and such like. I aimed to collect comparable data – or individual accounts - 
on certain policy-related issues, in order to get a more as accurate a picture as possible 
‘[…] across the entire field of potential viewpoints’ (Pawson, 1996: 298). Given the 
sensitivity of most of the issues I discussed with interviewees – e.g. migrant rescuing 
operations at sea – there were often contradictions between official and non-official 
accounts which worked as a key source of data. 
With almost all structured interviews I was able to record the talks. However, I 
mixed this technique with much less formal investigative strategies so as to avoid 
limiting the range of information within the boundaries of my research agenda (Birks 
et al., 2007). For instance, once interviews ended I visibly turned off the recorder to 
create an artificial rupture between two distinct parts of the same talk. In this way, 
formal interviews were commonly followed by a final and more friendly and informal 
talk. Here I hoped that informal conversations might provide me with more 
confidential information that was less structured by my set questions and recording 
technology. This often led to broadening my understanding about areas of policy 
implementation that I was not otherwise aware of. Since these sort of post-interview 
talks never lasted very long, I was able to take relatively accurate notes afterwards.  
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Semi-structured interviews: here I addressed individuals from both the local fishing-
related industry as well as fishers themselves. Semi-structured interviews were aimed 
at discussing a series of issues I had planned beforehand, while leaving the 
interviewees with a great degree of freedom to talk. Similar to structured interviews, 
I intended to gather vital information over precise dynamics concerning local fisheries 
and the interactions of fishers with the workings of the border at sea. During the initial 
weeks of my fieldwork in Lampedusa I accumulated basic knowledge on fishery, which 
involved rudimentary notions that fishers often took for granted. Indeed, when I 
arrived in Lampedusa, I had very little knowledge regarding actual fishing or the 
technicalities related to it that were crucial in order to comprehend the fishers’ social 
reality. On the other hand, I also used these interviews to drive my knowledge towards 
the most relevant local issues (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001; Grady, 1998; Birks et al, 
2007).  
In general, I tried to organize meetings in places familiar to the interviewees 
themselves, such as their working places – fishermen’s tool sheds, the fish canning 
factory, the fishermen’s association or their fishing vessels pier (see Plates 3.1 to 3.6) 
- or any public space where they would regularly go – Plate 3.7. This helped informants 
feel comfortable, while allowing me to have a direct look at those physical spaces 
where my participants spent most of their daily lives. On other occasions, however, I 
could not decide where interviews took place: rather, the interviewees decided where 
to take me. 
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Plate 3.1: The exterior of one of the Lampedusa fishermen’s tools shed. Carlo, the youngest artisanal fishermen of the island, is arming the purse seine net during a winter day of bad sea conditions (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author)  
 
Plate 3.2: The interior of Giovanni’s tool shed. He was the oldest local fishermen. Other retired colleagues played cards while he sat at the bottom of the barrack, waiting for one of the several interviews we had (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author)  
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Plate 3.3: The interior of one of the two Lampedusa’s fish canning industries, with employees – all women apart from one man - peeling boiled mackerel before putting them under oil (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author)  
 
Plate 3.4: The interior of Lampedusa fishermen’s association: the president – Piero - is standing helping the two fishermen in front of him to manage some bureaucracy (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author)  
47  
 
 
Plate 3.5: Canopy of Gran Tarajal fishermen’s association. Jorge, a local active fishermen and a member of the local fishermen association – leaning against the roof pillar - speaks with older retired fishermen (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author)  
 
Plate 3.6: Jorge, interviewed on the Gran Tarajal fishing vessels’ pier (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author)  
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Plate 3.7: Francesca – one of the employees of the only aquaculture plant in Lampedusa – interviewed in the main road of Porto Lampedusa (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author)  
Ethnographic & Participant observation: here I collected some of the most significant 
data (Brewer, 2000). The information I was able to gather constituted key material 
that I would discuss later with interviewees, and which I used in order to check what 
they told me beforehand. This is why this ‘relatively intense, prolonged interaction […] 
and first-hand involvement in the relevant activities of [the interviewees’] lives’ 
(Levine et al., 1980: 38) turned itself very quickly into a core source of information.  
When I first arrived in Lampedusa, the first tangible opportunity I had to get in 
touch with local fishermen followed my encounter with Mariano, the owner of one of 
the two fish warehouses located in the old port – Plate 3.8.  
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 Plate 3.8: The exterior of Mariano’s fish warehouse (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author) 
 
Although he soon invited me to visit his own workplace to get in touch with as 
many fishers I could, I did not want to appear – and be – excessively intrusive. Thus I 
proposed to Mariano that he allow me to help him with some of his workload in order 
to make myself simultaneously more comfortable and more visible, while, hopefully, 
gaining the fishers’ trust. Consequently, the first few times I went to the warehouse I 
helped Mariano moving ice and fish boxes and unloaded fishing vessels – and I kept 
doing that occasionally throughout my fieldwork on the island. Quickly, fishers asked 
either me or Mariano who I was –and I could then introduce myself and my 
investigation. During this time I also observed the many activities taking place in the 
warehouse. Indeed, my participation turned out to be an effective way to grasp 
fundamental information while also merging myself into the observed context 
(Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994; Sandelowski, 2000). Later, during the last weeks of 
my stay in Lampedusa, I also embarked twice to go fishing. On both occasions we 
remained for more than 12 hours at sea at more than 20 nautical miles off the island 
(see Plate 3.11). Both times I helped less with the workload that in fact requires a 
greater degree of experience and risk, compared to working in a warehouse – but 
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there was, of course, no other way I could observe social life at sea other than going 
fishing. 
During my participant observation I carried out approximately seven to eight hours 
of ethnographic observation per day along the islands’ port piers - Plates 3.9 and 3.10 
- in the local public spaces most frequented by the interviewees – such as local bars 
or the main squares of the villages – or inside fishers’ tools sheds. In these 
environments I took notes while either there, or once away from the location in which 
observations took place. However, in such small islands and villages, ethnographic 
observation never really stopped, even during what I considered to be my free time. 
Spending time with local friends around the island, I could not avoid observing what 
was happening around me. 
 
Plate 3.9: Fishermen changing their fishing nets along the port pier of Lampedusa (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author)  
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Plate 3.10: Gran Tarajal port pier (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author)  
 Plate 3.11: Fishermen Mario and Pietro fishing 20 miles South of Lampedusa (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - 
elaborated by the author) 
 
Informal talks: I addressed fishers, law enforcement and/or Coastguard officials, 
employees of the local fish canning industry, local politicians and almost everyone that 
participated in the investigation, in informal as well as formal talks. This enabled me 
to gather what was sometimes confidential data that I would have not been able to 
access otherwise. Indeed, some of the issues I dealt with during several interviews 
regarded either illegal conducts related to fishing, as well as possible fundamental 
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rights violations related to the working of the border at sea. Informal talks became 
the only way to gather such sensitive data. Moreover, as I have said, informal talks 
also served to often check and countercheck that information that I collected through 
more formal interviews. 
Although there was generally no formal structure to these conversations, I was 
often able to at least partly drive talks so that I could cover specific issues that I wanted 
to discuss. Following these conversations I took notes when finding - or making - 
myself alone. 
 
Focus groups: in Lampedusa I conducted two focus groups. The first time, I was with 
the members of the crew of the first fishing vessel I concentrated my research on in 
Lampedusa. I opted for this specific strategy simply because I could not get an 
individual interview with any of them. This was largely because this group were not 
properly Lampedusan fishers, having arrived there from Porto Empedocle - the closest 
Sicilian seaport - for six months a year to access the local richer fishing grounds. Since 
they slept and lived on their vessels, it was literally impossible to find them alone for 
a quiet and long talk. Soon I realized that my only option was a group meeting.  
Something similar happened when I interviewed a worker at Lampedusa’s fish 
canning industry at a friend’s place while she was having her hair tended to. My hope 
was that before or after the hairdressing, we would have had the opportunity of 
spending some time alone for an interview. However, after a few minutes, I was in the 
room chatting with her while my friend - and hairdresser - was still there - and his 
mother appeared as well. Since she was a retired worker of the same local fish canning 
industry, soon what I wanted to be a pre-interview talk became an informal focus 
group where everyone – including my friend – actively participated in the discussion.  
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The first interview with the fishing vessel’s crew took place over lunch, at one of 
the fishermen’s house – Plates 3.12 and 3.13. The other – as I said – took place at my 
friend’s place – Plate 3.14. In both cases I was able to record our long informal talks, 
while I could also observe group interactions. Moreover, on both occasions, the film 
maker - Lorenzo - and his two cameras, accompanied me. As I did not want the 
presence of the two cameras to interfere excessively with the situation, for the two 
focus groups we placed them at the margins – often the corner – of the room and left 
them there so that interviewees – and us – soon forgot their presence. Obviously, all 
interviewees already knew Lorenzo and felt comfortable having him in the room.  
 
Plate 3.12: The house where the focus group interview with the fishing vessel’s crew took place (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu elaborated by the author) 
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Plate 3.13: A scene from the actual focus group interview with the fishermen crew (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu elaborated by the author) 
 
 
Plate 3.14: A scene from the actual focus group interview with the two women from Lampedusa’s fish canning industry (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu elaborated by the author) 
 
Documentary film shooting: while on both islands I also conducted numerous filmed 
interviews for the shooting of a documentary.12 The major concerns related to the 
                                                          
12 ‘Once the sea was covered with water. European fisheries at the edge’ - http://borrachalavida.wix.com/oscvv [Accessed on April 21, 2015] 
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filming of these interviews derived from the several investigative risks associated with 
taking a camera and another person to interviews. However, besides these worries, 
the camera soon became an opportunity leading to further interviews and data. 
The project of the documentary moved initially from my wish to produce a visual 
document of the research able to reach a wider public than an exclusively academic 
one. However, the presence of two cameras and a filmmaker could have had the risk 
of affecting the intimacy of conversations. In light of this, we organized interviews in 
front of the camera only after having already spent more than one month on the 
islands, and we limited the first shootings to landscape framings only. In such a way 
we tried to not be too intrusive, while at the same time we also wanted to make the 
camera, Lorenzo and the documentary somehow increasingly visible, so that locals 
began to get both familiar with and curious about them. In this way, we artificially 
stressed and created a distinction between my research work and the documentary. 
I was the one interviewing and getting in touch with people, so far that I carried out 
individually each and every task related to the research. At the same time, people who 
were getting to know me were also seeing me around the island with a friend and a 
camera. When questioned about this, I always presented the documentary as a 
parallel but separate project so that I could highlight the distinction. Thanks to these 
initial moves, we almost immediately gained locals’ curiosity. Soon, the presence of 
Lorenzo and the camera begun to be perceived as less and less intrusive and further 
interviews with the same subjects were finally possible – another opportunity for me 
to countercheck interviewees’ answers (Ruby et al., 2001).  
Thus, despite the several difficulties related to the intrusion of a camera and a 
filmmaker to my fieldwork, my feeling was that this did not significantly distort the 
validity of my investigative endeavour. Filmed interviews took place separately from 
those I organized exclusively for my study, but the link for an online version of the 
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documentary is attached to the thesis – and it can be used as an alternative source of 
data and narrative about the Island (Barbash and Taylor, 1997; Morawska, 1996).  
 
Although I have discussed each data collection technique separately, in the field I very 
often merged them together. Moreover, if on the one hand I planned to use most of 
these strategies before moving to the islands, I also opted for some of them because 
of contextual and practical situations that I encountered in the field. Table 3.2 – 
presents my various data collection techniques in relation to the groups of 
stakeholders that I addressed in the field. On a minor note, I must clarify here that 
despite the relatively substantial number of people I addressed in my fieldwork, as 
frequently happens for ethnographies, throughout the thesis there are a number of 
excerpts from a smaller number of ‘key informants’. After all, using informal data 
collection techniques, I could only record a limited number of interviews. 
ADDRESSED GROUPS DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 
Institution Structured Interviews, Informal Talks, Ethnograpic & 
Participant Observations 
Civil Society Structured Interviews 
Fishing-Related 
Industry 
Semi-structured Interviews, 
Informal Talks, Ethnograpic & 
Participant Observations, Focus 
Groups 
Documentary Shooting 
Fishery Semi-structured Interviews, 
Informal Talks, Ethnograpic & 
Participant Observations, Focus 
Groups 
Table 3.2: Data collection techniques used on the field, for the diverse groups of stakeholders I addressed. Unplanned-in-advance research techniques in italics and underscored 
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Before moving to the core discussion of the data, I describe the several challenges 
I encountered on the islands in terms of data collection and the strategies I deployed 
to overcome them – often turning these challenges into investigative opportunities.   
 
3.2. Rethinking data collection techniques 
Here I map the most significant epistemological barriers that obliged me to rethink 
data collection techniques throughout my fieldwork, together with a description of 
the strategies I implemented in order to overcome them. Most of these difficulties 
refer exclusively to Lampedusa. In addition to the fact that Lampedusa was the island 
where I spent most of the months of my fieldwork, the local community in Lampedusa 
seemed to experience greater tensions than any I could detect in Fuerteventura. 
 
3.2.1. ‘Yes we live on the border but please, do not ask us about it!’ 
As one of the most direct manifestations of the Lampedusa’s centrality within the 
building and showing of the European external border, a major complication I 
encountered in Lampedusa derived from the intrusive academic and media presence 
on the island - to which I was also, of course, participating. Such an unusual condition 
for an isolated and tiny population interfered intensely with locals’ attitudes towards 
those coming to the isle to carry on investigations of any sort – more or less 
indifferently from them being journalists, activists or academics. When I landed on 
the island there were already several other researchers/activists/Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) members: all of them working on local boat-migrant related 
issues. Yet, such intrusive attention was interpreted by the islanders as neglecting 
their own experience, which understandably provoked some annoyance and 
reluctance to answer those asking about the European external border and boat-
migrants. I immediately realized that I had to distinguish myself from the rest of 
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researchers in Lampedusa so that I would be more likely to be welcomed by locals. 
When I landed on the island, this was a main concern: to avoid being seen as yet 
another researcher studying the workings of the European external border in 
Lampedusa, as this would have surely reduced the quality of data that I could collect 
on the island. 
In light of these initial worries, over the first weeks I intentionally avoided 
addressing local migrant-related issues with potential interviewees. Rather, my first 
talks and contacts concentrated exclusively around the impact of the CFP on the local 
fishery, allowing me to overcome, to some degree, the initial distrust that my 
questions may have generated. Although this was not quite the case – as the border 
was central for my analysis – I knew that was only a temporary arrangement for me 
to improve the quality of my investigation. In fact, since I knew that I was going to 
pass the winter on the island, I was also aware that I could come back to discuss with 
the same interviewees migration-related issues once I had gained people’s trust and 
when most of the journalists and other researchers had left the island. In fact, when 
winter came and sea conditions worsened, boat-migrants’ arrivals dramatically 
decreased and so did the salience of the island for the national and international 
media and academic communities.  This provided a more reasonable time for me to 
then be talking to the communities about issues related to the border. 
 
3.2.2. One sea, several worlds: local fishery as a segmented reality 
Another technical concern regarded fishers’ contradictory accounts of specific events. 
What I found confusing were the several inconsistent accounts told by the same 
individual. This puzzling phenomenon made it difficult to obtain a consistent picture 
of how specific local dynamics actually took place. Yet it also constituted a form of 
data itself, as it reflected a series of distinctive features of the world of the fishery. 
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Besides the fact that people may often hold quite contradictory and capricious views 
of the reality they live in, small local fishing communities are often characterized by a 
high degree of segmentation, both in terms of individual and group interests – for 
instance, based on different approaches to fishing (Jacobs et al., 2001). 
Moreover, for those fishers who pass a long time on the sea, the sea was often 
framed as their exclusive space, as if there was no way for non-fishermen to really 
understand it. Such an elitist perspective was challenged by my questions and 
curiosity, even more so when touching upon sensitive topics such as illegal fishing, or 
dangerous situations experienced at sea. Thus, during the initial months in 
Lampedusa, fishers’ reaction to my sometimes-thorny queries was often to try to 
confuse me even more, in an attempt to somehow keep me away from their sea 
(Festing, 1977) – and their knowledge. It has to be understood that the Sicilian channel 
and, in particular, that part of sea with Lampedusa in the middle, was a space crossed 
by several international illicit activities – drug trafficking, smuggling, human 
trafficking, and weapons smuggling for instance– with many actors involved – not 
least Sicilian and other regional mafias (Aronowitz, 2001; Ben-Yehoyada, 2011). 
Moreover, the fishery itself was a work activity characterized by a high degree of 
illegality (Agnew et al., 2009). Consequently, fishers would unlikely be sincere with 
me, in our initial interactions at least.  
This was a situation that I did not find in Fuerteventura, where there seemed to be 
much less to hide about what was happening in the sea. Also, the local fishery was 
much more organized and monitored in Fuerteventura than it was in Lampedusa, so 
that a much smaller degree of illegal activities characterized the local professional 
fishers’ work environment.  
Moreover, it must also be considered that artisanal fishery is a varied job sector 
where apparently very similar fishing vessels fish diverse species by using different 
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fishing techniques, in various areas of the sea and at different times of the day and 
the year. This meant that, despite the fact that fishing vessels often looked similar 
amongst themselves while anchored along the piers, fishermen experienced very 
different work realities, consequently producing partly diverse accounts of life at  sea. 
The contradictory narratives that I heard often complicated my initial 
understanding of the most basic dynamics characterizing the complex reality of the 
fishery I was observing and analyzing for the first time in my life. However, aiming to 
overcome these confusing discrepancies, while also considering them as a central set 
of data, I took the chance of asking very similar questions and discussed the same 
issue from diverse angles, more and more often with the same person and in different 
contexts: informally at the bar, at the fish warehouse, being alone or among other 
fishermen, and then more formally during the interviews. I used these repeat 
interviews as ‘a strategy to enhance the level of comfort of the participants and 
therefore the breadth and depth of the information provided by them’ (Birks et al., 
2007: 152). I had turned the segmented and sometimes contradictory dimension of 
life on the island into an opportunity to deepen and refine my investigation over time, 
while simultaneously building my understanding of fishers’ daily lives and experiences 
in light of those very contradictions. 
  
3.2.3. Opening the study: how to include women participants 
As expected, on both islands, work on board fishing vessels was a male-only job 
sector: in other words, I could not meet any woman who actually embarked as part of 
any of the fishing crews I addressed. When Lampedusa’s fish canning industry started 
rapidly declining in the 1990s – as I discuss in the next chapters – women began losing 
their jobs in the local fishing industry (Taranto, 2012). Thus, in order to recognize the 
broader community on the island, in Lampedusa I interviewed workers of the two 
61  
 
canning industries still operating, together with others who were forced to leave this 
sector when most local factories had closed down. As for Gran Tarajal, I failed to 
include women, given that the local fishermen’s association I worked with was 
exclusively male. Apart from the association’s secretary, on the island women were 
largely excluded from the sector (see also De la Paz, 2012). 
 
While I was able to turn many of these difficulties into opportunities to refine and 
deepen my collection of data, as I explain in the following section, there were also a 
series of other limitations that I could not overcome. 
 
3.3. The limits of the investigation 
The most important limitations of my study refer to the investigative challenges 
outlined above. The scarce cooperation of both the Coastguard and the other law 
enforcement officials in Lampedusa entailed a series of further obstructions to my 
data collection. The obstinate refusals of the local high commands to collaborate – 
and to allow any of their subordinates to do so – was partly circumvented by 
addressing officials with informal talks or conducting ethnographic observations. 
However, the institutional unwillingness to collaborate also meant that I was not able 
to get official permission to embark on professional fishing vessels. Nevertheless, in 
the last weeks of my stay in the island I finally went fishing twice - with no permit and 
thus at my own risk. Yet, the non-collaborative attitude of the authorities nonetheless 
limited my access to official documents and reports such as, for instance, those 
regarding local fishers’ main recorded misconducts. 
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3.3.1. Ethical concerns 
I obtained consent for the interviews verbally. As for informal talks, before gathering 
any data I made sure the interlocutor was aware of the purposes of my presence on 
the islands and thus of my research. However, I also gathered information by listening 
to other people’s conversations, for example, a group of police officers spending their 
free time on one of Lampedusa’s beaches. On that occasion, I heard sensitive 
information regarding forthcoming departures of migrants’ boats from the Libyan 
coasts. This data represented a key information source to understand better the 
workings of the border around Lampedusa. However, it was also a form of “stolen” 
data, but, due to non-cooperation from the authorities, I simply could not gather this 
data in any other way. 
Furthermore, the impossibility to get any permit to embark on professional fishing 
vessels generated a further ethical concern. I had to decline the invitations of 
professional fishermen that wanted to take me aboard without a permit. This was, to 
my understanding, an excessive risk for them to take as they could be fined for having 
me aboard. Consequently, the only possibility remaining for me to observe fishers at 
work was to go on fishing vessels that went fishing illegally. During winter, when the 
bad sea conditions allowed only few days of fishing per month, professional fishermen 
often claimed unemployment benefit, self-reporting that they were no longer fishing. 
However, when the weather allowed, they fished illegally with leisure boats and by 
not declaring their catches. By embarking with them I gained insights into both illegal 
and professional fishing at once – both dimensions of the same job reality I was 
observing. However, I was also aware that my presence on the vessel was at the same 
time facilitating their illegal activity so far that, by having me aboard helping with their 
fishing, they could embark more catch without running any actual legal risk while at 
the sea. Indeed, recreational fishing vessels – what these vessels officially claimed to 
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be – could legally embark up to five kilograms of catch per person on board. 
Nevertheless, I decided to go for the collection of data anyway, being convinced that 
those transgressive conducts I was observing would have taken place in any case, with 
or without me on board the vessel.  
As a result of these concerns, I avoid using the actual names of interviewees and 
participants that I saw and observed conducting illegal activities. Moreover, besides 
asking for verbal consent, I also asked if interviewees wanted their names to be 
explicitly included in the thesis. Consequently, individuals’ names reported 
throughout the text are both actual and pseudonyms. However it is clear that in such 
tiny locations as the villages where I conducted my study, contextual data could lead 
locals to understand who many interviewees really were. When similar conditions 
applied, asking for verbal consent to the interviewees (Power, 1989; Moore, 1993) I 
also made clear to them that by allowing me to use the interviewees’ data, I was also 
automatically disclosing his/her very identity to locals – no matter whether or not I 
faked his/her name. 
 
By using such a varied and articulated set of data collection techniques, I had access 
to a significant amount of in-depth information. From this base, the following chapters 
analyse how European governance had changed the fishers’ lives in both Lampedusa 
and Fuerteventura, starting by introducing the history of both overseas territories up 
until they became part of the EU.    
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4. LIFE BEFORE THE EU 
‘There were mountains of fish on the pavement, on the street, inside the factory. And my mum would yell, “Take the fish! Bring it here!”’ (Maria, retired worker of the bluefish canning industry in Lampedusa)  
Before exploring how the European Union (EU) changed everyday life on both islands 
I will locate these two remote European territories historically, providing a brief 
overview of the history of the local fisheries in Fuerteventura and Lampedusa. My 
account of the history of Lampedusa ends when, in the 1970s, the initial pillars of the 
Common Fishery Policy - CFP, such as the establishment of a common market for 
European fish and the first structural policies, were introduced (da Conceição-Heldt, 
2004). My pre-EU-history of Fuerteventura ends later, when Spain joined the EU in 
the 1980s. Given that the major focus of my study is on Lampedusa, I provide more 
historical data about this island compared to Fuerteventura. 
 
4.1. Lampedusa: an island in the middle of the Mediterranean 
Due to institutional neglect, no relevant official archives exist today on Lampedusa. 
When I asked for official documents on the Italian island, institutional as well as non-
institutional actors repeated that all archives were burnt in a series of fires. The 
following overview of the history of the island thus mixes data from the few texts and 
documents I collected, either on the island or outside of it – mainly at the University 
of Palermo – and also from the oral histories that locals shared with me.  
One major source of this data came from Nino, a 63 year-old architect from Naples, 
who owned a private gallery in Lampedeusa, and who was the son of a Lampedusan 
seaman. Given his passion for his ancestors’ island, for more than 40 years Nino had 
collected historical objects or documents relating to Lampedusa. When he retired as 
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an architect in 2007, he decided to open a small gallery and establish the Historical 
Archive of the Lampedusa Cultural Association, which counted more than 50 
members in 2012. Since the first time we met, Nino repeatedly told me that if it was 
not for him and a few others, there would have remained no trace of the past of the 
island. The archive is a sort of permanent library and a gallery where Nino exhibited 
historical photos and images of Lampedusa, screened historical videos about the 
island and sold artistic souvenirs. Carefully taking off from below his desk a showcase 
containing a small silver coin with the inscription of a tuna, he told me: 
There is evidence that already during the fourth century B.C., Greeks 
established on Lampedusa where they coined currency like this one… Later… in 
994 AD the Saracens governed the island: according to a census of the time, 
islanders were all Muslims… I am talking of about 1,000 people that, 
supposedly, were living off fishing and agriculture.  
As discovered by the English archaeologist Thomas Ashby (1911) during his two 
day visit of the island in 1909, local tracks of human settlements dated back to the 
Neolithic period (Radi, 1972; Leighton, 1999). Lampedusa’s location always made the 
island both a natural safe port of refuge as well as a strategic outpost in the middle of 
the Mediterranean. The Pelagic archipelago, whose major island is Lampedusa, also 
became a battle ground, and a land for corsairs interested in disrupting and making 
profits out of the trade between North Africa and Sicily. After the island became a 
Bourbon possession in the 15th century, it transformed into the target for the famous 
Turkish corsair Dragut, whose stronghold was in the Tunisian town of Mahdia - the 
closest North African port to Lampedusa (Formentini, 1999).  
In the 19th century, Bernardo Sanvisente, the first governor of Lampedusa, wrote: 
‘there is unquestionable evidence that the island was inhabited by several ancient 
peoples. […] Here we found Sicilian […] Arabic, Turkish, Venetian, French and Maltese 
coins’ (Taranto, 2012: 5). It is not by chance that the most important religious site on 
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the island is the sanctuary of Our Lady of Porto Salvo, the Preserver of all the people 
of the sea. The sanctuary is nothing more than a cave, already in use in the 14th 
century, that worked as an interreligious space shared by both Muslims and 
Christians. Following centuries under many diverse dominations, in 1843, the 
Bourbons who, at that time, ruled the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, finally took full 
command of Lampedusa. Bernardo Sanvisente arrived on the island that same year 
with the intention to make Lampedusa an agricultural colony: soon he started to bring 
people there – 90 men and 30 women – mostly peasants and artisans, with the 
promise of plots of land to cultivate (Mancini, 1978). However, in 1860 Italy was 
unified and the Spanish had to leave.  
In 1872, under the control of the Italian kingdom, the island became a penal 
colony. Given the isolation of Lampedusa, detainees could spend the daytime moving 
freely on the island and socialising with locals. As one of the first actions taken by 
Italian authorities over the local population, they revoked the islanders’ land property 
rights that they had been granted by the Bourbons. Consequently, locals’ life 
conditions started deteriorating immediately and the scarcely successful agricultural 
history of Lampedusa soon ended (Taranto, 2012). However, around 15 years later, 
the fishing history of Lampedusa began when, in 1887, a fisherman from Trapani – a 
fishing town in the north west of Sicily – discovered a school of sponges just off the 
shores of the island. Chronicles from the following years speak of tens of Greek, 
Turkish, Tunisian and Sicilian surface-supplied divers and wooden sailing fishing 
vessels – trabbàcoli (see Plate 4.1) -  moving to Lampedusa to start fishing the valuable 
catch. The few wealthy Lampedusans bought their own smaller vessels and also 
started fishing sponges to sell them in the busy markets of the North of Italy (Mancini, 
1978; Taranto, 2012).  
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Plate 4.1: Disused Trabbàcoli in Lampedusa’s old port beach (Roghi, 1954) 
 
In 1888, other shoals were found in the waters surrounding the smallest of the 
three islands of the archipelago, the uninhabited rock of Lampione. Other vessels, 
especially from Greece and Dalmatia – corresponding to todays’ southern Croatia – 
soon joined. Besides the actual fishing, plenty of islanders were employed on land to 
treat raw sponges and transform them into marketable goods. The economy of 
Lampedusa begun to flourish at an unprecedented speed. Nevertheless, Italian 
authorities continued to neglect the archipelago and Lampedusa, pushing its booming 
industry away from the islands. The lack of a telegraphic cable connecting the 
archipelago to mainland Sicily encouraged sponge fishing entrepreneurs to move 
southward and base their activities in what is  today the Tunisian coast town of Sfax, 
but which was then part of the Ottoman Empire (Mancini, 1978). At the time, in light 
of the Italian-Tunisian friendship and the trade and navigation agreement of 1868, 
Sicilian fishers had full rights to fish in Tunisian waters and use the country’s ports and 
beaches without any licence. In fact, given that thousands of Italians – and in 
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particular Sicilians – lived in Tunisia and fished from there, the agreement provided 
them free access to fish resources in Tunisian waters. Then, in 1881, following the 
French invasion of North Africa, Tunisia, Italy and France renewed the treaty that 
continued to operate until Mussolini’s regime declared war on France in 1940 (Medici, 
1991; Messina, 1993).   
Giovanni was 86 years-old and possibly the most respected fisherman and captain 
of the island. He remembered these times: 
What I can tell you about the fishing of sponges does not come from my direct memories: I was just a little kid by then. However, also my father owned one of these wooden sailing fishing vessels they used for sponges… Locals used to go fish in Tunisia, in Sfax: there were many Lampedusans based there… Depending on the conditions of the sea, we spent entire weeks and months in the Sfax lagoon… Nevertheless, we overfished our sponges so that it became much harder to find them, while many of us started working from Tunisia: later, they invented the artificial sponges and we had no more market to sell natural ones.  
Soon the fishing of sponges declined and Lampedusa had to look for alternative 
sources of income. Meanwhile, if on the one hand the island experienced the neglect 
of national as well as regional authorities, Lampedusa never really stopped playing a 
national strategic role for mainland Italy, functioning as an open-air jail. At the end of 
the First World War, political prisoners were detained on Lampedusa (Procacci, 2006) 
and, during Mussolini’s regime, the number of political prisoners on the island 
increased (Ebner, 2011).  
Professor Giovanni Fragapane, a 78 year-old Lampedusan, was the mayor of the 
island between 1983 and 1993. He had worked as fisherman, then as a local secondary 
school professor and, later he became a well-known painter with exhibitions across 
Italy. When he invited me to his place for a talk, he explained the fascist past of 
Lampedusa: 
For more than 70 years, prisoners of any sort – mainly political ones – were sent to Lampedusa and confined here… Prisoners on the island could move freely during the day and I remember that there was close interaction with locals. 
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[There were no problems among detainees and islanders:] maybe someone of us learned to read and write, since also intellectuals were confined here… Even Gramsci had to come to Lampedusa before he was finally assigned to the island of Ustica. 
The substantial lack of infrastructure on the island confirmed the Lampedusans’ 
marginality within the frame of Italian politics but, at the same time, Lampedusa had 
maintained a strategic value for the government in Rome to house political dissidents. 
The strategic use of the island by the national authorities became even more 
prominent during the Second World War when Lampedusa was quickly militarized 
with more than 4,000 soldiers and a variety of military facilities being placed there.  
In the immediate post-war period, Lampedusa suffered the enormous damages 
brought by the war and Lampedusans continued feeling neglected by the Italian 
authorities. Life in the island again became very difficult. The land had been 
impoverished by one decade of intensive farming and deforestation, and it could no 
longer provide enough food for locals to live a comfortable life. Moreover, the open 
sea surrounding Lampedusa was too rough to fish with the locals’ small fishing vessels 
for the whole year. 
However, besides the many sponges in Lampedeusa’s waters, it was clear to 
everyone that Lampedusa’s seawaters were also extremely rich in fish and, in 
particular, bluefish. During the decades when sponge fishing represented by far the 
most valuable and, consequently, the main fishery of the island, occasional bluefish 
fishing – especially of round sardinella – had also contributed to local sustenance. Yet, 
these could only be fished when the sea conditions were stable, as with good sea 
conditions, locals who did not embark on the big sponge-fishing sailing fishing vessels 
would use their small boats to fish for the abundant shoals of bluefish surrounding 
the island. Local women would salt the catches on land, and salted fish provided basic 
nutrition for islanders over the lean winter months, while the surplus was sold in the 
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rest of Italy - mostly the north of Italy – travelling on board the big wooden sailing 
boats that transported sponges to the mainland. Giovanni explained:  
The first fishery on Lampedusa was round sardinella fishing. [When the sponge fishing boomed we] kept fishing the round sardinella as well as other species of bluefish: we salted the catches and what we did not consume on the island was taken to Trieste with the big sailing sponge fishing vessels from there. They sailed across the Sicilian Channel first and then the Adriatic…. A very rich man from Trieste, Mister Lusic, owned that ruined warehouse that you can see on the other side of the port: there he salted the fish that then he took to Trieste.  
Once the war and sponges had ended, some of the richer families from outside the 
island who had been fishing sponges sensed the new possible profit: the bluefish 
catch. Soon, tens of steam fishing vessels began reaching Lampedusa. Nino explained: 
Although locals from decades made up their diet also relying on the abundant bluefish found even into the port waters, it was as if all of a sudden people discovered that Lampeusa was rich in bluefish - especially mackerel… It was during the years following the end of the Second World War when tens of engine-driven vessels reached the island from all over Italy and mainly from Trieste: fishermen fished here and then they navigated to mainland Sicily – especially to Catania – were they sold their catches. Then, they returned to Lampedusa. 
Giovanni remembered these vessels coming from outside. Once again, given their 
difficult economic situation, locals could not afford to buy large vessels like these. He 
continued:  
Initially – or, at least, since when I remember – there were a few fishing steamboats… We were not used to see these kind of boats coming here to fish. They weighted some 200 tons and they were made of steel! 
Lampedusa had begun a new chapter of local economic development, but also a 
new kind of socio cultural history: the island was becoming ‘The Mackerel Island’ 
(Roghi, 1954). 
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4.1.1 Lampedusa ‘The Mackerel Island’13 
The legacy of this Lampedusa, whose economy was entirely devoted to the fishing and 
canning of bluefish, was still very much vivid and present on the island. This was the 
Lampedusa that preceded the European accession of Italy. In 1954, the popular Italian 
journalist and diver, Gianni Roghi (1954: 56), wrote: 
If God had not created mackerel […] Lampedusa would not exist. To say it better, only the island of Lampedusa would exist [but not Lampedusans]: it would be just a flat surface high over the sea as an immense slab lacking of any tree or rivulet. Nevertheless, there would certainly not be the village and its 4,000 inhabitants.  
Less than one decade after the Second World War, Lampedusa had already 
transformed and its economy started to grow. As soon as the first big and new engine-
powered fishing vessels reached the island and started to fish the abundant bluefish, 
canning factories appeared on Lampedusa. Celona and Camparetto (2009: 119) say 
that across the 1960s and 1970s, 25 canning factories operated on the island. Their 
main products were ‘oily mackerels, salty anchovies and sardines […]’. Giovanni 
remembers more than 50 factories working on the island in the 1950s.  
In November 2012, I interviewed Vincenzo, the owner and manager of the only 
aquaculture plant on the island - Acquacultura Lampedusa Ltd. Before Vincenzo 
started investing in aquaculture he used to work in the family business that was one 
of the most important local canning factories. He told me: 
The island economy relied entirely on the canning industry. Imagine that there were six to seven factories… three of which were quite well structured, while the others were basically run by families.  
The number and nature of canning industries active in Lampedusa differs, probably 
due to the fact that numerous families ran factories informally inside garages or their 
homes and sold their cans to other local established firms. Thus, it is very difficult to 
                                                          
13 The expression appears in Italian as the title of an article of 1954 written by the Italian journalist and diver Gianni Roghi after he went back from a visit on the island (Roghi, 1954). 
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get any precise figure: however, what it is important is that such an industry provided 
jobs for many islanders for decades.  
In January 2013 I met Maria and Angelina, two workers – one of whom was retired 
- of the island’s canning industry, both in their early sixties. I was visiting a friend who 
ran an informal business as hairdresser at his home. Maria was there for her haircut 
while my friend’s mother, Angelina, joined us unexpectedly. They were both very keen 
to tell me about their lives spent working at the canning factories: 
Angelina: I used to go working in the canning factories when I was a kid. I worked in a factory of a man from Trapani. 
Maria: I remember as well when, as kids, we had to go helping our mothers, taking off the heads the anchovies… 
Angelina: Fishermen brought their catches while kids took them to the mothers using a small piece of wood that the bosses gave us… By then every man of the island went fishing! 
Maria: During the good season, they went fishing every day. Catches were always available. There was even too much fish at times. Fishers went fishing on the evenings, and the following morning they returned back to land where they sold all the fish they had on board of their vessels.   
The local canning industry was flourishing, employing almost the entirety of the 
local population. Not only were men busy all over the good season fishing bluefish, 
throughout the same months, local women also worked full-time in the canning 
industries, together with their children. This is Giancarlo, a local retired fisherman: 
Bluefish provided jobs for the whole island and to entire families – and I am talking of families counting seven to ten kids each. Mothers used to leave home with their kids to go to the factories all together to can the catches. There were those who took fish’s heads away, those that put fish into the cans, and those who filled them with olive oil. 
The picture Giancarlo provides about the local canning industry was partial, and, 
in fact, fishing on the island was more complex and not limited to oily mackerel. As we 
have seen, local industries canned also great quantities of salty anchovies and 
sardines. This, according to Angelina and Maria, is how it would work: 
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Angelina: Our mothers… took fishes’ and interiors away. Then they put anchovies into the cans in layers: one layer of anchovies and one of salt. Once they filled the whole can, they closed it… As for mackerels, once they took off the fishes’ heads they put fish into crates… they washed them, they boiled them and then fish had to be left cooling down for some hours.  
Maria: Once the fish was cold, women begun to take off the fillets and put them into the cans. This stage of the manufacturing used to happen at around three in the morning. After all the cans were ready, it was enough to pour olive oil and seal them.  
According to Enzo – a local fisherman and assessor for Lampedusa’s fishery - 
fishermen and industries on the island coordinated their works: when there was too 
much catch, fishers stopped fishing to allow industries to can the fish. At this time, it 
seems that the seawaters surrounding Lampedusa were perceived as a bottomless pit 
providing an endless supply of bluefish. Vincenzo explained: 
It was spectacular when… boats came back from fishing… They had catches everywhere… and they navigated with their decks at the water level [- see Plate 4.2.] The island lived exclusively out of these fishes: I remember as if it was yesterday when my father bought 120 tons of mackerel. It is an enormous quantity of catch that we could not boil using our six industrial boilers… Unfortunately, there were no freezing facilities on the island so that we had to boil the fish before it went bad. Therefore, we decided to salt half of the catches and to oil the remaining 60 tons… I do remember mountains of fish over the docks. 
Just like for the canning entrepreneurs, vessel owners came mainly from outside 
the island: however, non-islanders needed locals on board with their knowledge of 
the island’s seawaters – and the cheap price of their workforce – in order to 
successfully exploit the island’s resources. Giovanni explained: 
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Plate 4.2: One of the overloaded small boats with which Lampeudsa’s fishermen brought back to land their catches (Roghi, 1954) 
 
Up to the 1950s we had boats for fishing by lamplight: there was no mechanical gear and we both rowed and sailed since they had no engine… When… these boats began to disappear, what we call ciancioli [actual purse seine fishing boat] substituted them: it was still fishing, but it was a mechanized fishery. It was not anymore the manual lampara fishing.  
The old vessels owned by locals could only work with very calm sea conditions. 
Another of the oldest local fishers, Nicola, explained what it was like to go fishing with 
these boats:  
We used to fish with our rowboats: these small vessels had four oars. We went fishing even around Lampione [the third island of the archipelago located 18 nautical miles – 33 kilometres – west from Lampedusa]. Later, when the lamp fishing boats came, they had eight oars. 
Engine powered purse seine vessels, by requiring less workforce aboard, could also 
go fishing more often. Given the dimension of their hulls, they could also stay longer 
at sea and they could fish in more adverse sea conditions. Up to 20 men worked on 
board these vessels. They were the captain, an engineer, a lead fisherman and the 
rest of the fishers. Once the vessels returned to the island, they started selling their 
catches. 
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Trade happened along the docks and in front of several of the canning industries 
that were disposed along the shores of the port (see Plate 4.3). The selling of fish 
represented one of the most important daily activities of the island. Vincenzo 
remembers that morning ritual: 
 
Plate 4.3: Catches disposed along the docks of Lampedusa’s old port. On the right lower corner of the photo, it is possible to spot also children apparently busy (Roghi, 1954) 
 
There was a market on the island [between the 1950s and the 1970s]. Every morning the fish auction took place along the dock! The auctioneer stood on the platform while fishers remained on board of their boat, just below the dock and their fish displayed there. They showed their fish crates: this was not really to show the quality of the catches… It was rather about showing the size of mackerels - whether they were large or small - because that was what made a difference… Indeed, at that time we used five kilogram cans [as the] minimum size. Around the 1960s, we worked also with cans of one-fifth – 200 grams – as well as of 500 grams. However, not all of us entrepreneurs had the machinery to seal cans of these sizes. Thus when catches abounded you normally went for mackerels of the right size to fit the five kilograms cans. 
As I have said, the selling of catches was possibly the most important moment of 
the day for fishers: good peddling meant more money throughout the year. Once the 
industrialist paid them for their catches, the members of the fishing vessel’s crew 
77  
 
divided the earnings. This happened according to a very articulated but well-
established system (Roghi, 1954).  
After a few weeks spent on Lampedusa, while trying to gather a detailed historical 
account of Lampedusa’s fishery, I went to visit 90 year-old Graziella. Considered by 
many on the island as the local living historical archive, I went to collect at least some 
of her memories. She came from a relatively rich local family and she described to me 
how money from catches of bluefish was divided among fishers and lead fishermen:  
Those women working in the canning industries came from poor families or, at least, they were not rich. The others like me worked as bookkeepers. I used to work for my father who owned a fishing vessel. I had to cash up for everything concerning the vessels and its workers: I transferred money to pay fishers’ welfare… It was not so easy to keep everything right: the captain took one part, while the other 15 fishers got one 15th each. The point is that depending on each fisher’s experience and task on board, I had to vary the value of each 15th. 
Once the vessels’ operational costs were subtracted from the sale, half of the 
remaining money went to the captain who, given the small size of Lampedusa’s 
vessels, often corresponded to the vessel owner. The rest was divided equally among 
the remaining members of the crew, applying some slight variation for those four 
fishers undertaking the most complex operations (Brignone, 1971). Only a few 
contested this well-established system that was in use for decades. Fishermen were 
more than literally “on the same boat” and they knew that if they did not fish enough, 
none - including the captain - would have had any decent gain (Roghi, 1954). 
Once the oily and salty fish had been canned, industrials sent the cans to the rest 
of Italy and, as for sponges, they tended to be sent to the north of the country. 
However, despite its flourishing canning industry, Italian authorities continued to 
neglect Lampedusa. For example, electricity only reached the island in 1951 with the 
building of a local power station. This allowed the installation of an icemaker machine 
of extreme importance to conserve the catches. However, until the late 1960s, the 
78  
 
island had no drainage system, schools or hospital, and the ship connecting 
Lampedusa to the rest of Sicily came only twice a week (Taranto, 2012). Following 
locals’ protests against their perception of government disengagement with the 
island, in 1966 the Italian Ministry of the Interior came to Lampedusa and, in the 
following year, the island was provided with both telephone and television 
connections. Finally, in 1968 the local airport was built and inaugurated (Mancini, 
1978). This was the beginning of a new chapter of the island’s history and of the 
destiny of its fishery: as much faster and reliable connections with the mainland were 
now available, tourists started to discover Lampedusa as a possible holiday 
destination. The island economy started transforming accordingly as an increasing 
number of fishing vessel and canning industry owners began building new tourist 
facilities, rather than keep investing in the local fishery sector.    
 
4.2. Fuerteventura: a piece of Sahara between Americas and the ‘best [fishing 
ground] in the universe’14 
Fuerteventura was first colonised by North Africans approximately 2,000 years ago 
(González-Reimers et al., 2001). Later, According to Cruz (2005), Mediterranean 
civilisations preceding the Roman Empire, and African peoples living around the Niger 
River, as well as in the Fouta Jallon and Ivory Coast, would fish the Saharan shoal just 
60 to 80 kilometres off of Fuerteventura. Around the 15th century, the Spanish, 
together with other European powers of the time – such as the Portuguese – reached 
the archipelago. The islands and, especially, Fuerteventura as the closest to the 
African coast, were of interest to the newcomers for a variety of reasons: the first, but 
not the only, being its rich source of fish. Following the 16th century and the full 
                                                          
14 Galindo, J. A. (2005) The History of the Discovery and Conquest of the Canary Islands. London: Elibron Classic. 
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conquest of the archipelago by the Spanish crown, the islands started to serve as a 
hub for the Spanish trade in slaves and goods between Africa and America. To 
undertake the long Atlantic crossings, a supply of local fish was essential. By being 
relatively cheap, salty fish constituted a valuable nutrient capable of not spoiling for 
weeks and months at sea (Kurlansky, 1998). At that time, for most Europeans, the 
Saharan shoal dividing the island of Fuerteventura from mainland Africa constituted 
possibly the richest fishing ground they had ever found (Santana Pérez, 2012).  
As a consequence, in the 16th century, catches coming from this extremely rich fish 
ground became fundamental to the archipelago’s economy in order to provide 
nutrient-rich salty fish to enable travel to other Spanish colonies in Latin America 
(Cruz, 2005; Guerra, 2002). Fuerteventura itself, however, did not benefit much from 
this new economic development. Contemporarily, Las Palmas of Gran Canary and 
Santa Cruz of Tenerife were by far the main economic centres of the archipelago. 
Despite Fuerteventura’s geography, those staying in Fuerteventura lived mostly in the 
centre of the island, far from the sea. Hidden in land among the dry hills and extinct 
volcanos, locals made their living from goats and agriculture, protecting themselves 
from the frequent incursions of pirates coming from the African coast (Encinas, 1979).   
More than one century later in 1764, the English mariner George Glas (1976) wrote 
that the sea dividing Fuerteventura from mainland Africa was certainly the richest of 
the universe. He also provided a detailed description of the local fishery and of how it 
used to work: if ship owners provided vessels, salt and food provisions, fishers had to 
bring their own lines, hooks, and fishing tools. As for Mediterranean fisheries – and 
similar to what I have described for Lampedusa - fishers, boat owners and captains 
divided the profits according to previously established criteria. At that time, locals 
went fishing on small sailing boats made of wood which were shorter than five meters 
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and equipped only with a small triangular sail. Remaining close to the coast, they 
easily fished groupers and other species nowadays considered high value. 
Fuerteventura’s fishery was certainly among the poorest of the archipelago. Most of 
the island’s fishers diversified their sources of sustenance to such a point where many 
of them could in fact be considered as peasants: consequently, the time they spent at 
sea was limited (Glas, 1976). 
Moving forward to the middle of the 19th century, after centuries of relative 
neglect, the Spanish Bourbon rulers decided to invest in the archipelago and begin to 
build the first ports. After centuries of domination, the islands could only count on the 
myriad of natural bays and refuges scattered along their coasts. Despite the centrality 
that ports had for such an archipelago whose main function for the Spanish distant 
authority was to serve as a hub for trade and fishery, port facilities were not built 
before, mainly for two reasons. On a very practical level, the crown had scarce 
resources for building them. Moreover, the presence of ports would have exposed the 
archipelago to pirate raids. Nevertheless, Gran Canary and Tenerife got their first 
ports in 1851, and the other islands waited until the beginning of the 20th century. Yet, 
in 1852, the Bourbons declared the main ports – natural as well as artificial - of the 
seven islands – including the one of Porto del Rosario in Fuerteventura – free ports - 
generating a transformation that many see as giving birth to the contemporary Canary 
Islands from both an economic and a social point of view (Perdomo, 2002).  
When in 1862 the treaty on trade between Morocco and Spain ratified the full 
exploitation rights of the Spanish on the Saharan shoal, once again Fuerteventura 
benefited only marginally from the advantages deriving from the fishing activity taking 
place just in front of the island’s shores. In the second half of the 19th century, fishery 
in the archipelago did grow to include 80 vessels, providing jobs for 170 families (Bas 
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et al., 1995). As for the past, once the internal demand for fish was satisfied, all the 
remaining catches were salted. Given the substantial lack of infrastructure, 
Fuerteventura’s fishers could only access the internal market and they struggled to 
reach the interior of the island where most people lived (Cruz, 2005). Even when the 
Spanish Crown begun subsidizing fishery at the end of 19th century, local fishers – from 
both Fuerteventura and the entire archipelago – received very little benefit. In fact, 
financial transfers from the central state were set mostly to satisfy the need of 
mainland Spanish fisheries obliged to move southwards to fish after their access to 
the North American fishing grounds of Newfoundland became increasingly difficult 
(Lear, 1998). 
Besides the many fishing vessels coming from mainland Spain, for decades the 
Canary Islands’ fisheries already had to compete in their seawaters with other 
European fishing fleets, and mainly the French whose colonies were present on the 
opposite African coast (Cruz, 2005). At the same time, other Europeans also started 
to fish on the Saharan shoal. It was thanks to these newcomers that the local fishing-
related industry begun moving away from the production of salty fish and towards the 
more remunerative and growing trend for canning. Furthermore, during the two 
World Wars, due to the militarisation of European seas, other European fishing 
vessels, unable to operate on their usual fishing grounds, moved southwards towards 
the famously rich Saharan sea (Cruz, 2005). At this point, apart from the two main 
port towns situated at the two major islands of the archipelago, the other islands 
continued to experience significant deprivation and hardship. Consequently, Islanders 
started to look westwards - and the sea dividing them from the Americas became a 
bridge - a vast extension of dangerous seawaters unifying the archipelago with a 
possibility for a new and more comfortable life.  
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At the beginning of the 20th century, many locals left the archipelago through two 
major emigrations coinciding with the two World Wars. First, within the first 25 years 
of the century, 154,000 locals left the islands by boats directed to Cuba and, later, 
between 1945 and 1965, another 140,000 islanders went to Venezuela (Guerra, 
2002). Most of these people emigrated to escape economic insecurity, the violence of 
the Spanish Civil War, and the political persecutions of Franco’s regime (Antón, 2005). 
Relying on seasonal winds, islanders – in particular fishermen and their families - used 
their tiny vessels to cross the entire Atlantic in very perilous journeys that could last 
more than one month (Figueroa, 1984). 
At the end of the Second World War, up to the 1970s, Gran Tarajal’s fishery - one 
of the major fisheries in the island – was just a minor local economic sector employing 
just a few people. Alvaro explained: 
Some 50 years ago, there were four or five boats here. My uncle owned one of them… You do not have to imagine anything like a fishing vessel: they were small wood rowboats of about five meters… and [fishers] used to own them… At that time, we normally went fishing alone: at the most, we took one more fisher on-board… We used to load the boat with catches quite quickly: to find fish was not the problem. The problem was that there was no market on the island… This island was poor and very little people lived here… We went fishing red mullet, and tuna. We also fished lobsters and we did not sell them. There was no way to sell lobsters! We used them to fish: they literally worked for us as baits. 
Economic conditions on the island did not change until 1956 when, coinciding with 
the Suez channel crisis, most of the world’s traffic from Asia to Europe changed route. 
Here, ships had to circumnavigate Africa so that the Canary Islands’ main ports – such 
as Las Palmas of Gran Canary and Santa Cruz of Tenerife – transformed to become 
core European commercial hubs. It was at that time when these two port cities 
expanded to an unprecedented size (Perdomo, 2002). Then, thanks to the first vessels 
capable of processing and freezing their catches on-board, between 1964 and 1975, 
the world’s fishery boomed. Local plants for the salting of fish closed down and others 
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for the canning of oily catches started to operate on several of the archipelago’s 
islands, including on Fuerteventura. Their main markets were now in Asia and Africa 
(Rodríguez, 2002). When the Fuerteventura airport began to work for civil purposes 
in 1967, catches from the island’s artisanal fishery increased, since local fishers could 
finally transport their fish by air to Las Palmas of Gran Canary and Santa Cruz of 
Tenerife (Arbelo, 1994).  
Yet for many of the villages located along Fuerteventura’s shores, fishery remained 
mainly a sustenance activity. The little portion of the catches exported from the island 
were dried or salted (Rodríguez, 2002). By the 1970s, authorities registered eight 
industrial fishing vessels and 63 artisanal fishing boats operating on the island. The 
fleet was distributed across three port towns where today the three islands’ 
fishermen associations are based: Corralejo, Gran Tarajal and Jandia. If most non-
recorded fishers on the island lived a more peasant-based lifestyle in which they 
alternated their activities to occasionally go fishing, 211 men were nonetheless 
recorded as professional fishermen in 1970. Considering that Fuerteventura’s shores 
contained the richest fishing ground of the region, the local fleet was, though, clearly 
insignificant in commercial terms. This was even more so considering that the island 
was located at the crossroads of two of the major world fishing ports of the time - Las 
Palmas of Gran Canary and Arrecife of Lanzarote. Moreover, despite the very small 
number of vessels and fishers active in Fuerteventura, internal fish consumption was 
insufficient to maintain their livelihoods. For example, in comparison to the 1,400 tons 
of fish unloaded each year on the island by the local fishing fleet, locals’ consumption 
never exceeded 200 tons a year (Cabrera, 1970).   
As for Gran Tarajal, this small fishing community located in the south of the island 
and just in front of the Saharan shoal, experienced economic conditions similar to the 
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rest of the island. While I was in Fuerteventura, I would spend a few hours a day under 
the shadow of the canopy off the local fishermen association’s main building, a few 
meters away from the docks and the fishing vessels. That was a sort of gathering point, 
especially for elder and retired local fishers, who would spend their days close to the 
sea and the fishing vessels, observing the work of the other fishermen.  
Alvaro was 63 years-old and still an active local fisher. When I asked him how 
fishing in Fuerteventura changed compared to how it was when he started, he said: 
Before [between 40 to 50 years ago] things here were completely different: there was so much fish and too little market to sell it that we fished just about 50 kilograms per day. Often, at the end of the days, we had to throw some of the catches away since we were not able to sell them and there were only few fridges on the island. 
On the island there was a limited and somewhat unorganized internal market. The 
market was small, and it was very hard to physically reach the villages of the interior. 
As Juan, a 59 year old local fisher, told me: 
Decades ago, it was sufficient to spend the morning at sea to get more than enough fish to sell… It was frequent to return on land before noon with 60 to 70 kilograms of catches… We definitely stopped fishing when we saw that we had too much of it… On the island, a donkey driver used to pass from village to village to load no more than 50 kilograms of catches and take them to the villages of the interior of the island, where most people used to live. 
What can be seen is that most people in Gran Tarajal did not live entirely from 
fishing. Despite the little rainfall on this desert island, for centuries Fuerteventura 
lived off agriculture. Indeed, in the immediate post Second World War, Gran Tarajal’s 
notables – mainly land owners – founded the first agricultural cooperative of the 
island. Initially they produced alfalfa, eggs and goat cheese and exported them to Las 
Palmas. From 1949 the cooperative began exporting tomatoes to mainland Spain and 
since then the production and export of these fruit became the main economic activity 
of the village, attracting a workforce from all over the island. By the mid-1960s, the 
cooperative started to export tomatoes further abroad where the packaging required 
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an even larger workforce, and Gran Tarajal consequently became the economic centre 
of the island (Suaréz, 2007).  
Given the booming tomato industry, Gran Tarajal’s fishery remained at the margins 
of the local economy. Yet the economic situation for its local fishers worsened in the 
late 1970s due to the political developments taking place on the African coast facing 
Fuerteventura. First, in 1973 the Moroccan state unilaterally extended the limits of its 
Exclusive Economic Zone – EEZ - up to 70 miles off its coasts, de facto reducing the 
fishing grounds accessible by Fuerteventura’s fishermen (Rodríguez, 2002). Second, in 
1975, Spain decolonized today’s Western Sahara, a territory that was under Spanish 
administration since 1884 and that was immediately occupied by its bordering 
countries, Mauritania and Morocco, as soon as the Spanish left (Jensen, 2012). Taking 
advantage of the unstable situation, after Mauritania had withdrawn its own claims, 
Morocco’s king Hassan II organised the so-called ‘Green March’ to assert the 
kingdom’s claims over the area. Despite the United Nations’ attempt to settle the 
situation through a referendum, a few weeks after the march was over the Spanish 
king announced the trilateral conference of Madrid where Mauritania, Morocco and 
Spain would decide the future of Western Sahara. On that occasion all participants 
agreed to divide the region into two administrations governed by Morocco and 
Mauritania.  
An important aspect of this agreement directly affected Fuerteventura’s fishery. 
Spain gave up its fishing rights to the Saharan sea in exchange for 35 per cent of the 
‘interest in Fosbucraa, the [700] million dollars Saharan phosphate industry’ (Frank, 
1976: 716). Since 1977, then, Morocco decided not to sign any long-term fishing 
agreements with Spain and, rather, opted for temporary and provisional 
arrangements renewed each year according to changing conditions. This 
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automatically produced uncertainty for the whole Canary Islands’ fishing sector, 
including Fuerteventura. On top of the already precarious situation, the Moroccan 
Navy begun to violently seize Spanish vessels found fishing on the Saharan shoal 
(Molina and Rey, 2002; Larramendi, 1997).  
Fishers in Gran Tarajal remembered this major transformation very well: the 
seawaters where they had fished for generations became suddenly inaccessible:  
To go fishing sardines you need similar boats to the ones you use to fish tuna: they are just smaller vessels, but very similar overall… Between here and Africa is full of sardines and consider that you need just six hours of navigation in order to reach the other shore. It was very easy to get to the other side and everyone went there to fish. Often, when we arrived to the fishing ground, five to six vessels were already fishing there. However, there was no problem sharing space and catches since there was more than enough fish for everyone… We used part of the catch to produce fishmeal. Then, we packaged and froze the other portion of these three to four tons of sardines we normally got fishing in the Saharan shoal. These frozen sardines went to the canning factory of Puerto del Rosario. The discard of the transformation – mainly fish heads – became fishmeal as well. Nevertheless, when it became impossible to go fishing out here, the only canning factory of the island almost immediately bankrupted… At least 800 people worked there, seasonally: they also used to work with tuna! Today if you go fishing to Africa they fine you and seize the vessel… If they catch you and if the ship owner is on board, they send him to jail. Those treaties represent a dark page of the history of this island: they created enormous problems for us. Across the late 1970s and the 1980s, if Moroccan Coastguard or army caught you at sea in front of Gran Tarajal, no matter whether or not you were in international waters, they just took you and your boat… Now, we paid 1,200 Euros every three months in order to fish there. Last time I went to El-Aaiún… I paid 600 Euros to dock my vessel for half a day. (Juan) 
In the lead-up to European integration, the situation for local fishers on 
Feurteventura was certainly not an easy or flourishing one. Besides the increasingly 
stringent limitations to fish on what was for centuries their main fishing ground, 
Fuerteventura’s fishermen struggled for several other internal (and partly also 
external) reasons. For example, a report about the primary economic sector on 
Fuerteventura preceding the accession of Spain to the EU describes the condition of 
the island’s fishery as characterized by a substantial organisational anarchy (Hormiga, 
1992). Since 1986, the local fishermen’s association could count on a 600 square 
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meter warehouse with a freezing room and a fridge truck. However, none of these 
facilities worked until the early 1990s, since no electric connection was available. The 
main fishing gear used by local fishers were fish-traps or, alternatively, longlines. 
Intermediaries monopolized the market: they used to wait for fishers on the beach at 
their return from the sea in order to buy their catches. While professional fishermen 
struggled to survive economically, given the very low prices offered by intermediaries, 
they also had to unfairly compete on the local market with recreational fishermen. At 
the same time, they suffered the quick decline of several local fish stocks endangered 
by the growing number of big industrial fishing vessels – European as well as non-
European – fishing illegally within the 12 miles limits of territorial waters or just 
outside of them (Hormiga, 1992). 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
Since the finding of schools of sponges, the seawaters surrounding Lampedusa 
constituted the islanders’ major source of subsistence. As for Fuerteventura, the 
islanders’ relation with the sea was not so comparably intense, since their local 
economy concentred more on agriculture and livestock. If, on the Italian island, fishery 
constituted the core economy, in Gran Tarajal fishers contributed only marginally to 
the local wealth. The significance of fishing on the two islands thus constituted 
different aspects of the sociocultural as well as economic fabric of their local 
communities. Yet, what fishers from Fuerteventura and Lampedusa had in common 
was their intense relationship with their neighbouring African coast – Tunisia and 
Western Sahara. Moreover, as inhabitants of very detached territories, both 
communities experienced first-hand the authorities’ recognition of the geostrategic 
value of their islands, combined with a substantial neglect towards islanders. Since 
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the islands had become part of Italy and Spain, the two countries exploited the 
geography of Lampedusa and Fuerteventura for internal as well as geostrategic 
political goals – i.e. with political detention in Lampedusa, or as a hub for Spanish 
colonial exploitation of the Atlantic for Fuerteventura. Simultaneously, however, 
national institutions did not consider the local populations, barely providing them 
with the most basic services and infrastructures. 
In the next three chapters I explore how the arrival of the EU brought a new 
chapter to the lives of the islanders, transforming the working of local fisheries, the 
fishers’ individualities, their relations with and use of the sea, as well as the 
sociocultural fabrics of the two communities. In the next chapter I begin to describe 
the working of European governing technologies in order to illustrate how the 
communities and individuals adapted to them. I outline the effects that EU 
governance on fishery had produced on the two islands even before the CFP entered 
officially into force, when European fisheries and fish markets were regulated under 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
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5. - THEN THE EU CAME: THE EXPANSION, INDUSTRIALISATION AND 
MODERNISATION OF THE EUROPEAN FISHING FLEET. 
‘Before there was plenty of fish but we could not afford buying the nets to fish. Once we could finally buy the nets, there was no more fish left’ (Giovanni, retired fisherman and captain in Lampedusa) 
 
As soon as big European fishing boats built with EU taxpayers’ money had reached the 
Canary Islands in the 1970s, Communitarian rules on fishery started having an impact 
on Fuerteventura’s small-scale fishery, long before the Spanish accession to the EU. 
Similarly, European norms, regulations and – most importantly – subsidies for fishery 
were applied in Italy almost three decades before the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) 
entered into force in the early 1980s. According to the Common Agricultural Policy’s 
(CAP) provisions, which included fish among the agricultural products, since the 
1950s, Communitarian subsidies began to support the European fishing industry, 
including the vessel owners whose boats had began reaching Lampedusa in significant 
numbers by that time. Despite the different timing and the dissimilar economic and 
sociocultural contexts experienced by the two fisheries, when EU governance reached 
the islands, the CFP produced very similar pressures for the small-scale fishers on both 
Lampedusa and Fuerteventura.  
In this chapter I discuss how the first generation of Communitarian rules and 
directives concerning fishery were implemented locally and show how they had 
eventually re-shaped local fishers’ daily lives. I focus on the initial phase of European 
management where fishery was regulated within the frame of the CAP. Thus I examine 
the impact of the initial wave of EU subsidies for the modernisation of the European 
fishing fleet that started in the late 1950s to end in the 1980s because of increasing 
environmental concerns. I concentrate on those small-scale fishers who temporarily 
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left their islands to embark on big industrial fishing vessels on the promise of very 
good salaries, and who returned to Lampedusa and Fuerteventura years later to invest 
their wages and work independently.  Yet, I concurrently analyse the local outcomes 
of the unprecedented exploitation of local fishing grounds consequent to the 
increasing industrialisation and commercialisation of fishery taking place in those 
decades.  In order to produce a single European and comparative narrative, for this 
chapter I mix data from the two islands.  
 
5.1. Fish as an agricultural good and the first Structural Policies: the time of 
subsidized bigger, faster and more productive vessels 
The post Second World War subsidized expansion of the European commercial fishing 
fleet constitutes possibly the first significant change that the EU brought to the lives 
of European small-scale fishers on the islands. European financial aid boosted the 
industrialisation of fisheries and produced several implications for both the health of 
traditional fishing grounds and the economy of European small-scale fisheries (Bo, 
2010).  
As Communitarian financial support combined with the availability of several 
technological developments capable of substantially enhance the productivity of 
fishing vessels, EU subsidies provided the financial means to produce the fastest 
growth in catches ever recorded in Europe (De Sombre and Barkin, 2011). When all 
norms and regulations applying to agricultural products were extended to include 
fisheries’ goods in 1958, the EU set up financial schemes to improve fisheries’ 
productivity by optimizing the use of the means of production – fishers’ labour force, 
vessels, fishing equipment and available maritime resources. Financial support was 
distributed to ensure fishers’ fair living standards and to stabilise fish markets so as to 
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ensure both the availability of supplies and reasonable prices for consumers (Long and 
Curran, 2000). Monetary transactions were managed through the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)15 and they addressed the 
European fishing industry at many levels: supporting the building of new vessels and 
the upgrade of existing ones; discounting taxes from fuel and keeping catches out of 
the market to guarantee fishers’ minimum selling prices (Hatcher, 2000). As the CFP 
did not yet exist, Europe’s biggest fishing countries, such as Italy, (De Sombre and 
Barkin, 2011) received Communitarian direct subsidies for among the 13 to 20 per 
cent of the overall value of the landed catches (Flaaten and Wallis, 2000). 
Simultaneously, European financial aid to the fishing sector took a number of other 
indirect forms of funding  - for instance, in the building or maintenance of harbours, 
the payment of fishing rights to third countries, or the costs related to negotiate these 
agreements (Lövin, 2012; Stone, 1997). As fishery became economically attractive, 
many people and communities were incorporated into this maritime economy and 
industry that had come to rely on vessels of an unprecedented fishing power (Khalilian 
et al., 2010).  
During the 1970s, in preparation for the official introduction of the CFP in 1983, 
the EU issued the first structural policy for fishery alongside the establishment of a 
common market for fishing products (da Conceição-Heldt, 2004). With this 
transforming regulative framework, financial aid was distributed to reduce the 
exceeding European fishing capacity by restructuring and modernizing the fishing fleet 
of each member state. On top of these direct subsidies to refurbish existing vessels, 
other subsidies distorted the functioning of the EU fish market as they increased the 
selling value of products for fishers, creating and maintaining maritime resource 
                                                          
15 The EAGGF is a ‘Community's agricultural support fund’ (Hatcher, 2000: 129) 
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overexploitation, while keeping European consumer demand high thanks to artificially 
reduced selling prices (Markus, 2010). In line with the most obvious economic rules, 
the combination of all these subsidies had the effect of enhancing, again, the 
European fishing fleet’s overcapacity. After more than 20 years of EU taxpayers’ direct 
and indirect subsidies, European fisheries had thus become increasingly 
commercialized and industrialized with a predictable knock-on effect to fish supplies, 
degrading their habitat and numbers. As I discuss, both the expansion of European 
industrial fisheries and their negative effects in terms of available fish stocks 
generated a variety of consequences for the small-scale fishers on the two islands. 
 
5.1.1. Big- vs. Small-scale fisheries: two different ways of life 
The modernisation of the European fishing fleet enhanced the mechanisation of 
fishery, reducing the number of fishers necessary to operate vessels. At the same 
time, the expansion of the fleet meant that the number of vessels increased so that 
fishers losing their job in one vessel had the opportunity of being hired on board new 
vessels. According to Giovanni, since the 1950s, EU subsidies helped generating the 
conditions for Lampedusan fishers to leave their island:   
Until the 1950s there were a 100 boats for lampara fishing in Lampedusa… All Lampedusans used to work on those boats that needed a lot of workforce to operate… When… purse seine vessels started substituting lampara net fishing boats, things changed, even though we continued to catch mackerels: now everything was mechanized… and vessel owners needed less workforce… Thus many Lampedusans left the island and went to other Italian major port towns such as Rimini or Fiumicino. 
If many Lampedusans left, during the 1960s, besides working in the local bluefish 
catching and canning industry, local fishers would also work aboard the numerous big 
trawlers that came to the island, mostly from mainland Sicily, to access the local rich 
fishing grounds. Some worked on board these vessels for the whole year while the 
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majority embarked exclusively when the bluefish season ended in the winter months. 
Since the 1970s, however, while the local small-scale fishing industry was still 
flourishing, many Lampedusans moved towards another type of fishery that took 
them away from the island for months on end: oceanic fishing.  
Giuseppe was a professional fisher in his early fifties. Together with his younger 
brother, Carlo, he owned and worked on the only purse seine fishing vessel remaining 
on the island – the Nardina.16 This is the story of how his work changed from local to 
oceanic fishing: 
I am a fisher since I was 14. Actually, I was even younger when I began: I used to go fishing with my father when I was a kid. Then, as soon as I got my fishing permit, I embarked on one of those big commercial vessels who used to come here some 40 to 35 years ago… We went fishing to Senegal, Guinea and even the US. The Amoruso family from Bari owned those vessels: they used to work here since the 1950s. Then, when in the 1970s they built even bigger vessels, they started go for oceanic fishing.  
Giuseppe was 14 years old in 1975 when, thanks to the second big wave of EU 
subsidies preceding the introduction of the CFP, Italian consortiums, as well as vessel 
owners, were able to build and launch several new fishing vessels (Cataudella and 
Spagnolo, 2011). In the early 1970s the EU transferred about 150 million of the 
European Currency Unit – ECU (comparable to present day Euros) – in subsidies for 
the modernisation and renewal of the European fishing fleet (Hatcher, 2000). In those 
same years many Lampedusan fishers left local fishing and embarked on new and 
bigger vessels passing by the island heading towards the Atlantic. The majority of the 
owners of these big vessels who all came from outside Lampedusa were also the 
owners of those smaller vessels for industrial fishing operating on the island for years. 
That is why they trusted local fishers and wanted to have them on board. What 
                                                          
16http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/index.cfm?method=Search.DetailSearchSimple&event_key=21575501&search_type=advanced&search_id=2403 [Accessed on September 30, 2013] 
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convinced Lampedusans to leave their island for the Atlantic adventure were the very 
good salaries offered. Antonio explained: 
It was at the beginning of the 1970s and I was in my thirties when I embarked on one of those big vessels… It was a 72 meter long ship… and we went fishing off the coast of West Africa first, and then westwards towards America… The reason why [we] went fishing on board of those vessels was that they paid us much more than what we were used to be paid on the island. Besides, that was the easiest way to leave Lampedusa, at least for a while. 
Antonio was 84 years old, and a retired Lampedusan fisher who had worked on the 
Gabriella C, a bottom trawler that, according to the European Fishing Fleet Register17 
– EFFR, was constructed in 1971, thanks to several European subsidies. It 
subsequently entered into service in 1973 with a licence for oceanic fishing and an 
engine of more than 1,000 horsepower.18 When this and other similar vessels started 
passing by Lampedusa to hire local fishers, the bluefish canning industry was still 
flourishing and the island served as a platform in the middle of the Mediterranean to 
access the richest fishing grounds in the area. In a conversation between Antonio and 
Antonino, a Lampedusan freelancer who was filming our talk for one of his reportages 
from the island, Antonio explained this situation further: 
Antonio: You just had to know someone on board of one of those big vessels who went fishing to ‘Morocco’19 or you just had to go to the port and wait for the next vessel. It was a normal thing! We embarked here, we crossed the Gibraltar strait and we were on the Atlantic. 
Antonino: I assume you had to leave your family for long time. 
Antonio: yes, that was possibly the harsher side of the story. You had to stay months away from almost everyone important for you. Family, friends, neighbours. Luckily we were almost never alone: there was always at least one or more Lampedusans aboard. 
                                                          
17 “The Community Fishing Fleet Register […] is an essential tool to implement and monitor the Common Fisheries Policy. The Fleet Register is a database where all the fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member State have to be registered in accordance with Community legislation” (EC, 2014) 
18http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/index.cfm?method=Search.DetailSearchSimple&event_key=21414790&search_type=simple&search_id=5905 [Accessed on March 21, 2014] 
19 When Lampedusans fishers refer to oceanic fishing, most of them say that they went fishing to ‘Morocco’ meaning any place beyond the Gibraltar strait. 
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Initially, Italian captains with little or no experience of the Atlantic tended not to 
push themselves further than the stretch of sea dividing Western Sahara and the 
Canary Islands. Vito, a 72 year-old Lampedusan, worked all his life as captain of one 
of these oceanic vessels when he moved to the major Italian fishing port of Viareggio 
during the 1960s: 
Initially we went fishing in West Africa: we were not pioneers on this kind of fishery. There was plenty of other European vessels out there… We used to fish off Morocco and then down towards Mauritania and Senegal: usually we unloaded our catches in the port of Las Palmas of Gran Canary… At that time… we always had some Spanish fisher aboard since they were a much less expensive workforce than Italian fishers and they knew that sea. It was very easy to hire them when we docked there. 
Many fishers in Gran Tarajal also knew the stories of those Italian fishing vessels 
that came fishing there. Like Alvaro – a fisher from the Spanish port town - some even 
worked aboard one or more of them. As he told me: 
Many of us embarked on those huge fishing vessels… We used to go to fish to Africa as well as in North America, remaining at sea for weeks and months: it was very good money… Here [in Gran Tarajal] big fishing boats… used to anchor just a few meters off the [beach] and then two or more of their fishers went on dryland and hired locals with the promise of very good salaries like we had never heard before on this island.  
During the 1970s numerous fishers on both the islands abandoned local fisheries 
and embarked on large-scale industrial fishing vessels. Yet such a shift meant a 
dramatic transformation of fishers’ daily lives and labour conditions. Small-scale 
fishery worked in a dramatically different way than commercial fishing. First, vessels 
had no facilities to process fish on board. Second, vessels took at the most four to five 
fishers when using the more labour-demanding fishing gears. More importantly 
however, small-scale fishers spent only a few consecutive hours out at sea. Alvaro 
continued:  
We stay just one day at sea. The Bask fishers that have their vessel anchored at the end of the pier used to go fishing in the south of the island and remain at sea at least two or three days… However, I do prefer my way: I like to feel home every day I can… On the other hand, I can see their point since they are young 
96  
 
and where they go fishing there is plenty to catch! [However, I am sure that] if they had experienced what we had to pass through on those big commercial vessels some 30 years ago, they would love to come back home every time they can!  
Despite the individual costs in terms of family and community ties, to embark on 
these fishing journeys became common and relatively simple to achieve for islanders. 
Industrialised oceanic fishing meant some detachment from the island and loved 
ones: those who left and those who remained ended up inhabiting ‘largely separate 
worlds, in which husbands and wives build separate sets of ties, loyalties and 
activities’ (Symes and Philipson, 2001: 167). Fishers’ prolonged absences from both 
Gran Tarajal and Lampedusa put to test strong community ties based on mutual 
assistance and reciprocity which had previously been highly necessary in order to 
endure life on the islands (Kilpatrick and Falk, 2003; Wellman and Wortley, 1990).  
In addition to detachment from the islands, for many, a job aboard a big industrial 
fishing vessel was not about the fishing. It rather resembled working in a factory: 
[Inside] those big vessels you are doing a completely different job than fishing! You do not need to understand anything about the sea to fish with one of those floating factories. It is all mechanical and you are just one among many: you stay the whole day in the same position, doing the same thing over and over. (Alvaro) 
These big vessels had about three decks and work was organized vertically from 
the captain inside his cockpit. Three decks below, the fishers were busy putting fish 
boxes inside the huge refrigerating rooms at the bottom of the hull. Most fishers 
remained working at each level for weeks: only a few – as the captain or the board 
engineer – moved across the various levels. In between the top and the bottom of this 
chain, there were those managing fishing nets and, one deck below, those selecting, 
weighing and packing the catches. At each of these levels, fishers experienced diverse 
working and living conditions from one another, and thus received diverse salaries. 
According to Vito, internal mobility was based on experience and the captain’s own 
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discretion. Several Lampedusans, as well as fishers from Gran Tarajal, began their 
careers as commercial fishers working in the refrigerating rooms. Tonino was a 49 
years-old professional fisher working in Lampedusa. This is how he described his 
career fishing in the Atlantic:  
I barely saw the sea during that crossing since I had to stay below deck cartooning all catches… I hated that life: we had to work down there with no natural light, wrapped by the waves, sleeping two hours per day in some berth that even a dog would have refused… After we were at sea for a few months we could take a flight to come back here and stay home for a couple of weeks: obviously, the vessel owner paid for it. 
Oceanic fishing was discussed by the islanders as a hard and tough life. Fishers had 
to contend with homesickness and the feeling of having been hired as fishers to be 
used as workers for big fishing companies. Almost none of the skills that the fishers 
had learned at sea were of any use on board of the giant fishing machines (Ward and 
Hindmarsh, 2006). Consequently, the fishers soon became  interchangeable with the 
infinitely cheaper African and Latin American workforce. As Vito pointed out, with the 
European workforce being replaced with cheaper non-European workers, soon fishers 
from both islands started being left on dry land: 
In the 1990s I was in charge of a boat whose fishers were almost all Africans… We worked exactly in the same way we did when fishers were first Italian [mostly Lampedusans] and then Spanish… Jobs on board were divided in the same way... In the 1990s two levels below deck we had only Africans working: 20 years before they were all adolescents from Lampedusa! 
Initially, during the second half of the 1980s, Spanish fishers - mostly from the 
Canary Islands – had started to replace Italian ones. Then, Africans coming mostly 
from Mauritania, Senegal and Morocco started to take the place of Spanish fishers. 
Part of this trend was also a result of the obligation to hire local workforces which was 
established by EU fishing agreements with these countries – as a compensation for 
the (over)exploitation of national fishing resources (Carneiro, 2011). Yet, during the 
1990s, most owners of oceanic fishing vessels changed the flags on their boats so as 
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to benefit from open registration schemes – also known as the ‘flag of convenience’ – 
and registered their boats where it was most convenient in terms of both lower 
taxation and more lax fishing regulations (De Sombre, 2005).  
By then, however, many fishers from either Fuerteventura or Lampedusa had 
returned home with considerable sums of money. This is Tonino’s account of how 
Lampedusans returned to their island:  
Since the end of the 1980s big vessel owners realized that instead of having only ten Latin American fishers aboard, they could make the whole crew out of them… Soon we all lost our jobs but after years spent working and with our salaries almost intact – on board there were very little expenses - we all returned to the island full of money. 
As fishers had saved considerable sums of money while working on industrial 
fishing vessels, they tended to use this to come back to the island and buy their own 
small boats. In doing this, in Lampedusa many fishers became captains, while in Gran 
Tarajal they could finally get rid of their tiny rowboats and buy themselves new and 
better fishing vessels. In other words, after experiencing the hardships of working 
aboard industrial fishing vessels, many fishers returned to small-scale fishery. After 
all, fishing as a way of life is an occupational sector that is somehow hard to leave 
(Trimble and Johnson, 2013; Pita et al., 2010), and on these islands it was engrained 
in their culture. Moreover, as my participants’ biographies reveal, most locals had 
been fishing since they were very young, having almost no access to formal education 
at all. If, on the one hand, they had accumulated substantial fishing expertise over the 
years, at the same time they had little if nothing else than fishing skills to offer to 
potential employers. In addition, and similar to several other coastal communities 
(Dickey and Theodossiou, 2006), when Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal’s fishers returned 
to their islands in the early 1990s, few other occupational options were available 
locally. 
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However, after decades of the expansion of increasingly productive fishing vessels, 
fish stocks had been depleted. Local fish stock depletion did not spare the two islands’ 
fishing grounds. Indeed, while many fishers left the isles, others remained working 
there on extremely productive vessels coming from outside of both Fuerteventura 
and Lampedusa. Moreover, most of those locals who already owned a vessel – or 
more than one – decided to remain on the islands and make use of European and 
national subsidies to modernize their boats, inevitably pushing the local small-scale 
fishery into a more commercial version of itself. Those fishers returning home after 
years spent fishing away from their islands thus found their local waters severely 
impoverished of fish. 
 
5.1.2. Only one is overfishing  
As I have said, in contrast to big-scale fishery, small-scale fishers stayed at sea for no 
longer than a few consecutive hours or days and they depended completely on 
weather conditions. Indeed, given the reduced size of their vessels and the limited 
power of their engines, small vessels relied on almost perfect sea conditions to 
operate.  
Francesco, a 57 year-old captain, was among the first fishers I met in Lampedusa. 
He was from Porto Empedocle, and each year he moved to fish in Lampedusa between 
May and October with his nine meter long fishing vessel Nuovo Ligure.20 He explained 
the limitations on his work during wintertime: 
As for September, we could only work eight days. In October we worked the first four days of the month, then we had to stop for other 15 days and we went back fishing for two consecutive days. That was it for the whole month. As for 
                                                          
20http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/index.cfm?method=Search.DetailSearchSimple&event_key=21669217&search_type=advanced&search_id=2403 [Accessed on March 12, 2015] 
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[November] we could only work one day so far, and half a month has already gone. 
Although extreme weather conditions could also stop industrial fishing vessels 
operating, the working of small-scale fisheries depended entirely on the conditions of 
the sea. On both islands the situation was even more serious since they were in the 
middle of the open sea. Besides the dangers and the difficulties handling the vessels, 
when the sea is not calm, to remain at sea can become also a waste of time and 
money: 
If you fish with lines as we are doing now and the sea is not calm, or is calming down, you will have to deal with too many underwater streams… Once we get over the rock where we want to fish, then we must calculate where to position the vessel in order to make the weight falling the closest possible to the rock. [If the sea is rough] this calculation becomes much harder since you have stronger streams that move your line away from the spot. (Tonino) 
Despite the limits of small-scale fishery to go fishing within all sea conditions, while 
subsidizing the expansion of the industrial fishing fleet, EU subsidies had also financed 
the technological upgrade or refurbishment of smaller boats in order to optimise their 
fishing productivity. This financial assistance, combined with the availability, on a large 
scale, first of sonars - allowing fishers to literally scan the sea below their vessels and 
spot rocks where fish eat and hide, as well as fish shoals in the middle of the water 
column – and later of the Global Positioning System (GPS) radically changed fishing, 
allowing fishers to return with unprecedented ease and precision to good fishing 
grounds. Although it is clear that fishing vessel owners would have installed these 
technologies with or without the financial assistance of the EU, subsidies significantly 
helped many of them to cover the costs of buying these devices. Indeed, 
Communitarian financial aid compensated up to 50 per cent of the entire costs on 
condition that another five to 25 per cent was covered by member states (Hatcher, 
2000).  
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Consequently, by the late 1980s, European fishing vessels of any size were 
becoming more powerful, fishing gears more mechanized and more productive, and 
fishers started relying on technologies capable of dramatically facilitating their work. 
The depletion of fish stocks quickened, making it harder for fishers to find good 
catches. At the same time, however, upgraded and refurbished vessels permitted 
fishing with an unprecedented efficiency. This activated a sort of vicious circle where 
fishers could access more fishing grounds to counterbalance the economic 
consequences of the depletion of fish stocks, while at the same time accelerating the 
reduction of available fish stocks. 
As European industrial fisheries modernized and expanded, GPS and sonar 
increased the productivity of small vessels, transforming small-scale fishing into a 
commercial version of itself and a much easier job than it was before: 
Fishing remains fishing but today you have many more instruments helping you… Today if you throw a nail into the water you can find it the day after! All these instruments take you right to the place… Fishing today is another sort of job than the one I experienced… Now you can go fishing with your eyes closed! Now you can see under the water. As I told you today, once the sea was covered with water: now [with] these instruments [they] uncovered the sea. (Giovanni) 
Scientific studies have widely demonstrated the huge destructive potentials of 
intensive and large-scale fisheries (Clover, 2004; Sloan, 2003; Lövin, 2012). 
Nevertheless, small-scale fishery with contemporary technologies can also overfish, 
although, of course, their productivity is infinitely lower than industrial and 
commercial vessels.  
Alfonso was the captain of an 11 meter long fishing vessel, Sara,21 registered in 
Porto Empedocle. Even though he never worked aboard any industrial vessels, he 
made a clear and meaningful distinction between small- and big-scale fisheries: 
                                                          
21http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/index.cfm?method=Search.DetailSearchSimple&event_key=22970799&search_type=advanced&search_id=1114 [Accessed on January 02, 2015] 
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Small-scale fishing lives out of fishing ‘small’. Is it not obvious? Say, for instance, that I catch 500 kilograms of tuna in my best summer. [At the same time, industrial vessels] catch 50,000 kilograms in one go, in one night… Therefore, it is like saying that one big commercial vessel catches more than a whole fleet of small-scale vessels… It is like, one year worth of my fishing is nowhere near a single one [day worth of industrial fishing]. 
Commercial fishing, by its very nature, is ‘[…] characterized by a boom-and-bust 
cycle of development [expanding] to new regions […] until stocks of the target species 
are depleted [to then] move to a new species in the region, or to new region […] and 
the pattern repeats’ (De Sombre and Barkin, 2011: 25-26). On the contrary, small-
scale fishers, the vast majority of whom return on dryland daily, cannot approach 
fishing in the same way. They can, in fact, access just a relatively limited range of 
different fish species and number of fishing grounds, so that if they want to survive 
they have a primary interest in taking care of fishes and will try to not over-exploit 
them. Thus, if it remains questionable whether industrial fishing vessels alone caused 
the depletion of fish stocks or, if they had done this in combination with small-scale 
fishing boats as well, it is at the same time clear that big vessels have an infinitely 
greater impact on fish stocks. Within this picture, European regulations and financial 
instruments contributed substantially towards the improvement of the European 
fishing fleets’ ability to overfish, and, as we have partly already seen, this, in turn, 
changed the lives of fishers on Gran Tarajal and Lampedusa.  
 
5.2. – Conclusion 
In the early stages of the Communitarian management of fishery, European fisheries 
started receiving subsidies to modernize existing vessels and build new ones. The 
outcomes of these subsidies were soon experienced by Lampedusan fishers. The 
increasingly mechanized vessels that went fishing in Lampedusa to access the local 
rich fishing grounds required much less workforce than they used to, in order to 
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operate. While fewer jobs became available on the island, more opportunities 
appeared in other and more industrialized Italian fishing ports, as it was there were 
new vessels were eventually launched. There is little surprise then if across the 1950s 
and the 1960s, numerous Lampedusans left their island and went looking for jobs in 
the industrial fishing fleets harboured in the major Italian fishing ports – such as 
Fiumicino near Rome, Rimini in the northern Adriatic coast, or Viareggio in Tuscany.  
Yet, as soon as the EU launched its first structural policies on fishery in the 1970s, 
big vessels for industrial oceanic fishing started passing by the tiny Italian island and 
hired several local fishers. Again, islanders left Lampedusa while fishers’ jobs 
transformed and were significantly deskilled when working aboard these floating 
factories. When Italian and other European subsidised vessels reached the Canary 
Islands, everyday life had begun transforming in Fuerteventura and Gran Tarajal as 
well. Less than a decade later, however, industrial fishing vessel owners found it more 
convenient to delocalize their activities outside the EU, or to hire cheaper non-
European workers rather than European ones. Fishers from both islands started 
progressively losing their well remunerated jobs and thus returned to Lampedusa and 
Fuerteventura. Once back on their islands, when those small-scale fishers who had 
left reinvested the good salaries they had saved during their oceanic fishing campaigns 
and had turned themselves into fishing vessel owners and captains, they found local 
fishing grounds severely impoverished by decades of overfishing.  
As I discuss in the next chapter, it was over that same period that, following the 
introduction of the 1983 CFP, conservation of fish resources was prioritized by the EU, 
and a series of measures to limit the impact of European fisheries were introduced. 
These limitations had controversially extended almost equally to both small- and big-
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scale fisheries, in spite of their very different contribution to depleting European 
commercial fish stocks. 
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6. – THE CFP AND THE SEA: THE ENVIROMENTALIST TURN 
     ‘I cannot understand this policy: actually, no one can understand it… It is a strange policy of the feast today, famine tomorrow’ (Juan Ramon, fisherman and president of the Fishermen Association of Gran Tarajal)  
 
In the late 1980s, scientific and environmental alarms concerning the effects of 
industrial fishing gained momentum. Over the previous years, European politics 
apparently resisted reacting and adjusting the Common Fishery Policy’s (CFP) 
provisions to scientific advisors’ repeated warnings (Daw and Gray, 2004). 
Nevertheless, facing increasing public concern, the 1992 reform of the CFP 
concentrated on conservation – at least on paper - which translated into a series of 
limitations on fishing grounds and into a completely new set of structural policies. This 
reformed set of Communitarian measures endeavoured to remedy the serious 
imbalance between fleet productivity and catch potential. However, in both 
Lampedusa and Fuerteventura, European management produced a number of rather 
contradictory outcomes, with professional small-scale fishers turning increasingly into 
tourist operators but also into illegal fishermen, further endangering both the health 
of local fishing grounds and the economic sustainability of the local professional 
fishery.  
My following discussion of the local effects of the CFP is divided into two major 
sections, corresponding to the policy’s main areas of intervention on small-scale 
fishery as they developed chronologically. First, I start by focusing on the second wave 
of EU structural policies set in response to increasing environmental concerns and 
which aimed at the progressive reduction of the European fishing fleet. Second, I 
conclude the analysis by concentrating on another series of the CFP’s conservation 
strategies as they gained relevance since the 1990s to limit fishers’ access to the sea. 
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These were a complex sytem of quota and bans concerning specific fish species, 
combined with technical measures to limit the impact and use of determined fishing 
gears and techniques.  
Similar to the previous chapter, I mix  data collected from both Lampedusa’s and 
Fuerteventura’s fishermen as EU policies activated very similar dynamics on the two 
islands. 
 
6.1. - CFP structural policies: turning everything upside-down 
The first remedy that the 1983 CFP advocated was to reduce the size of the 
Community fleet and alleviate the social impact of industrial fishing practices (Ulecia, 
2014). Fisheries were introduced ‘into the Structural Funds [with] its own financial 
instrument [to] provide financial support for fisheries-dependent areas’ whose main 
job sector was seen as having to be narrowed (Semrau, 2015). This shift constituted 
possibly one of the CFP’s most criticised programmes. After years of public 
expenditure to enhance the European fishing fleet’s productivity, subsidies now 
aimed at reducing the fleet by financially aiding ‘the scrapping or laying-up of vessels’ 
(Long and Curran, 2000: 29). The explicit goal of the policy was to financially support 
fishers’ mobility towards new and diversified economic activity in coastal regions. 
With EU policymakers increasingly focused on designing and implementing effective 
conservation policies, the allocation of resources within the structural policies were 
literally turned upside down: European taxpayers’ money once spent to support the 
modernisation and expansion of the fleet was readdressed to finance the dismantling 
and reduction of that same fleet (see Chart 5).  
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Chart 6.1: Distribution of Community aid (in millions of ECU) for the EU fishing fleet between 1983 and 1993 (in Hatcher, 2000: 134. Elaborated by the author) 
 
The overturning of the CFP’s structural policies was completed with the 2002 
reform when the EU stopped financing the construction of new vessels. Later, since 
2004, subsidies for the modernisation of existing fishing boats were restricted to the 
installation of on board safety devices (Markus, 2010). Moreover, additional funding 
compensated the reduction of the number of existing professional fishing licenses 
through buyback programmes, simultaneously limiting the issuing of new permits 
(Guyader et al., 2004). 
Concerning the dismantling of vessels, payments varied proportionally on the basis 
of the vessel’s tonnage and age, whereby the owners of the bigger and older vessels 
received major compensations to dismantle their boats. This Communitarian support 
scheme worked to make it more attractive for fishermen to opt for the subsidies to 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total Community aid forvessels' CONSTRUCTION(mECU) 21.3 39.1 46.8 38.7 64 8.7 63.5 44.2 7.8 5 4
Total Community aid forvessels' MODERNISATION(mECU) 7 10.4 15.2 18 9.2 19.3 20.3 26.2 21.4 14.7 19.1
Total Community aid forvessels' WITHDRAWALS(mECU) 0 0 2.3 3.9 1.9 16.8 14.6 13 32.3 77.4 62.3
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dismantle their vessel and which withdrew their professional fishing license, rather 
than selling them to potential new fishers. Combining these subsidies with a limit on 
the issuing of new professional fishing licenses and the buyback programmes, CFP 
structural policies became simultaneously the main obstacles for newcomers to 
access professional fishery and the major incentive for elder fishermen to abandon 
their activity.  
In line with the policy goals, this new generation of EU structural policies on fishery 
contributed to turning the islands’ economies from fishery to tourism through 
transforming professional fishers into tourist entrepreneurs. Yet, contrary to the 
expected outcomes, this set of structural policies had also jeopardised the economic 
and environmental sustainability of small-scale fisheries in both Lampedusa and Gran 
Tarajal. 
 
6.1.1. To fish or to cash in? 
I met Francisco at the local fishermen association’s restaurant on one of the first days 
of my stay in Gran Tarajal. He served me and, seeing me alone at the table, soon 
started talking to me. I explained to him why I was there, and he told me: 
I was a professional fisherman until I decided to give up with fishery last year… It was not what I really wanted to do: however, I took the final decision when the government announced that there were new subsidies for decommissioning fishing vessels and withdraw professional fishing licenses. As I said, it was not an easy choice but given my age I decided to step out… What convinced me was money! I loved going fishing, but I needed some financial stability. 
I had heard similar stories several other times when I was in Lampedusa. Many 
fishers there admitted that the only reason they had left fishing was the sizable 
amounts of money offered to them to dismantle their vessels and/or withdraw their 
licenses.  
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Besides still being an active captain, Nicola – who was 79 years-old - also owned a 
restaurant. When I met him he was busy assembling his own wicker-made fishing pots 
(see Plate 6.1).  
 
Plate 6.1: Nicola working on his fishing pots (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu elaborated by the author) 
 
I asked him whether he had ever thought of giving up with fishery to get the EU 
compensation:  
Look, I could have done it more times: however, I did not. Fishing is my life and the job I love the most… Yet, here in the island, many scrapped their vessels and several others are waiting the authorities to issue the next call for subsidies to scrap their own boats… I do not think it is an easy choice for a fisher, believe me! At the same time, however, it is also an opportunity that you cannot miss: who knows if [the EU] will change policy once more? 
Despite a number of  stalwarts like Nicola, analysis of the European Fishing Fleet 
Register’s (EFFR) aggregate data on Lampedusa’s fishing fleet highlights a constant 
and substantial contraction of the local fleet since the early 1990s (see Chart 6.2).  
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Chart 6.2: Evolution of Lampedusa’s fishing fleet (Elaboration of the author: data from the EFFR22)  
 
Piero – a professional fisher and the president of Lampedusa’s fishing vessels 
owners association - confirmed that these trends were directly related to CFP’s 
structural policies for fishery. According to him, the vast majority of the files they dealt 
with at the association concerned alternatively the subsidized scrapping of vessels or 
professional fishing licenses’ withdrawal.  
Yet, for Gran Tarajal, the trend looked, at least initially, different to that of 
Lampedusa, as the local fleet of small-scale fishing vessels did increase significantly 
across the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, only to start decreasing 
in the following years (see Chart 6.3).  
                                                          
22 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/index.cfm [Accessed on July 24, 2014] 
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Chart 6.3: Evolution of Gran Tarajal’s fishing fleet (Elaboration of the author: data from the EFFR23) 
 
This partly unexpected trend emerged largely as a result of the initiative of a local 
fisherman – Juan Ramon – supported by the provincial authority for fishery and 
agriculture. Since the early 1990s they had very efficiently organized Gran Tarajal’s 
Fishermen Association so that, given the greater profits, an increasing number of local 
fishers had incorporated and regularized themselves. 
Nevertheless, what fishers in both islands highlighted was that many of those 
fishers who received compensations from the EU for scrapping their vessels and/or 
withdrawing their licenses, had actually reinvested the money to buy new vessels and 
kept fishing as recreational fishers. This outcome was exactly the opposite to the  
expected goals of the policy in terms of diminishing the fishing fleet in order to reduce 
the overall fishing effort: small-scale vessel owners who decided to scrap their boats 
had registered their new vessels for recreational fishery and then went fishing to sell 
                                                          
23  http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/index.cfm [Accessed on July 24, 2014] 
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their catches illegally. The post-1992 CFP structural policies had thus produced a 
number of unintended and unpredicted outcomes at the micro level of the two 
islands, the major effect being its ineffective reduction of the number of boats and 
fishers that actually went fishing. Rather, the policies effectively financed the transfer 
of professional small-scale fishers into the much less regulated – and monitored – 
recreational fishing sector. While this transformation was broadly in line with the 
EU/policy intentions to increase tourism on the islands, the policy had little effect on 
over-fishing. At the same time, several large-scale vessel owners who had benefited 
from much greater subsidies to withdraw their licenses or dismantle their vessels – 
given the size of their boats and the value of their fishing permits – used the money 
to simply change the flag of their vessel or to directly buy a new vessel abroad. As they 
started operating outside of the EU under much laxer fishing rules and then imported 
their catches in the European market anyway, the fishing pressure on commercial fish 
stocks remained the same – or it had even increased (Popescu, 2010; Mulvad and 
Thurston, 2010).  
These contradictory policy outcomes must be framed within a further incongruity 
characterising the second wave of CFP structural policies. These extremely expansive 
structural policies were aimed at counterbalancing industrial fishery’s depletion of 
fish stocks. Yet they were extended indifferently to also include small-scale fisheries 
leading de facto to a similar reduction of both fisheries, (see Chart 6.4) regardless of 
small-scale fishery being a relatively sustainable fishery and a major source of 
employment on the islands – which was also the case in most European coastal 
communities.24   
                                                          
24 In Gran Tarajal a similar comparison was impossible since the local port did not harbour fishing vessels longer than 12 meters – or at least they were not recorded on the EFFR between 1992 and 2014. 
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Chart 6.4: Numbers of Lampeudsa’s small-scale (<12m) and big-scale (>12m) fishing fleets, 1992-2014 (Elaboration of the author: data from the EFFR25) 
  
For these reasons, if small-scale fishers willing to abandon professional fishing saw 
in these subsidies a possibility to increase their financial assets, potential as well as 
actual professional small-scale fishers perceived this Communitarian financial aid as 
unjust and dangerous. Jorge, a 38 year old fisher from Gran Tarajal, emphasized the 
effects of the second wave of EU structural policies for fishery: 
I was very lucky to find and buy my boat three years ago. Indeed, the EU pays fishermen crazy prices to dismantle their vessels or withdraw their professional fishing licenses... However, to become a professional fisherman you must practice for at least three years on board. Then, how am I supposed to practice if there are no new vessels available? Furthermore, if you are lucky to find your spot on an existing vessel, the day you want to buy your own boat and become a captain if you find any vessel on sale you pay it much more than its market price. The EU is somehow competing with you to ‘buy’ that same vessel for unreasonable prices in order to dismantle it! I paid for my vessel [see Plate 6.2] 38,000 Euros while, according to everyone else here, at regular market prices it should have been at least 10,000 Euros cheaper. 
                                                          
25 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/index.cfm [Accessed on January 12, 2014] 
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Plate 6.2: Jorge’s fishing vessel Fuerte Marejada (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu elaborated by the author) 
 
Juan Ramon confirmed Jorge’s view: 
For fishers is very hard to start their profession simply because there are no fishing licences and vessels available. I am telling you this because here more fishers can come if we agree on the fishing rules! What does not make any sense is that with the justification of protecting marine resources [authorities pay to] withdraw licences for professional fishing… while at the same time they issue… thousands of licences for recreational fishing… If they would stop with this nonsense policy here we could be at least the double than we are… There could be 100 fishing vessels operating – vessels that are anyhow already operating, although illegally. 
On a more superficial level, the reduction of the European fishing fleet may appear 
like a policy success so far in that, according to data, the European fishing fleet 
decreased substantially over more than 20 years of subsidies. Nevertheless, if we look 
at the reduction of the EU fishing capacity, data contradicts the expected outcome: 
between 2000 and 2006, against more than one billion Euros invested by the EU to 
reduce the fleet, registered fishing capacity increased on average by three per cent 
(Cataudella and Spagnolo, 2011). Besides, it must be considered that such data does 
not count unrecorded catches introduced illegally into the market by the booming 
European recreational fishing sector. Looking at the local effects that these structural 
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funds produced in Gran Tarajal and Lampedusa, they had further endangered fish 
stocks and generated unpredictable economic, social and cultural effects. 
 
6.1.2. From Fishery to tourism: chronicle of a profound transformation 
Across the 1990s and the 2000s the fisheries on Lampedusa and Fuerteventura 
experienced a series of major transformations. EU rules and directives certainly 
played a role and worked as a major factor pushing the islands’ economies towards 
tourism. No doubt the construction of airport facilities completed on both islands at 
the end of the 1960s was also crucial for such an economic turn. However, tourism 
remained a relatively marginal economy on both islands until the 1990s (Wood, 1993; 
Santana Talavera et al., 2010; Arbelo, 1994). Moreover, it is clear, neither Lampedusa 
nor Fuerteventura were isolated from the global world where similar economic shifts 
from production to a consumption economies had already taken place or were taking 
place in those decades (Harvey, 1990). Yet even those global transformations were 
likely to have been activated or encouraged by these specific EU policies. 
Caloggero is a retired shipwright from Lampedusa who had lived and worked for 
almost 20 years in the port-town of Fiumicino, near Rome, before returning to his 
island in the 1980s. This is what he told me about this process: 
Tourism grew thanks to the many entrepreneurs that left fishery. The beginning of this process coincides with the building of the airport on the island. However, during the initial years there were only a few tourists but of course the local industry kept growing since then… In 1982 the situation had already changed: you could see new faces on the island during summer and people – mainly from outside Lampedusa - started building the first hotels and tourist villages… Since then tourism started progressively substituting fishery with many moving from one sector to the other. Fishers started renting rooms to tourists… As soon as they got money, and especially after they came back from ‘Morocco’, most of them built flats and small houses and new rooms up to today when we could offer 25,000 beds [for tourists] on the island. 
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At the end of the 1970s, the tourist sector employed between eight and ten per 
cent of Lampedusa’s total working population but the local fishing industry employed 
70 per cent (Mancini, 1978). Indeed, even by 1993 when ‘The Independent’ travel 
journalist Stephen Wood visited the island, he documented a local economy still 
largely centred on fishery with only 15 per cent of locals employed in the tourist 
industry (Wood, 1993). As Caloggero points out above, in the beginning, the island’s 
tourist industry was monopolized by non-islanders: structures to host tourists such as 
hotels and residences were relatively big and required the investment of capital that 
only few, if any, islanders owned. However, since the 1990s, a series of complex and 
interrelated dynamics facilitated a substantial shift in the local workforce from fishing 
towards the tourist industry. With local fish stocks declining, canning factories began 
struggling to access the same amounts of catches. On top of this situation, with the 
European accession of Portugal and Spain at the end of the 1980s, cheaper bluefish 
caught by fisheries from the two Iberian countries started overwhelming the 
European markets – including the Italian one. Sicilian and Lampedusan canning 
industries started opting for cheaper raw materials and fishers in Lampedusa became 
progressively uncompetitive and unable to sell their catches. Professor Giovanni 
Fragapane explained: 
 In 1992 I was the mayor of [Lampedusa]: that year my fellow citizens began sensing the first side-effects of the European Common Market… They organized their first strike ever and… they came to the city hall and threw hundreds of kilograms of mackerels and sardines in front of the door and inside the building. I do not blame them for what happened that day since they could not understand the reasons of what was going on! Since a few years and increasingly in the last months, they struggled to sell their catches… It took a while [up until the late 1990s] for local fishers to understand that the canning industry had to slowly close down.  
Francesca - the 35 year-old daughter of a retired local fish trader, worked for her 
father until he closed down his activity. Since then she worked at the island’s only 
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aquaculture plant. Although she was only 12 in 1992, she remembered the fishers’ 
strike clearly: 
Mackerel were all over the place... Fishers were protesting because they could sell less and less of their catches. It took a while but finally they understood that it was because the market was filled with much cheaper catches coming mainly from Spain… Sicilian canning industries found it more convenient transforming frozen and cheaper fish coming from the Iberian Peninsula. 
With cheaper bluefish entering the Italian market from abroad, Lampedusa’s 
canning entrepreneurs were increasingly excluded from the market as they had to 
deal with greater shipping costs for frozen fish to reach the island, compared to their 
Sicilian competitors. Soon, they found themselves with few opportunities other than 
to transform their canning factories into tourist facilities. As Angelina, a former worker 
of the canning industry, told me: 
I used to work for the Maggiore family who owned a canning industry. When they decided to stop their activities they made some ten holiday apartments out of their factory.  
Unavoidably, local workers - the women working in the factories or the men who 
went fishing - had to start looking for other sources of income. Yet, as several fishers 
in Lampedusa had returned from oceanic fishery with considerable capital, many 
reinvested this through buying a boat and/or a holiday house for tourists. The EU 
subsidies to scrap vessels and withdraw licences had heightened this progressive shift 
away from fishery and towards the opening of several family-run tourist activities: 
My understanding of what happened here to fishery and why so many left it for the tourist sector is simple: everyone realized that in order to earn a living there was another much easier and more profitable option than fishing. [Thus,] everyone left fishing… People here faced two options: either they invested more in fishery and get the fleet and the facilities to make local fishery survive and flourish, or they had to stop fishing professionally and invest on tourism… It is clear as the impoverishment of the sea played a role as well: however, here that we can access some of the richest fishing grounds of the Mediterranean, there were surely the margins for fishery to survive. Besides, the fact that everyone keeps fishing illegally demonstrates that there was and there is enough fish to make a well-organized fishery profitable... Since tourism boomed over the last ten to 15 years, maybe also for a lack of imagination, everyone thought that the only and easier option available was tourism… 
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Subsidies to scrap vessels certainly helped creating such unnatural opposition between fishery and tourism, as if instead of developing them together, one sector – tourism - had to substitute the other – professional fishery… Fishers bought many of those small boats for tourism that you can see in the port with the money they received scrapping their vessels: today they use them to take tourists around the island during summer, and to go fishing illegally during winter. (Francesca) 
As for this progressive shift from a production to a consumption economy, it was 
as if several elements combined and, at the same time, favoured each other in 
determining the collapse of Lampedusa’s fishing industry. The decline of the local 
canning industry can be seen as both the cause and the consequence of this economic 
shift. Even fish stocks’ depletion does not explain alone the move away from what 
was once a flourishing industry providing employment to an entire island. Within this 
picture, EU subsidies had accelerated and triggered the transformation before the 
1990s by quickening fish stock depletion, and later by economically subsidizing fishers’ 
abandonment of professional fishery. 
Similar to what happened in Lamepdusa, in Fuerteventura the tourist industry had 
also developed, initially thanks to investors coming from outside the island across the 
late 1970s and the 1980s. Since then, the local tourist industry continued to grow until 
the first decade of the 2000s (Santana Talavera, 2010). The development of the tourist 
industry passed through a number of stages and, from the 1990s, the number of hotel 
rooms available multiplied ten times compared to previous years, with a significant 
growth of small holiday apartments built and owed by locals (González Morales et al., 
2012). Like in Lampedusa, the development of the tourist industry in Fuerteventura 
was thus initiated by major investments coming from outside the island, but this had 
later been supplemented with a number of small tourist facilities owned by the 
islanders. 
When Gran Tarajal’s fishers returned from oceanic fishing and, later, when they 
could access subsidies to scrap their vessels and/or withdraw their licenses, they 
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finally had the financial opportunity to take a share of this expanding and profitable 
industry. This shift away from professional fishery was so dramatic that it reached a 
point in the 1990s when the local fishery risked losing a generation of fishers and, with 
it, hundreds of years of accumulated practical knowledge (Ruddle, 2000). Professor 
Agustin Santana Talavera of the University of la Laguna of Tenerife, who I met during 
my first week in the Canary Islands archipelago, studied Fuerteventura’s small-scale 
fisheries for decades. He told me: 
During the 1990s the huge demand of workforce from the construction sector related to the tourist industry combined with the several fishing vessels owners who decided to dismantle their vessels to access EU subsidies, and pushed many fishers to leave professional fishery. There was the concrete risk of losing one generation of fishermen. 
Over no more than two decades many islanders who earned a living from the sea 
left professional fishing and found an occupation in the booming tourist industry. 
Rapidly, family based tourist activities – holiday apartments and houses, and small 
restaurants - developed on both islands. Yet on both islands, buildings grew without 
responding to any regulation. Giuseppina Nicolini, the actual Mayor of Lampedusa, 
was seriously concerned with this issue: 
Politics on this island has lived out of illegality for years. They exchanged votes for illegal permits to build… Imagine that there is no town plan on the island… It was a weird run to occupy as much space as possible, were you had to run back to your friend, neighbour, relative: if he or she could make it then I could make it as well! A proper race to destroy this very fragile natural environment.  
As for the initial large resort hotels in Fuerteventura, extensive illegal building 
mutated the morphology of the islands, as well as social relations within small local 
communities. Individuals began struggling with each other to occupy their (is-)lands 
and build one or more holiday houses for tourists. Yet, as noted above, while the 
tourist industries boomed, the exploitation of sea resources did not end: fishers got 
their recreational fishing licenses and remained at sea. 
 
120  
 
6.1.3. From professional fishery to illegal fishing: increasing unfair competition and 
decreasing economic and environmental sustainability 
Although the EU lacks any detailed definition of recreational fishery, with 
specifications varying across member states, the European Commission (EC) describes 
recreational fishery as any fishing activity conducted without a commercial end. 
Fishing gears allowed on board of recreational boats and other specifications are 
instead regulated at the national level. In Italy, recreational fishers are exclusively 
allowed to fish with lines and they can land a maximum of five kilograms of fish per 
person on board. As for Spain, the same two specifications applied and they combined 
with a series of other more articulated restrictions that varied according to fish species 
(Pawson et al., 2008). 
Despite the Communitarian obligation to not make any commercial profit out of 
recreational fish catches, my fieldwork revealed that this was not always the case. 
Indeed, most recreational fishers in Gran Tarajal and Lampedusa sold their catches. 
By operating under more lax regulations and restrictions and a cheaper taxation 
regime, recreational fishers had thus became the professional small-scale fishers’ 
major competitors, whereby their illegal catches competed unfairly with professional 
fishers’ ones. Moreover, as recreational fishers were not obliged to complete a 
logbook,26 unlike professional fishers, they had no obligation of any sort to register 
the weight of catches, the species they fished, the fishing gear they used, the areas 
where they were fished or the amount of hours they spent at sea (Gerritsen and 
                                                          
26 An important section of the CFP is concerned with control technologies and strategies to monitor the European professional fishing fleet through collecting detailed data on fishing activities ‘at every point along the production chain [to prove] that the fish was caught legally [according to] standards [that apply] to all fishing activities in EU waters’ (EC, 2014a). According to EU norms, the logbook is imposed on all captains of vessels longer than ten meters as an essential tool for the implementation of effective control strategies. 
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Lordan, 2010). It was thus very difficult to control and monitor the activities of 
recreational fishers.  
When I was working in Mariano’s fish warehouse, as long as I did not know who 
had a professional fishing licence and who did not, I found it problematic to distinguish 
between who landed legal or illegal catches. Yet, Sandro – Mariano’s father – did not 
express any worry when indicating to me who was fishing legally and who was not. As 
he explained: 
This man who had just landed those fish boxes [two of squid and one of greater amberjack] owned a big vessel of ten tonnes with three other fellows… [However] they could not agree on anything and decided to scrap their vessel to get the compensation and let their 13 fishers [become] unemployed. Now each of the four of them has his own boat: they take tourists around the island during summer, while in winter… they go fishing with a smaller boat and with a bit of squid and a bit of greater amberjacks they make their 50 to 60 Euros per day. 
In Lampedusa, professional fishers sold their catches in the same places that 
recreational fishers did. Moreover, those who were professional fishers during 
summer often became recreational ones during winter. For example, Giorgio, a 
Lampedusan professional big-scale fisher and member of the Fishing Vessel Owners 
Association in Lampedusa, told me:  
Many people on the island take their vessels out of water during winter and apply for unemployment benefits. However… none of them really stop fishing… They keep going with some other boat or they embark with a friend… Our vessel [the Andrea Doria27] is too big so that we would spend too much for taking it out of water… The only thing that remains for us to do [in winter] is to go fishing illegally every time there is good weather, with the other small boat we have! With the big vessel it is not worth going fishing for a few hours,28 while with the small one we just go fishing at a couple of miles from the island. 
                                                          
27http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/index.cfm?method=Search.DetailSearchSimple&event_key=21642467&search_type=advanced&search_id=4342  [Accessed on September 21, 2014] 
28 Giorgio and his brother’s vessel was a 15 meter long trawler that could not face bad sea conditions for too long, so that in winter they preferred to go fishing with the other boat they owned. 
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As can be seen, the situation in Gran Tarajal resembled that of Lampedusa, with a 
contracting professional fishery, a booming recreational fishery, and plenty of catches 
sold illegally. However, although recreational and professional fisheries competed for 
the same local market – especially restaurants and hotels – on Gran Tarajal the 
realities of recreational and professional fisheries were markedly separated. On dry 
land, for a variety of reasons that were mostly dependent on the organisation and 
structure of the local Fishermen’s Association, professional fishers did not share their 
work environment with recreational ones. As for the commercialisation of the 
catches, this also had to pass exclusively through the Fishermen’s Association.  
Spatially speaking, all professional fishing vessels were harboured on a separate – 
and dedicated – section of the port, away from the rest of docks (see Plate 6.3 and 
6.4). Moreover, as the Gran Tarajal Fishermen’s Association directly managed the 
selling of catches, illegal catches had to be sold through other channels. Additionally, 
due to the latitude of Fuerteventura, sea conditions did not change dramatically 
through the seasons, so that local professional fishers could fish throughout the year. 
 
Plate 6.3: Map of Gran Tarajal port and the area where fishers exclusively harbour (image of the Provincial Government of Fuerteventura elaborated by the author) 
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Plate 6.4: Gran Tarajal fishermen’s docks (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu elaborated by the author) 
 
Notwithstanding such a separation, many of those fishing illegally in the Spanish 
island were retired professional fishers. Juan explained: 
Here the problem is that there are too many fishermen that go fishing with no licence. Better: they only have the licence for recreational fishery… They fish like us, if not more than us. I want to tell you something more: many of them were professional fishermen before… They normally sell their catches to restaurants or hotels that already asked for their fish… They are becoming our main competitors here on the island - since they have less expenses, they sell their catches for much cheaper prices.  
If illegal fishers were not retired fishers, they were effectively potential 
professional fishers who could not find their way into professional fishing. The 
economic consequences of the unfair competition from recreational fishery was seen 
as devastating for the professional small-scale fisheries: 
The problem for us is not really the lack of fish: in fact, I would not say that there is less fish now than there was one or two decades ago… Our major problem is illegal fishing that competes with us for the same local market… Here, as in many other Italian small ports, recreational fishers’ catches are sold in the same boxes as our fish is sold: they put them together. Fish traders register all the catches in the same invoice and that is it! Since recreational fishers sell their 
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catches at much cheaper prices… we have to reduce our selling prices as well… I am not necessarily referring to those retired fishermen with their little boats that go fishing to get their 50 Euros a day that help them to survive… I refer to those with powerful boats that made illegal fishing their own profession... Authorities do not do anything to them, and they rather come and control us. (Francesco) 
When selling their catches, recreational fishers impacted upon small-scale fisheries 
at three levels: they unfairly competed within the same market; they competed for 
the same maritime resources, and, by using heavily impacting fishing gears to fish in 
forbidden areas and periods of the year, recreational fishers’ activities were seen to 
be the major cause of small-scale fishery target species depletion (Post et al., 2011; 
Coleman et al., 2004).  
Miguel, of the Fishery Control Unit of the Provincial Government in Gran Tarajal, 
stressed that it was much simpler for recreational fishers to act illegally compared to 
professional small-scale fishermen: 
Here in Gran Tarajal there are almost no violations perpetuated by professional fishermen. On the other hand you have plenty of illicit conducts concerning the recreational fishing sector… They fish where it is forbidden; they fish prohibited species; they fish during the biological bans: they basically undermine all conservation policies in place. 
Official data on illegal fishing confirm – and worsen – the situation Miguel and 
other fishers described to me. A recent assessment of unreported landings for Spain 
highlights that 36 per cent of unreported landings came from recreational fishers. 
Then, another 32 per cent correspond to the black market – where, again, recreational 
fishers got most of the share. Another 17 per cent was unloaded by those fishermen 
fishing for sustenance. Professional fishers’ unreported catches thus amounted to two 
per cent of the total amount of illegal landings (Bellido Millán et al., 2014). Similar 
data apply for the Mediterranan (Tuleda, 2004).  
This is not to say that before EU regulations on fishery, local fishers did not engage 
in any illicit fishing activity. What seems to be the case however, is that the CFP’s 
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inconsistencies and uneven distribution of the costs of its implementation – 
conservation policies hit most severely the economy of relatively sustainable small-
scale fisheries – constitute fishers’ main rationale for conducting illegal activities at 
sea: 
The problem is that fishers complaining today [about] the unfair competition of recreational fishers, tomorrow will be fishing illegally with a recreational fishing license once they will have withdrawn their professional license. If things remain as they are now, this is what everyone will end up doing. Today you are damaged by recreational fishers. Tomorrow you will be [a recreational fisher] selling illegally your catches… I bet that when there will be the next round of subsidies to stop fishing, those whose application will succeed will turn into recreational fishers! (Piero) 
The second generation of EU structural policies for fishery, aimed at preserving 
maritime living resources, had thus produced quite the opposite effect of endangering 
coastal environments and the economy of local professional small-scale fisheries.  
Although small-scale fishers provided for almost half of the entire workforce 
employed in the European fishing industry, EU policymakers seem unaware of such 
inconsistent situations facilitated by Communitarian regulations. When I attended the 
public hearing for the reform of the CFP organized by the European Parliament Fishery 
Committee (EPFC), during his speech to the Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) and members of the EC, Alberico Simioli of the Legacoop Pesca Campania29 
denounced the damages that recreational fisheries had caused to small-scale 
professional ones. Yet when I approached him at the end of the hearing, he resignedly 
told me that it was not the first time they had denounced the situation: yet no decision 
was taken to do anything about it so far. Indeed, the EC’s green paper for the 2009 
reform of the CFP mentions recreational fishery only once, equating it – and the need 
to protect it – with small-scale fishery: ‘Fisheries with their large share of small- and 
                                                          
29 The Legacoop Pesca Campania is the league of fishermen cooperatives of the Italian region of Campania- http://www.legacoopcampania.it/?page_id=55546 [Accessed on June 02, 2013]  
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medium-sized companies play an important role in the social fabric and the cultural 
identity of many of Europe’s coastal regions. […] It is therefore essential to secure a 
future for coastal, small-scale, and recreational fishermen’ (EC, 2009: 14). Although 
structural policies certainly helped, providing fishers with financial opportunities to 
diversify their sources of income, engage in tourism, and allow them to continue to 
own boats and thus continue to ‘play an important role in the social fabric and cultural 
identity’ of the islands, they also further endangered the health of European 
seawaters. In other words, the setting of subsidies to scrap vessels or withdraw 
professional fishing licences did not exactly correspond with the approach that EU 
professional small-scale fishers would recommend. The same applied for a series of 
other key conservation policies implemented within the frame of the CFP. 
 
6.2. Conservation Policies and the privatisation of the sea 
As for the shift in the structural policies that I have described, through the years the 
CFP increasingly concentrated on conservation policies (Karagiannakos, 1995). The 
first Communitarian attempt to regulate and limit the access to European fish 
resources dates back to 1983, with the introduction of the Total Allowable Catches 
system (TACs). This complex system of quotas was designed to limit member states’ 
catches per fish species, based on scientific elaboration of data on commercial fish 
landings (Franchino and Rahming, 2003; Mansfield, 2004). In 1992, the first reformed 
CFP introduced the key concept of ‘fishing effort’ as an index combining several 
vessels’ technical parameters – such as the engine power, the length of the hull and 
the main fishing gear. This was in order to balance national fleets’ productivity on the 
one side, and the available fishing opportunities on the other. In 1998 a list of 
minimum sizes of marine organisms was introduced with the Council Regulation 
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850/9830 while, with the 2002 reform of the CFP, policymakers introduced and 
explicitly prioritized further conservation policies to protect European marine 
ecosystems (Lutchman et al., 2009). The TACs system combined with the ban to fish 
specific and endangered fish species, while the EC developed a series of technical 
conservation measures aimed at limiting the impact or the use of determined fishing 
gears and techniques (Long and Curran, 2000).  
As for the second wave of structural policies, their conservation elements had most 
severely affected small-scale fishers rather than their commercial and industrial 
colleagues. In the next section, I thus analyse the local impacts of the TACs on small-
scale fisheries, before examining how local fishers made sense of these limitations in 
the light of their interactions with non-EU fisheries operating just off the 12 miles of 
territorial waters surrounding the two islands.  
 
6.2.1. The unjust distribution of quotas 
The TACs system consisted of a regime of quotas to limit the landings – and thus the 
catching – of specific endangered fish species. Imposed to tackle the damages 
produced by overfishing, this complex system was meant to regulate the access of 
European fisheries to maritime resources, and it was set periodically on the basis of 
scientific evaluations exchanged among EU countries (EC, 2014b). Once quotas are 
established at the EU level and distributed nationally, single member states allocate 
them to national fisheries in the form of individual shares for either vessels’ owners 
or fishing consortiums and cooperatives. Those receiving quotas own them and are 
                                                          
30http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014PC0265&from=EN [Accessed on February 3, 2015] 
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entitled to use or sell them to other national stakeholders (Cataudella and Spagnolo, 
2011).  
Here, I will limit my analysis to Bluefin tuna, since it is the only species whose 
fishing was also regulated through quotas on the Mediterranean - and thus in 
Lampedusa as well (EC, 2010). In particular, it was the International Commission for 
the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) that was responsible for the conservation 
of tuna and which transmits quotas to the EU. In its turn, the EU then distributed these 
nationally. During an interview with the Fuerteventura province’s ministry for fishery, 
Rita Diaz Hernandez,31 she expressed her full concern regarding the TACs system:  
A recent example of the damages that the TACs system can produce on local fisheries regards Bluefin tuna. This is an island whose fisheries historically benefited from and were organized around the passages of Bluefin tuna… This year the central government assigned a maximum quota of 25 tons of tuna to the whole archipelago… Meanwhile, big vessels from mainland Spain come here to fish their quota of tuna: this is madness. 
There were two major problems upon which small-scale fishers lamented in 
relation to the distribution of the right to access tuna fishing. First, they felt they were 
again paying the price for the damages that someone else – the industrial fishery – 
had produced. Second – and most importantly – almost everyone I spoke to 
emphasized the fact that quotas too often remained in the hands of the biggest and 
more powerful and influential actors of the European fishing industry: those big 
vessels who had depleted the stock. As Juan Ramon told me: 
They introduced the quota system and since then we are not allowed to catch any tuna or, depending on whether or not you get your quota, you can only catch a certain amount of it. But, the right question should be: who owns these quotas? Big vessels and consortiums have the quotas since they can buy them. They are the same that depleted the stocks and that generated the conditions that pushed authorities to introduce these limitations… Believing in politicians’ good faith, this looks like a schizophrenic policy. There is no doubt that this 
                                                          
31http://www.cabildofuer.es/portal/p_46_final_Distribuidor_3.jsp?seccion=s_fdes_d4_v1.jsp&codbusqueda=199&language=es&codResi=1&codMenuPN=1&codMenuSN=4&codMenu=217&layout=p_46_final_Distribuidor_3.jsp [Accessed on June 23, 2014] 
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system is wrong since [those] who pay the major costs are always inshore fishermen who did not generate the problem.  
 Once distributed individually at the national level, quotas went, in the vast 
majority, to big fishing enterprises who held enough capital to buy them. Given their 
limited access to capital, small-scale fishermen’s associations will unlikely take the risk 
of investing in the quotas. To not catch enough tuna would have compromised the 
entire association’s financial stability. Besides, many lamented that there seemed to 
be numerous inconsistencies within how quotas were set and what they actually 
experienced at sea. Rather than mirroring the state of local fish stocks and fisheries, 
TACs were seen as distributed on the basis of political compromises. Juan Ramon 
continued: 
This year the Canary Islands had a 25 ton quota of Bluefin tuna. This obviously does not make any sense since in the archipelago 600 vessels do tuna fishing. As for the Mediterranean, the EU gave to Spain 700 tons of quota. However, you must consider that Spain has much less tuna fishing vessels in the Mediterranean. 
Bluefin tuna pass yearly in the seawaters surrounding both islands and constitutes 
one of the most valuable catches for small-scale fisheries. Given the average weight 
of this species – single tunas can weigh 3-500 kilograms - and the value given to parts 
of its flesh – such as the belly that can be sold for up to 200 Euros per kilogram – 
Bluefin tuna certainly represents by far the best possible catch for small fishers (see 
Table 6.1).  
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FISH SPECIES PRICE PER KG AVERAGE 
WEIGHT 
AVERAGE WHOLESALE 
PRICE PER FISH  
Red Snapper 14€ 5/20kg 70/280€ 
Grouper 10€ 5/20kg 50/200€ 
Greater 
Amberjack 
8€ 8/15kg 64/120€ 
Swordfish 10€ 110/140kg 1100/1400€ 
Bluefin Tuna 5€ 3/400kg 1500/2000€ 
Table 6.1: Most common fished species in Lampedusa with the corresponding indicative average wholesale prices per kg for 2012, the indicative average weight of catches and the indicative average wholesale price per fish for 2012 (data elaborated by the author as they were collected through participant observation and interviews in Lampedusa) 
 
Consequently, inshore fishers perceived TACs as highly costly limitations that 
negatively impacted the economic sustainability of their job. Yet, since fishers 
perceived this set of regulations as unjust, the authority of the EU was de-legitimised, 
making it easier for them to morally circumvent its rules (cf. Tyler, 2006). Around 
midday of one of the many days I spent at Mariano’s warehouse, when there was 
almost no one else around, he took me to a side door of his shop. When he opened 
the door, I could only see frozen tuna. They were tens of big Bluefin tuna and they 
were stored into a sort of clandestine refrigerating room just one door from his 
warehouse. Taking me there, he wanted to demonstrate to me that fishers kept 
fishing tuna, either voluntarily or as by-catch when, for instance, fishing swordfish 
with longlines, and that local authorities were complicit with fishermen:  
Here people keep fishing tuna while authorities turn a blind eye to them. The same happens in mainland Sicily where I had been working for the last five years… The Coastguard let them fish: actually, most of the time they do not even have the money to get gas on their patrolling boats and eventually follow them. When fishers return on dryland, the Coastguard control their catches and vessels either randomly or because some other fish trader told them to go and check those vessels. [When they find tuna] fishers are convicted and fined, while the Coastguard seize the catch. At this point – and that is why you can find a lot of tuna in any of the warehouses on this island – often [the Coastguard illegally] sell the tuna to either the traders who informed them or to the fish 
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trader that corrupted them… They obviously do not throw tuna away so that it keeps circulating, although it is sold at lower prices since it is [an] illegal catch. (Francesca)  
It is clear that the CFP’s provisions were ineffective in terms of improving the 
environmental sustainability of local fishery, while at the same time severely 
undermining the economic performance of professional small-scale fishing. Facing 
economic insecurity and scarce – or corrupt - law enforcement, in Lampedusa, the 
fishers very easily acted against the law, although recreational fishers were more 
involved, since they did have to run the risk of seeing their expensive professional 
fishing licence suspended or revoked. Deviation from the CFP legal restrictions was 
also buttressed by fishers’ direct knowledge of the sea: on both islands fishers 
repeatedly emphasized that the Bluefin tuna stock was always quick to recover from 
over-fishing. The fishers’ first-hand practical experience of the sea and its fish was 
utilised here as a reason to contest the legitimacy of EU impositions. Effectively, they 
denied that they were harming tuna stocks (cf. Sykes and Matza, 1957). This denial 
was made even simpler, considering that tuna was often caught as by-catch when 
using longlines. Here, the fishers could not help but catch tuna – and they could thus 
deny their intention. Denial was made even easier as local fishers constantly 
encountered non-European fishers catching as many tunas as they wanted in 
international waters. 
 
6.2.2. Fish do not stop at the border: conservation policies do 
Countless non-European industrial fishing vessels operated daily out of the 12 miles 
of both Italian and Spanish territorial waters. Frequently, these non-European fishers 
used techniques and gears forbidden aboard of Communitarian vessels. Enzo 
expressed his anger about this: 
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Even if we agreed with European regulation and every one of us complied with them… we cannot feel any commitment to them. Every day we see Tunisian… fishers catching tunas just a few hundreds of meters away from us! We are told not to fish tuna because otherwise the stock will collapse: at the same time, Tunisian fishers catch the same tunas we would catch, and then they sell them in Italy and the rest of Europe… If we have to stop because of any environmental concern, then they should stop as well: am I wrong? 
Fishers’ experiences at sea undermined the CFP provisions’ legitimacy once more. 
Within the frame of EU policy-making on fishery, third-countries’ commitment to 
maritime conservation policies constituted one of the major issues on the table. 
Indeed, in order to preserve migratory fish stocks from collapsing, the application of 
conservation policies must necessarily transcend the limits of territorial waters. 
However, several factors undermined the EU and member states’ negotiating power. 
Neighbouring countries such as, for instance, Tunisia and Morocco, felt themselves 
legitimated to not comply with any EU conservation policy after European fishing 
fleets had overfished for decades on their waters. For these groups, it was seen as 
their turn to make profits out of their seas (Feidi, 1998): 
It does not make any sense to stop people fishing a certain fish if you allow someone else to fish it 100 meters southern. Fish do not stop at the border… I cannot see how [EU] institutions can claim that these policies aim at preserving the species… It seems rather a development policy for Tunisia and North Africa in general so that they can grow a local strong fishing sector that might work as an economic driver for the region. (Francesca) 
Although Francesca was not familiar with academic literature on the topic, given 
her first-hand knowledge of the Sicilian and Tunisian fishing industries, she pretty 
much framed the issue as most specialists do (see De Sombre and Barkin, 2011; 
Acheampong, 1997; Papaconstantinou and Farrugio, 1999). The fishing sector in 
Tunisia was literally booming, and their main market was Europe. The problem 
concerning the geographical as well as operational limits of conservation policies was 
that there was little point implementing them on migratory fish stocks if the effort did 
not come from every national stakeholder, including non-European countries. As for 
other areas of the CFP, this inconsistency unavoidably undermined not only the 
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effects that the policy might aim to produce, but its legitimacy from the perspectives 
of fishers who experienced, at their own expense, all of CFP’s contradictions and 
paradoxes. 
 
6.3. - Conclusion 
Since the introduction of the CFP, EU governance of fishery kept directly and 
profoundly influencing small-scale professional fishers’ everyday life on both islands.  
With the second wave of structural policies designed to reduce the environmental 
damages produced by the previous modernisation and expansion of the European 
fleet, the pouring of professional fishers into the tourist industry was accelerated. EU 
subsidies combined with the increasing operational costs of professional fishery 
consequent to the implementation of CFP’s conservation policies, pushing 
professional fishers away from their profession and into illegal fishing and the tourist 
sector, further jeopardizing the economic and environmental sustainability of local 
professional fisheries.  
Yet, while the EU’s inconsistent and scarcely effective regulations lost legitimacy, 
both the recreational fishing and tourism industry developed on the two islands within 
a frame of diffuse illegality. At sea, illegality endangered local maritime ecosystems, 
invalidating conservation policies implemented by law-abiding professional fishers, 
further reducing the profitability of professional fishery and increasing its operational 
costs. In this way, a vicious circle was activated, leading more professional small-scale 
fishers to opt out and turn toward illegal fishing, further marginalizing professional 
small-scale fishery.  
While European management of fishery had already contributed significantly in 
transforming the lives of small-scale fishers and the sociocultural and economic fabric 
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of their communities, across the end of the 1980s and the 1990s, Lampedusa started 
being turned into an outpost of the European external border, producing further and 
profound alterations of everyday life on the island, which is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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7. LIVING THE BORDER 
‘Welcome to Death Island’ (Gill, 2013)  
 
Europe’s external border replaced a pre-existing boundary that Lampedusans had 
transgressed for decades - and continued to transgress (Andreas, 2000; Walters, 
2006). Since the late 1990s, when Europe’s outer border moved to the middle of the 
Mediterranean, border management was structured in Lampedusa through the 
European Union (EU) authorities’ strategic use of the island and their simultaneous 
neglect for the concerns of the population inhabiting it. The border is an expansive 
and massive machinery, permanently working from the island and in its surrounding 
seawaters. Yet, in Lampedusa, even the most basic welfare services and facilities were 
lacking. On top of this tension, despite the huge political and media attention about 
the island as ‘the quintessential embodiment of the Euro-African migration and 
border regime’ (Cuttitta, 2014: 199), islanders’ voices remained marginal within the 
production and reproduction of the border narrative surrounding Lampedusa. In this 
sense, the EU external border was put into operation, regardless of Lampedusans’ 
everyday life (Boelpaep, 2013). Yet, locals, especially fishers, interacted frequently 
with the border apparatus established on and around their island. 
The working of the EU border impacted on Lampedusans’ everyday lives mainly at 
two levels. First, islanders dealt with the multiple concrete manifestations of the 
border and its management on the ground such as migrant detention centres, 
patrolling boats, radars and so like – what can be called ‘border functions’ (Szary and 
Giraut, 2015). At a second and more discursive level, there were a number of local 
effects related to the island’s increased visibility – or centrality - within the media, of 
political and academic representations of Europe’s border and migration regimes. As 
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Cuttitta (2014) puts it, both these components structure Lampedusa’s borderness as 
the condition of being at the border, which results from Lampedusa’s geography, 
combined with a series of policies, practices and discourses developed in and around 
the island; a set of processes that can be called borderization (Cuttitta, 2012: 25). 
In this chapter I explore these two dimensions of Lampedusa’s borderness. Before 
doing so, in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the borderization 
processes at play, I discuss how Lampedusans had experienced a form of marginality 
unrelated to specific EU policies. Further to this introductory section, I begin with the 
analysis of the most tangible mechanics of Europe’s outer border ‘on the ground’, 
examining how Lampedeusian small-scale fishers interacted with it, and took part in 
its functioning and management. I then move to an examination of Lampedusa’s 
mediated centrality within national and European narratives about the border, 
charting the effects of such disproportionate attention on the small and once isolated 
population.  
 
7.1. On Lampedusa’s borderness: inhabiting the margins of Italy 
Cuttitta (2014: 197) highlights that not ‘only most Italians but also many other EU 
citizens immediately link Lampedusa with keywords like ‘irregular migration’ and 
‘migrant boats’’. Yet, to live on the quintessential loci of Europe’s border regime is 
simply a part of the islanders’ experience of borderness. Being at the border does not 
refer necessarily or exclusively to migration and border policies per se.  Everyday life 
on small detached islands may encompass frequent experiences of isolation and 
marginality (Royle, 2008; Burholt et al., 2013). Isolation, as a common condition of 
being at the margins of any territorial unit, might refer to the perception of 
geographical distance from ‘the rest’, or to structural difficulties in accessing stable 
137  
 
supplies of goods. To live in the middle of the open sea often implies difficult 
communications and travel from and to the closest mainland. To inhabit the 
geographical peripheries, in this sense, is experienced at a variety of levels (Buhalis, 
1999). As for Lampedusa, marginality refers, for instance, to the precarious and 
unreliable ferry connection or to the lack of adequate hospital or school facilities on 
the island. In relation to Lampedusans’ everyday lives, marginality was not only 
multidimensional, but also extremely significant. 
 
7.1.1. Experienced marginality 
One of the major dimensions of Lampedusans’ experienced marginality related to the 
limited connections of the island with Sicily. This is not something that one may realize 
at first glance: on paper, the almost 6,000 officially registered Lampedusans count on 
one ferry to Porto Empedocle and two flights to Palermo per day all over the year, 
plus a series of extra connections – with further flights and a hydrofoil – during 
summer. However, once I was on the island, I realized myself how hard and costly it 
was for islanders to reach Sicily. At the same time, I appreciated that these 
connections with the mainland performed a fundamental role in ensuring stability on 
the detached island. If, for fishers, the ferry constituted the only means to access fish 
markets and sell their catches, the ferry was also the only way for islanders to get 
basic goods otherwise not available in Lampedusa. Given the relatively limited size of 
the Lampedusan fishing vessels, boat owners would need special permission to cross 
the often-rough stretch of sea dividing the island with mainland Sicily. Additionally, 
the aircraft connecting the island with Palermo was not suitable to transport any 
goods - having no licence to load anything else than passengers and their luggage 
(Plate 7.1).  
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Plate 7.1: Lampedusa’s Alitalia aircraft in 2014 (@ Francesca del Volgo - elaborated by the author)  
 
Given the deteriorated working conditions of the ferry that had almost 30 years of 
service, it covered the distance with Sicily over nearly half a day when it took the 
chance of crossing the sea. Mariano, the fish trader who allowed me to work inside 
his fish warehouse, elaborated on some of the problems that islanders faced when 
relying on the ferry:  
I do not know whether the ferry will come the following day until late in the evening. I call the ferry company every day around nine in the evening, two hours before departure, so that I will know whether the ferry will arrive here the following morning! Therefore, when fishers go fishing I do not know whether I will be able to send their catches to the market the following day… While time passes, catches lose most of their value, even though I had already paid the fishers.  
During my stay on the island, the ferry arrived on average two or three times per 
week although, due to sea conditions, once it did not come for 20 consecutive days. 
According to Mariano, fish traders were losing most out of these frequent and 
unpredictable disruptions. Yet, at the same time, fish traders often used the awkward 
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ferry connection as a justification to lower the price of catches they paid to local 
fishers. Prolonged severe weather conditions could also lead to the lack of adequate 
food provisions for the Lampedusan population. Since islanders had abandoned 
agriculture and farming when the archipelago’s economy turned primarily to tourism, 
goods from outside the island had become a necessity.32  
As both the ferry company and the airline were funded by substantial public 
subsidies to cover their connections to the island, many islanders saw these 
deficiencies as a result of Italian institutional failure:  
The ferry and the aircraft are for us the only connections to the rest of Italy. They operate thanks to [a] huge amount of state subsidies and… authorities should be in charge of checking whether the companies benefiting from them provide the services: the territorial continuity33 is a constitutional principle and our basic right. (Enzo) 
The lack of adequate hospital and school facilities constituted another sign of the 
island’s marginality and was a source of major anxiety for islanders. Expectant 
mothers had to fly to Palermo at their own expense to give birth, while the local 
elementary school was evacuated during October 2013 due to the risk of collapse 
because of its deteriorated structure. Although these manifestations of the island’s 
marginality had little to do with EU policies or the establishment of the EU border in 
Lampedusa, they tended to exacerbate locals’ relation to those authorities that had 
established the Schengen external border there. The day-to-day deprivations 
experienced on Lampedusa contrasted with the substantial financial capital invested 
in the island to keep the border fully functioning. This contradiction had framed 
                                                          
32 Until the 1980s, meat came from cows farmed in the neighbouring island of Linosa and were butchered in the two slaughterhouses of Lampedusa. Moreover, the interior of Lampedusa was cultivated, and the products of the island’s canning industry guaranteed a safe provision of food always available for locals in case of prolonged isolation (Mancini, 1978). 
33 The principle of territorial continuity derives from citizens’ right to access the same social and economic opportunities. As a mere economic activity, transportation guarantees also the essential right of mobility as required by Article 16 of the Italian constitution, regardless of where citizens reside. 
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Lampedusans’ understanding, experience and perception of the EU external border 
and its management in Lampedusa, a border whose functioning I now analyse in 
detail.  
 
7.2. On Lampedusa’s borderness: inhabiting the margins of the EU. 
With Italy joining the Schengen space of free movement of people in 1997, Lampedusa 
became part of the EU external border (DG Home Affairs, 2014; Friese, 2008). 
However, as Caloggero – a retired Lampedusan shipwright - told me, migrants’ arrivals 
in Lampedusa had begun earlier: 
Around 1993 young Tunisians on board of some old wreck reached the island. There were no officials controlling them and most boat-migrants did not know that they had landed on such an isolated rock… Often they asked us where the train station was… As soon as they discovered that they had reached just half of their journey, they purchased a ferry ticket and went to Sicily: no one checked their passports.  
Migrants’ boats had thus crossed this strait of sea before Europe’s external border 
moved southwards to the middle of the Sicilian channel. At this time, Italian 
authorities would largely overlook arrivals, and the boat migrant phenomenon went 
generally unnoticed by the media (Cuttitta, 2014). What changed with the Schengen 
space of free movement of people encompassing Lampedusa was that arrivals started 
to be perceived and managed differently. With the Italian normative frame on 
migration adjusting to the European one, and an ensuing increased number of 
undocumented migrants’ border crossings that were detected, securitisation replaced 
the previous laissez faire and improvised approach (Léonard, 2011; Van Houtum and 
Pijper, 2007).  
Paola, the personal assistant to Lampedusa’s mayor, a lawyer and the owner of a 
bed and breakfast on the island, remembered this shift: 
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Once authorities started to organize themselves to deal with the issue – for instance with the opening of the first detention centre at the airport – the strategy aimed at separating the phenomenon from locals. Authorities’ strategy was to hide all they could hide from the eyes of Lampedusans. As soon as migrants arrived on dry land, a bus took them to the centre and they disappeared from [the] islanders’ sight.  
With the introduction of the Immigration Act 40/199834 Italian legislators adjusted 
the national rules to Schengen parameters (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). Now 
migrants had to be detained - and hidden from islanders. New detention facilities 
were built, and old military facilities were converted to house migrants or they were 
being used on the island to detain newcomers (Tsianos and Karakayali, 2010). 
Alongside this, several European external sea-border patrolling missions coordinated 
by FRONTEX were launched from the island (Spijkerboer, 2007; Carrera, 2007; Giorgi 
and Pinkus, 2006; Barrero and de Witte, 2007; Paoletti, 2011). As the Warsaw based 
European agency started managing the operations carried out around the island by 
different member states’ navies and armies, the EU border regime in Lampedusa also 
became structured through a quasi-militarisation of the island and the seawaters 
surrounding it.  
Europe’s external frontier in Lampedusa had, however, developed as an unstable 
and multi layered apparatus. Not only was the functioning of the border transformed 
through time, but it was also continually re-structured as a vast maritime and land 
area, relying on the use of diverse and integrated surveillance and defence devices 
with the involvement of several actors. To understand how border functions were 
introduced and fashioned through time, below I distinguish between the maritime 
and the (is)land border. 
 
                                                          
34 http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/98040l.htm [Accessed on July 23, 2015] 
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7.2.1. The EU border at sea 
Before focusing on the border dividing Lampedusa and the EU from North Africa, I 
analyse briefly how this frontier was traced onto the sea. As I have explained, 
Lampedusans and especially fishers, constantly crossed the seawaters separating 
Tunisia and Italy. However, following Tunisian independence, this situation changed 
alongside the mutating relations between Italy and the EU on the one side, and Tunisia 
on the other.  
 
Contested Waters 
In 1951, following Tunisia’s freedom from the French colonists, a bilateral agreement 
between the Tunisian government and France provided that the area of the 
Mammellone (see Map 7.1) would become a Tunisian exclusive fishing area. This 
decision constituted a legal precedent in the field of international law of the sea. As 
Chevalier, (2005: 45) argued: 
143  
 
 
Map 7.1: The area of the “Mammellone” coloured in green (@Italian Navy)35 
 
Because of the shallow waters in the region, the external limit of this fishing zone is a line, the points of which are located, in certain cases, as far away as [75 nautical miles] from the Tunisian coast, and only [15 nautical miles] from the Italian island of Lampedusa. The Tunisian fishing zone encompasses the rich bank called “Il Mammellone”, which has traditionally been exploited by Italian fishermen, and is considered as an area of the high seas by Italy. 
However, following the ratification of the agreement, Italian fishing vessels were 
allowed to keep fishing in Tunisian waters thanks to compensations passed by the 
Italian government to its Tunisian counterpart – which can be seen as a form of 
indirect subsidy for Italian fisheries who operated there (Lövin, 2012; Stone, 1997). 
                                                          
35http://www.marina.difesa.it/cosa-facciamo/operazioni-in-corso/Pagine/vigilanza-pesca.aspx [Accessed on April 23, 2014] 
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Later, in 1971, in another exception to international maritime spatial planning, Italy 
agreed to trace the median line delimiting the Italian and Tunisian continental shelves 
without taking into account the presence of both the Pelagic archipelago or the island 
of Pantelleria as base points to calculate the equidistance amongst the Italian and 
Tunisian shores (Karl, 1977). For this reason, the line was drawn a few miles off the 
archipelago. This is why today this boundary literally surrounds the Pelagic islands (see 
Map 7.2). Later, in 1979, when the last fishing agreement between Italy and Tunisia 
was not renewed, Italian fishers lost the preferential access to fish inside Tunisia’s self-
proclaimed territorial waters. As soon as Tunisian forces started patrolling their 
territorial waters and catching Italian vessels, Lampedusa’s fishers experienced for the 
first time the maritime border in their southern seas. 
 
Map 7.2: Median line dividing the Italian and Tunisian continental shelves (@ U.S. Department of State (1980) - elaborated by the author)36 
 
                                                          
36http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58822.pdf [Accessed on November 13, 2014] 
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Following the Tunisian refusal to prolong the agreements, the Italian authorities 
established the Mammellone as a protected no-fishing high-sea area37 for the 
breeding of fish. With the excuse of monitoring Italian fishing vessels and prohibiting 
them from fishing, the Italian Navy launched the Fishing Surveillance Operation – that 
was still in operation during my fieldwork – and which began patrolling the sea south 
from Lampedusa with two ships (Marina Militare, 2014). While the situation 
concerning the Mammellone later stabilized, from 1998, corresponding with the 
establishment of the EU external border in Lampedusa, Italy and Tunisia signed three 
bilateral agreements on border patrol, economic aid and development programmes 
(Coslovi, 2007).  
Since then, the relation between Tunisian and Italian – and Lampedusan – fishers 
around the border was progressively turned upside down. Indeed, over the last 20 
years, that sea once crossed by Lampedusans to access the richer, calmer and warmer 
Tunisian waters, turned into a fishing ground for the increasingly competitive Tunisian 
fishery: 
More than ten years passed since Tunisians started to come fishing on our waters: they… come in groups of five to ten boats and they fish especially around the island of Lampione where the limits of our territorial waters are closer. They go fishing in groups of five to six vessels, and incessantly occupy fishing grounds… Italian authorities do simply nothing to protect our interests. (Enzo) 
Giacomo, a 30 year old former official of the island’s Coastguard echoed this: 
Tunisian vessels entered the island’s waters when I was still working for the Coastguard… The most we did was to push them out of the limits of our waters. You can easily imagine how busy we are here with all the migrants we rescue: we cannot spend our days controlling the waters around Lampione. Not to mention the fact that, although technically speaking we must seize Tunisian vessels and their catches, there has always been a general understanding that 
                                                          
37 Continental shelves determine national exploitation rights only for those resources contained below the bottom of the sea. Since Italy did not fully recognize the Tunisian and French agreement of 1951, from the Italian government’s perspective, Tunisia could only claim exclusive fishing rights over its territorial waters and not beyond 12 nautical miles from their coasts – and certainly not over the Mammellone (Monteforte, 2014). 
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we did not have to bother them excessively: this was at least what commanders told us.  
As a by-product of these processes, Lampedusans experienced marginality at sea, 
with fishers feeling somehow overlooked within a major geopolitical matter between 
the EU, Italy and Tunisia. Nonetheless, Lampedusans continued to cross the border to 
fish illegally in Tunisian waters –a frequent activity on the island. As I will show, the 
EU border apparatus made up of complex surveillance and rescuing systems focussed 
their enforcement almost exclusively on migrant boats, and not on local fishers. 
Indeed, they often relied on the cooperation of fishers in order to help them with their 
task. 
 
Schengen at sea 
The contemporary maritime EU border is enforced by complex electronic surveillance 
devices, big navy ships, drones and helicopters, intelligence deployed in the North 
African coast, Coastguard’s boats, radars, law enforcement officials and more. This 
border covers a vast area of hundreds of square nautical miles through which some 
migrants’ boats are first detected and then intercepted and rescued, and, at times, 
illegally  pushed back towards Africa (Cuttitta, 2006; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). 
Consequently, to provide any meaningful analysis of how the EU external border 
intersected with Lampedusan fishers’ daily lives, it is necessary to disentangle this 
complex and multi-layered border, also paying attention to how its management was 
transformed though the years.  
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Since 200638 the first patrolling and rescuing missions coordinated by FRONTEX and 
the Italian Navy moved southwards, several miles away from the limits of the Italian 
Search and Rescue Area (SAR)39 - see Map 7.3.  
 
Map 7.3: Light blue demarcates the limits of the Italian SAR, while the red line indicates the unilaterally declared boundaries of the Maltese SAR (Malamocco, 2009 - elaborated by the author)40 
 
Initially, migrants only occasionally encountered Lampedusa and landed there 
during their journey to Italy. With the EU management of the border, however, boat 
migrants started being detected and rescued many miles away from Lampedusa but 
were then taken to the island. Here, Lampedusa began to be transformed into an 
                                                          
38http://frontex.europa.eu/operations/archive-of-operations/GULRIV [Accessed on July 23, 2015] 
39 ‘The humanitarian law of the sea dealing with Search and Rescue is covered by various maritime laws […] and traditions, which are put into practice by various actors […] The coastal states […] have a leading role in realizing and implementing the regime […] They are responsible for distress communication and co-ordination in their area of responsibility (SAR area) and for the rescue of persons in distress at sea around their coasts […] The international SAR regime relies on the naval security forces or the coast guards of the coastal states […] on the commitment of all seamen to the longstanding maritime tradition to rescue people in distress […] All vessels at sea, including private commercial vessels, are part of the SAR system and have a duty to rescue.’ (Kleep, 2011) 
40https://geograficamente.wordpress.com/2009/04/20/profughi-leuropa-che-deve-affrontare-unita-lemergenza-umanitaria-del-sud-del-mondo/ [Accessed on May 23, 2014] 
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offshore platform for EU authorities to canalize, filter, detain and eventually deport 
migrants before they could reach mainland Sicily (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2012). 
Border forces relied on four major sources of information to locate migrants’ 
boats. As I heard first-hand from law enforcement officers in what Lampedusans 
called ‘the police beach’, patrolling forces often received intelligence directly from the 
North African shores so that they knew whether and from which areas migrants were 
undertaking their journey. Once migrants’ boats were at sea, patrolling forces 
increasingly then relied on information collected using surveillance technologies such 
as radars and drones monitoring the channel (Hayes, et al. 2014). Often, however, 
both patrolling forces and civilians navigating south of Lampedusa saw migrants’ 
boats and provided coordinates to rescuing forces and/or they directly intervened. 
More recently, migrants had started launching direct requests for assistance using 
satellite phones (Léonard, 2011). This is what the captain of the Carabinieri in 
Lampedusa, Salvatore, explained me before he asked me to turn off the recorder: 
Today what happens most frequently is that migrants send their SOS [to] Father Zerai41 in Rome: they call him with a satellite phone and prove their location so that he can call the Coastguard and someone from here intervene. However, also fishermen often spot first migrants’ boats in distress and call for rescue.  
Rescuing operations tended to take place at a substantial number of nautical miles 
from the island. However, at times and depending also on migrants’ strategies and 
tactics to cross the border, migrant vessels reached the island undetected. This 
happened countless times during 2011 when, following the revolution in Tunisia and, 
later, the civil war in Libya, thousands left the coasts of North Africa heading to Europe 
by boat, via Sicily and Lampedusa (see Plate 7.2).  
                                                          
41 ‘Father Mussie Zerai […] leads a Rome-based refugee charity’ (Van Reisen et al., 2014: 180) 
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Plate 7.2: One of the several migrants’ boats that reached the coasts of Lampedusa in 2011 (@ Nino Taranto)  
 
With the fall of the Ben Alì and Gadhafi governments, Tunisian and Libyan 
patrolling of their own coast and maritime border on behalf of the EU stopped 
(Boubakri, 2004). As Paola told me: 
In 2011 the situation returned somehow to the past, with boat after boat landing directly in Lampedusa: the majority of vessels entered autonomously [into] the port. Authorities could just not patrol the border effectively since too many migrants’ vessels arrived. 
The memories of that year were still very much vivid in Lampedusan fishers’ minds. 
Nicola described to me the difficulties that local fishers had to face in 2011: 
In 2011, you could not go half mile off the island when you had to stop and rescue some migrants’ boat: they all went to Lampedusa. If you were able to make your way across the crowd at the port and leave the pier with your vessel, you just had to stop [a] few hundreds of meters later to assist rescuing this or that migrants’ boat… It was impossible to work!  
Soon after the 2011 crisis ended in September of that same year, with the 
reactivation of the bilateral migration and border management agreements in place 
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before the Tunisian revolution, the border progressively returned to operating at high 
sea (Ufheil-Somers, 2011). For instance, when I was on the island, rescuing operations 
took place largely inside Libyan waters. On the 3rd of October 2013, however, the 
border moved again back to the island just for one tragic day when more than 360 
migrants died on a capsized boat less than one mile from the island (Orsini et al., 
2014).  
Looking at the EU external border from the surface of the seawaters surrounding 
Lampedusa, it can be seen that the external edge of the Schengen space of free 
movement of people actually covered an enormous maritime area corresponding to 
the entire Sicilian channel, with a number of border functions distributed at variable 
distances from the island’s shores. While at sea, therefore, Lampedusan fishers 
interacted either actively or passively with the functioning of the border. These 
interactions generated a variety of major ethical concerns for local fishers. 
 
Sea ethic at stake 
Legally speaking, Lampedusan fishers were involved in the management of the Italian 
SAR – as was anyone else navigating in that area (Malamocco, 2009). International 
maritime legal requirements and traditions encouraged fishers to rescue anyone in 
distress at sea.42 However, around Lampedusa, maritime law conflicted with national 
legal provisions concerning undocumented border crossing. Indeed, in line with the 
law of the sea, if fishers rescued people in distress at sea in either territorial or 
international waters, they should have been protected against any legal consequence 
                                                          
42 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Convention) provides that: ‘Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag […] (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him.’ (Watch the Med, 2015) 
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on dry land. In reality, however, if fishermen decided to take migrants on board their 
vessels, they became caught up in long and costly criminal proceedings for their 
apparent favouring of illegal immigration. Although these proceeds often ended with 
acquittals, they nevertheless lasted for years and entailed substantial legal expenses 
(Vassallo Paleologo, 2007; Salamone, 2011). Giovani explained: 
When you see someone in need of assistance in the middle of the sea you must stop and help… Initially many of us helped and took the risk of carrying on very dangerous operations: it is never easy or safe to transfer people from one boat to another in the middle of the sea, especially when boats are overcrowded and the sea is not calm. Either boat can very easily capsize… Today, however, if you rescue a boat migrant you will deal with serious legal and economic consequences on dry land: those fishers who had rescued migrants at sea had to answer authorities’ interrogation… running the risk of being incriminated for favouring illegal immigration… Meanwhile, officials seize your vessel at least for a couple of days to carry inspections on board of it, since illegal immigration became a crime… Nowadays fishers do not rescue migrants at sea anymore: they do not want to get into trouble. Authorities treat us as if we were traffickers… Fishers have to escape from their responsibilities because they are afraid of the legal consequences of saving someone’s life. 
In 2009, under the so called ‘security package’, the then Italian Ministry of Home 
Affairs introduced legislation that made unauthorized presence in the country a crime 
(Ambrosini, 2011; Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini, 2011). Since then, providing support 
to migrants entering the territory of the country – no matter whether they were 
risking their lives – exposed fishers to the danger of being incriminated for being 
involved in illegal immigration.43  
The functioning of Europe’s external border thus challenged the most basic rules 
of navigation and mutual support, excluding boat migrants in the name of their 
‘unclear and undefined status that threaten our interests’ (Van Houtum and 
Boedeltje, 2009: 227). In effect, the contravention of the traditional law and norms of 
the sea with regard to rescuing people in danger had dehumanised boat migrants, 
                                                          
43 Despite the Italian government’s abrogation of the law in May 2014, the new normative would not apply before December 2015.  
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suggesting that they were somehow not human and thus not protected by seafaring 
norms. The fishers of Lampedusa thus carefully avoided migrants and prevented them 
from boarding their boats– unless the Coastguard asked them to do so. Enzo explained 
this situation: 
When you spot some migrants’ boat in distress, you stop, call the Coastguard… and wait until someone comes. You take off your nets from the water and try to stay close to boat-migrants, passing them what you have on board: water, food and so on. What you do not have to do is to take anyone on board of your vessel. 
According to several fishers, rescuing operations of this kind were extremely 
frustrating. Fishers felt themselves helpless to assist, especially when the conditions 
of migrants’ vessels were precarious. Such operations were time consuming and costly 
to the fishers’ work at sea. This was the case especially for small-scale fishers during 
the bad season, when they went fishing only for a few days per month: once the 
fishers were at sea they were reluctant to lose the entire fishing day and the money 
spent for fuel and baits to rescue yet another migrant boat. Although no one was 
explicit regarding the avoidance of rescuing operations, they mentioned it on several 
occasions, referring to acquaintances or friends working on other vessels, rather than 
to their own direct experiences. For instance, Giuseppe said: 
Fishers on this island are on the frontline: it is as if a war was fought just off from our island’s shores… We are, the fishermen, among those rescuing the victims of such unjust and uneven war… However, people must understand that… we need to work here and we are not the Red Cross. I have always helped anyone I found in distress out at sea. However, I heard that sometimes, some of us prefer to turn their head to the other side… I do not approve what they do but I understand them. Besides the possible and negative legal consequences of rescuing migrants, you must also consider that every time you try to help people at sea you lose a lot of time – hours – and money! 
Given the high frequency with which Lampedusa’s fishers met migrants’ boats at 
sea, the fishers had got progressively accustomed to the situation, but their maritime 
ethic succumbed to more economic and formal legal calculations. The seafarers’ logic 
of mutual assistance and reciprocity - developed over centuries as necessary for 
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enduring an extreme geographic context such as the sea – had been altered to apply 
differently, depending on the individual who was in need of help or assistance. At the 
basis of this selective – or exclusive – attitude, was a complex set of normative 
provisions applying to migrants and the security discourse surrounding them, 
combined with the actual working of the border on the sea around Lampedusa. Boat 
migrants had become the exception to the law and ethics of the sea, as if they were 
inside the water but already behind the bars of the detention centres. Here, their 
humanity was denied in favour of EU security, they had become deemed the ‘human 
waste’ of our globalized time with which no European should come into contact 
(Agamben, 2003; Bauman, 2004). 
Seen from this angle, the EU external border regime at sea entailed three major 
conditions for fishers to commit crimes of obedience (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989). 
Fishers felt themselves institutionally authorized not to rescue migrants, and this had 
become a routinized (in-)activity. Moreover, the dehumanisation of migrants was 
supported by institutional discourses and laws concerning them, as well as by the 
frequent practice of leaving migrants starving and dying at sea. Third, these 
conditions, furthermore, had spun a web of ‘pluralistic ignorance’ (Thiel 2014) 
amongst the fishers who, by rarely discussing these controversial issues amongst one 
another, assumed that every other fisher on the island would do the same. 
Pluralistic ignorance became even more relevant concerning possibly one of the 
grimmest experiences that Lampedusa’s fishers dealt with in the seawaters 
surrounding their island. When fishing south from Lampedusa, it was not at all rare to 
catch migrants’ bodies or parts of them in local fishermen’s fishing nets. When this 
happened, fishers were again forced to decide what to do in light of the financial costs 
related to taking bodies on dry land. To publicize these sorts of events might 
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negatively affect the image of the local fish and fishing industry, attracting the 
dissatisfaction of other fishers. Yet, if fishers decided to announce their ‘catches’ to 
the authorities – as they should have done according to the law - they would have to 
immediately return to dry land, jettison all their catches and leave their vessels to 
authorities for at least two days so that they could conduct their inspections.  
This dynamic produced two main outcomes for fishers. On the one hand, they 
facilitated a further degradation and dehumanisation of boat-migrants. On the other, 
such a situation lead to a dramatic change of fishers’ perceptions of their workplace – 
the sea. Mimmo explained: 
I have to admit that I do not like going fishing to earn a living. However, if there was a moment of the fishing day that I always enjoyed that was the night guard. When we remain at sea for a couple of days, by night one of us remains awake while the other three sleep. When the sea was calm, I really loved to remain alone on the deck surrounded by the darkness of the sea. Now I do not enjoy night guards anymore… I would rather say that they became what I hate the most of going fishing here in Lampedusa. I am afraid of migrants. What do I do if I fish a body when all the others are asleep? What happens if I spot a migrant boat? 
Independent of these dynamics juxtaposing fishers’ economic and legal 
evaluations to the obligation of rescuing migrants at sea or taking their bodies back to 
dry land, fishers nevertheless performed a key role in the management of Europe’s 
external border at sea. They were often those that first spotted migrants in distress 
and who called the rescue forces to intervene. However, the same could not be said 
concerning the workings of the EU external border on the (is)land. 
 
7.3. The EU border on the (is)land 
Once rescued by the Coastguard, migrants were taken to Lampedusa while, in most 
cases, their vessels were left adrift. On the island, they were landed at the Favarolo 
quay, named by islanders as the ‘migrants’ quay’ (see Figure 7.1 and Plate 7.3). There, 
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migrants were disembarked (Plate 7.4) and received first aid (Plate 7.5). Dead bodies 
on the other hand were lain on the ground and put into into black mortuary bags, to 
be taken later to the island cemetery (Plate 7.6).  
 
Figure 7.1: The Favarolo quay of Lampedusa’s port closed to the public for the exclusive use of border enforcement agencies and health workers (@ Google Map - elaborated by the author) 
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Plate 7.3: Coastguard boat approaching the quay. One of the Italian Navy patrolling the border is visible up on the right corner, out of the port in 2012 (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu) 
 
 
Plate 7.4: The Coastguard patrolling and rescuing boat, disembarking migrants in 2012 (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu) 
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Plate 7.5: Migrants walking towards the bus after the first health check in 2012 (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu) 
 
 
Plate 7.6: Mortuary bags and operators surrounding them in 2012 (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author) 
 
After migrants received the first medical check and treatments on the quay, they 
were moved to a bus owned by the private company Lampedusa Accoglienza – today 
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substituted by the brotherhood Misericordia44 - which held the sole responsibility of 
the internal management of the island’s migrant holding centre. Then, the bus 
transported migrants to the local holding centre, escorted by the Carabinieri’s cars. 
Police forces regulated the access to the gated quay so that the disembarkation 
procedure took place in an area almost invisible for Lampedusans unless they 
positioned themselves from a specific spot of the port, on the opposite side of the 
quay.  
At almost the other extremity of the border on the island, there was the ferry quay 
where migrants were taken to be deported to mainland Sicily, and where authorities 
disposed them in lines within a fenced area where they were made to sit until the 
ferry arrived (see Plate 7.7 and 7.8).  
 
Plate 7.7: Migrants sitting in the fenced area of the ferry quay, waiting for the ferry to arrive in 2012 (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author) 
 
                                                          
44 The Misericordia brotherhood includes a variety of Catholic associations. This organisation manages several other migrant detention centres in Italy and ‘the volume of funds paid by the Ministry of Interior [for these services is] made dependent on both the number of detainees and the number of days spent by each of them in [detention]’ (Cuttitta, 2014: 203) 
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Plate 7.8: Migrants standing in the fenced area of the ferry quay, waiting to enter the ferry in 2012 (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author) 
 
Although behind fences and surrounded by uniforms, migrants now became visible 
to islanders. Once the ferry harboured, migrants waited for the disembarking of 
people and goods, and they embarked before the islanders, accompanied by several 
Carabinieri officers. The procedure unavoidably delayed the ferry that was so central 
to island life. Simone, a local retired fish trader, explained: 
It is already ten in the morning and we are still waiting for migrants to get all on board of the ferry. Can you see how many officers accompany them? I bet the ferry will not leave before two hours, so that it will sum up to four hours of delay. 
Although at times migrants were not taken to Sicily as they were rather deported 
back to North Africa with direct flights from the island, after their arrival all migrants 
remained in detention in Lampedusa. 
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7.3.1. Migrants’ detention on the (is-)land: historical development and main features 
Since the 1990s, the detention of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers 
became an increasingly common practice in Europe (Welch and Schuster, 2005). 
Migrants’ detention in Lampedusa started in 1998. As for the border at sea, migrants’ 
detention on the (is-)land was transformed through time, both regarding the physical 
spaces where it took place, as well as considering the management of detainees. At 
the beginning, authorities opened a gated camp for the migrants’ temporary stay - 
inside the area of Lampedusa’s airport (Monzini, 2008) - which had a maximum 
capacity of almost 200 individuals. Once detained, migrants were not allowed to exit 
the centre. After authorities and medical teams had checked each person, direct 
flights would transfer migrants to mainland Sicily within a few days (Gatti, 2005). In 
2004, the centre – and with it the whole island – went for the first time under the lens 
of national as well as European media attention as a result of two developments 
related to the border. First, when ‘Italian authorities expelled more than [1,000] 
undocumented migrants to Libya [directly from the island] on military and civil 
airplanes’ (Andrijasevic, 2010: 147), the complaints of several NGOs led to the 
European Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights’ condemnation of 
Italian authorities, saying that the expulsions violated the principle of non-
refoulement.45 Second, the inhuman conditions of migrants’ detention on the island 
had also raised objections by the same two EU institutions and the continental media 
(Andrijasevic, 2010).  
Following these scandals, the Italian authorities began planning the construction 
of a new migrant centre built in the inner valley of Contrada Imbriacola, the building 
                                                          
45 ‘The non-refoulement principle has been reaffirmed by the EU as the cornerstone of refugee protection. It prohibits the forcible return of anyone to a territory where they would be at risk of persecution. […] (mentioned in article 19§2 of the European Charter)’ (Andrijasevic, 2010: 149). 
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of which started in 2007. This bigger facility –primarily used for medical checks and 
identification, had a maximum capacity of almost 400, and up to more than 800 
people in case of ‘emergency’. When I first arrived in Lampedusa in October 2012, the 
centre of Contrada Imrbiacola was still the only facility used to detain migrants on the 
island. Nevertheless, between 2007 and 2012, a number of other local premises also 
served temporarily as migrant and asylum seeker holding centres.  
In 2009, the Italian government announced the opening of another identification 
and deportation centre in the westernmost corner of Lampedusa, inside the 
abandoned United States (US) Coastguard station and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation’s (NATO) barrack Loran. Once informed about this project, locals started 
protesting against the prospect of what they saw as the island beginning to be 
transformed into a sort of contemporary penal colony. Indeed, in first aid and 
reception centres, by law, migrants’ detention could last for a maximum of four days 
before they were transferred into identification and deportation centres. Yet in 
identification and deportation centres, detention could last for months. Rallies began 
in late January of that year and culminated when 1,300 migrants exited the – clearly 
overcrowded - centre of Contrada Imbriacola and joined Lampedusan protesters. 
Surprisingly, following media and political attention, within two days of the protests, 
Italian authorities turned the centre of Contrada Imbriacola into an identification and 
deportation centre, with the Loran base being transformed into an identification and 
first aid facility. Obviously, this had little effect on the tensions rising on the island, 
and they eventually increased. Migrants began a hunger strike until February 19, and 
they set fire to an entire wing of the centre of Contrada Imbriacola. The Italian 
government’s response to protesters’ demands – both migrants and Lampedusans - 
was to abandon the idea of using the Loran barrack for detention. Yet during those 
same days, the national parliament approved an extension of detention for 
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undocumented migrants for up to 18 months as the maximum possible holding period 
recommended by EU directives (Leerkes and Broeders, 2010). 
At the same time, thanks to the cooperation of the Libyan authorities within the 
frame of the Italian and Libyan friendship agreement, push back manoeuvres were 
moved out to the sea where boat migrants detected in proximity of the Libyan waters 
were deported back to Libya - again in violation of the principle of non-refoulement. 
With Libyan authorities also engaged in patrolling their shores, in the second half of 
2009, arrivals on Lampedusa dropped to reach a low point in 2010 (see Chart 7.1). As 
a result, for that year, the migrants’ detention centre was closed. 
 
Chart 7.1: Boat migrants landing in Lampedusa by year (data of the Italian Ministry of the Interior (Cuttitta, 2012: 26) elaborated by the author) 
 
Nonetheless, since the beginning of 2011, Lampedusa began to face its most 
difficult year in relation to the EU border, with migrant detention expanding over the 
whole island. In mid-January, immediately after the Tunisian president, Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali, fled Tunisia to escape the unfolding revolution, boat-migrants quickly arrived 
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in Lampedusa (Lotan et al., 2011). At the beginning of February, there were already 
1,500 Tunisians officially registered on the island. In the following weeks arrivals 
increased steadily, reaching a peak during March when boat-migrants began to 
outnumber Lampedusa’s residents. Later in the same month, when rumours spread 
that the Italian government was planning to organize a refugee camp on the island, 
islanders immediately occupied the old port in order to block authorities unloading 
tents from the ferry, concurrently denouncing the inhumane conditions in which 
young Tunisians had been kept. Lampedusans feared that the island was becoming an 
open-air concentration camp. Resembling what had happened in 2009, local 
protesters stood alongside the boat migrants.46 The situation was inflamed when the 
island’s population doubled to reach almost 15,000 locals, migrants and Italian law 
enforcement personnel, and indispensable supplies such as drinkable water began to 
run out. Despite this, the number of boat migrants retained in Lampedusa continued 
to increase. New arrivals to the island exceeded those that the authorities had 
evacuated to mainland Sicily. For many Lampedusans this was seen a deliberate 
choice of the Italian government.  
Indeed, it was not the first time that a large number of migrants had reached 
Lampedusa. In 2008, more than 30,000 boat migrants passed by the island but, here, 
they were fast deported to mainland Sicily without generating any serious concern for 
locals. However, the Italian government declared a state of emergency and asked for 
financial and logistical support from the EU, while leaving migrants to sleep in the 
open air over the area surrounding the island’s old port (see Plates 7.9 to 7.11). 
                                                          
46 La Collina della Vergogna. L’informazione in emergenza. Lampeduda. Dir. Antonino Maggiore. Libera Espressione. 20012. 
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Plate 7.9: Migrants sitting on the ferry quay in 2011 (@ Nino Taranto) 
 
 
Plate 7.10: Migrants camping on the hill over the ferry quay in the old port of Lampedusa in 2011 (@ Nino Taranto) 
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Plate 7.11: Migrants’ camp in the ‘Palms beach’ in Lampedusa’s old port in 2011 (@ Nino Taranto) 
 
While many migrants had to arrange their own makeshift shelters, some islanders 
spontaneously decided to make available their holiday homes and offered migrants 
accommodation in their own homes. As several fishers confirmed, during the first 
weeks and months of the ‘emergency’, Lampedusans provided migrants with the 
assistance that formal institutions had failed to make available. Facing what was 
becoming a humanitarian crisis, islanders opted for helping their ‘brothers from 
Tunisia’47 who continued to arrive each day, for weeks, and then months. It was for 
many a way to signal their subjective attachments to the population from the closest 
mainland, with which islanders – and fishers especially - had built ties for decades. For 
others, to host migrants was a way to avoid playing the authorities’ game of  
attempting to project the images of a threatening invasion and emergency. Giuseppe 
reflected on this situation: 
                                                          
47 Caloggero. 
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They were everywhere. My family house is just over the port and, believe me, we could not leave them outside… they were too many, while they clearly needed someone to take care of them. Institutions left them to their destiny, as if they were beasts. My wife and I opened our house, we had meals with them and hosted some there and others here inside the tool shed… Many islanders made the same [decision]: people opened also their holiday’s houses to Tunisians.  
Lampedusans opened their houses to the undocumented individuals that political 
and media discourse had depicted as potentially dangerous criminals (Campesi, 2011). 
Curiously, the dehumanisation of migrants that occurred at sea did not apply on 
land. Yet, in April 2011, the situation improved, as authorities started transferring 
migrants swiftly to mainland Sicily and the rest of Italy. At the same time, the 
government decided to reopen the migrant first aid and hospitality centre on 
Lampedusa. Incoming migrants were distributed between the centre and the former 
Loran barracks which had been reopened to host women and minors during the 
emergency – and no migrants remained sleeping in the open air. Nevertheless, given 
the ongoing media coverage of the events,48 the 2011 tourist season began with 
around 80 per cent of cancellations, which had a significant financial impact on the 
local economy (Bartoli, 2012). 
By the end of the summer, while tension continued to grow on the island due to 
the prospects of living through a winter without the earnings of the summer, migrant 
boat arrivals increased again with thousands of people fleeing Libya. In September, 
the Italian government announced that existing bilateral agreements had been re-
                                                          
48 Among other major Italian media, during 2011 the Corriere della Sera titled ‘Barricades in Lampedusa: “Six ships to empty the island”’ on March 29 (Available online at: http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2011/marzo/29/Barricate_Lampedusa_Sei_navi_per_co_8_110329037.shtml [Accessed on July 23, 2015]) or ‘Time bomb Lampedusa: assaults on trucks transporting food provisions’ on March 26 (Available online at: http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2011/marzo/26/Polveriera_Lampedusa_assalto_camion_del_co_8_110326023.shtml  [Accessed on July 23, 2015]). Major international broadcaster such as the BBC titled one of its online article ‘Italy's Lampedusa island hit by migrant crisis’ on March 22 of that same year (Available online at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12816340 [Accessed on July 23, 2015]).  
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established with the new Tunisian government and that authorities could now start 
deporting Tunisians back to their country directly from Lampedusa. Yet, on September 
22, hundreds of Tunisians organized a rally to protest against the threat of being 
forcibly taken back to their country. After having protested along the streets of the 
island’s small town, Tunisians gathered in front of one of the two gas stations of 
Lampedusa. Faced by the riot police, they threatened to explode a gas cylinder. At 
that point, the local population, already aggravated by the difficult year and worried 
about the economic consequences of a disastrous tourist season, came to feel  
threatened by those same people they had helped in the previous months. 
Surprisingly, here, many locals acted alongside the police by assaulting migrants and 
beating them with clubs and sticks (see Plate 7.12).  
 
Plate 7.12: Al Jazeera English’s images of the clashes at the gas station. While migrants escaped police forces by jumping down the wall of the gas station, islanders attacked them with rocks and clubs - right upper corner of the photo (@ YouTube49 – elaborated by the author) 
 
                                                          
49 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DcICc0SRhIw [Accessed on July 23, 2015] 
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Such a sudden shift in the islanders’ attitude towards migrants appeared to be 
underpinned by a number of factors. Certainly, economic anxieties played a role, as 
well as the fact that for a number of months the migrants had disappeared from island 
life – closed, as they were, behind the fences of the migrant centre, possibly 
contributing to their dehumanisation. However, within one week, following the 
screening of these events all over the world by global media, no more migrants 
remained in Lampedusa. Lampedusa had become declared an ‘unsafe landing place’ 
by the Italian government, who moved to taking migrants directly from the sea to 
mainland Sicily. Here, the spatiality of migrants’ detention on the island changed once 
again.  
Throughout 2011, besides the migrants themselves, Lampedusa’s fishers were the 
most affected by the emergency. This was particularly so for small-scale fishers who 
harboured in the old port. Given both the high frequency of arrivals and the large 
numbers of migrants and police occupying the quay, they were not able to work for 
most of the year. Piero explained: 
To say the truth [in 2011] we were damaged more on land than at sea. After all, it was impossible to go fishing… We also had expensive damages all over the old port, in particular on the tool sheds [that] many of us opened to migrants to provide them with a place to sleep.  
It is clear that, similarly to the border at sea whose function kept changing in line 
with changing EU directives, and whose operations moved incessantly back and forth 
from the island’s shores, the migrants’ border on the (is-)land also played out as a 
constantly transforming institutional apparatus. Even during the five months I lived in 
Lampedusa, the management of migrants’ detention changed dramatically 
throughout.  
Although the national legislation dictates that migrants must not leave the local 
holding centre and that detention in this type of centre cannot exceed the maximum 
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of four days, what happened in reality was that undocumented individuals arriving in 
Lampedusa remained in the centre for an average of three to four months – which 
was confirmed directly by ‘detained’ migrants I met on the island several times over 
the months I spent there. Yet, institutional failures did not stop there. In order to ease 
tensions inside the overcrowded detention facility, the authorities also tacitly allowed 
migrants to exit.  
Daria, a lawyer and member of the international organisation Save the Children,50 
worked at the centre of Contrada Imbriacola assisting minors, and she told about the 
situation in the centres: 
Here migrants – including minors – are illegally detained for months… Moreover, by law this should be a closed centre: however, in reality migrants exit from a gap in the back net surrounding the centre. In order to remain unaccountable for their illegal conducts, officials play a sort of trick… According to their accounts, when [the military who guarantee security inside the centre] see migrants crossing the net, soldiers call the police – despite their offices are at a few meters from each other - and tell them to go and look for those migrants who had left. Once police forces [who do not operate inside the centre] go looking for them, migrants are not anymore there. This is why, according to authorities, migrants escape controls. 
It can be seen that the Authorities denied their responsibilities to the migrants, 
presenting their unlawful conduct as unintentional, and making a strategic use of 
ignorance in which to hide their misdemeanour (Cohen, 2001; McGoey, 2007; Thiel, 
2014). Law enforcement officials and soldiers’ complicit ‘blind eye’ was applied to 
morally allow their mismanagement of the migrant centre. Their conduct was both 
known and not known by law enforcement officials in light of a discursive denial of 
their responsibility that fitted with the organisational purposes of keeping migrants 
on the island, despite the centre being evidently – and illegally - overcrowded.  
                                                          
50 Save the Children is a US based international NGOs whose actions concentrate on minors all over the world.  
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With migrants relatively free to move around the island, during the first months of 
my stay in Lampedusa, the island had again become de facto an open-air detention 
camp that allowed interaction between the newcomers and the islanders. Indeed, 
during their wait to be processed, many migrants got in touch with locals. They passed 
their time walking along the port quays and the streets of the village, often sitting in 
the terraces of the local bars. They stayed there for hours, side-by-side with locals and 
those officials of the Coastguard, the navy or the police forces that had rescued them 
from the sea. The migrants became familiar faces for some, and disturbing visitors for 
others. As a result of the permeability of the centres, an informal economy developed, 
with migrants selling locals the cigarette packs they were provided with inside the 
centre. Many migrants also asked islanders to change any money they were able to 
bring with them through their journey. Without valid identity documents, migrants 
were not allowed to change their money themselves in any of the local banks. If many 
locals were happy to help, others made the migrants pay a commission for the money 
changing service. However, each day at around nine in the evening, a police van 
passed along the few main roads of the island’s only village, picking up all migrants 
who had not already returned back to the centre. If they were seen to be involved in 
any unwanted activity outside the centre, they were sometimes punished for having 
left illegally, but otherwise, the police most usually turned a blind eye (Cohen, 2001).  
Since migrants begun being detained on the island, detention took place in a 
number of locations including in the open air (see Figure 7.2). 
171  
 
 
Figure 7.2: The spatial and chronological disposition of migrants’ detention in Lampedusa (@ Google Map - elaborated by the author) 
 
Talking to islanders, I found that most locals were aware of the law enforcement 
officials’ constant violations of the law dealing with detained migrants. The everyday 
experience of the EU external border management in Lampedusa implied frequent 
interactions with the state’s routinized lawless activities as carried out ‘in pursuit of 
the organisational goals of state agencies [and] tolerated for organisational reasons’ 
(Green and Ward, 2004: 11). Such a common experience of unlawful institutional 
conducts had served to undermine the state and EU’s legitimacy on the island, and it 
was often used as neutralisation for islanders to engage in illegal conduct themselves 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957). Paradoxically, then, for Lampedusans, their everyday 
interactions with the management of the EU external border challenged the 
criminalisation of migrants as it had been constructed by the Italian authorities 
(Barker, 2012). Migrants were at the same time imprisoned as dangerous individuals 
but illegally released by those same law enforcement officials in charge of controlling 
them.  
The increased securitisation of both Lampedusa and its surrounding seawaters 
through intense securitisation policies and austere discourses had, in its actual reality 
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on the island, been entirely inconsistent and contradictory. Such contradictions and 
inconsistencies had complicated islanders’ perception and experience of the border.  
 
7.3.2. Living in a permanent state of war against an enemy that does not exist 
Since Lampedusa became one of the most infamous spaces of Europe’s external 
border, one of the most visible transformations witnessed by islanders was the 
intense militarisation of both seawater and (is-)land. This was not the first time that 
Lampedusa had served military purposes however. Indeed, after playing an important 
role during the Second World War, since 1958 the island counted on its territory a 
weather and a telecommunication station operated by the Italian Air Force. Later, in 
1972, a NATO radio station (Loran), serving as a US National Security Agency (NSA) 
base, was established in Lampedusa. However, due to the supposed Gaddafi missile 
attack to the base in 1986, US officials left Lampedusa and the station became another 
communication unit for the Italian Air Force that in 1993 established a further base in 
the island’s airport (Black, 2000). Meanwhile, the Italian defence ministry had 
installed several military radar systems on the island. In other words, given the island’s 
geography, Lampedusa had always constituted a strategic outpost and military base 
in the middle of the Mediterranean (Mazzeo, 2014).  
Nevertheless, until the migrant ‘emergency’, the number of army officials on the 
island rarely exceeded a few tens of people and was thus largely irrelevant to island 
life. Moreover, there were almost no law enforcement agents within Lampedusa. Yet 
with Lampedusa becoming a central part of the European external border, 
militarisation accelerated and expanded quickly, and it was noted by islanders, such 
as Giovanni:  
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Here there have always been soldiers: the geography of Lampedusa makes this island an almost natural strategic outpost. How can you ever think not to have soldiers around here? Nevertheless, it seems to me that this presence is getting a little too intrusive. [During the crisis of] 2011 there were thousands of soldiers and police officers. Now, they are hundreds: we had never seen anything similar here in times of peace.  
The National Air Force, the Army, the Guardia di Finanza, the Coastguard, the 
Carabinieri and other EU armies – all under the coordination of FRONTEX – now had 
many officers, facilities and vehicles on the island. These units relied on a series of 
technological devices such as rescue boats, helicopters and drones, and the various 
agencies shared their use co-ordinately within the frame of border patrolling 
operations (Capasso, 2014). Lampedusa’s borderness was thus structured alongside 
the progressive merging of internal and external securitisation logic and practices, 
based on using defence and military apparatuses (Bigo, 2000; Balzacq, 2011). After all, 
Europe’s outer border is located in a geopolitically important stretch of sea such of 
the Sicilian channel (Victor et al., 2006). Defence technological devices installed on 
and operating from the island to patrol the border thus also served military goals - 
such us during the 2011 multi-national military intervention in Libya. As Capasso 
(2014) argued, 
Lampedusa has for decades been one the most important “eyes” of the USA and NATO on North Africa […] aggressively projected against Gaddafi's Libya […] Old and new conflicts in the Mediterranean and this very Triton51 are reviving Lampedusa's role as the “primary port” of disembarkment […] for migrants and asylum seekers. [Moreover, these conflicts] are already acting to reinforce national military operations on the island, with the arrival of new FRONTEX operators and the installation of ever more sophisticated radar and telecommunications centres, some of which are financed and made up by NATO. 
Within the frame of this increasing securitisation of the island, several powerful 
radars were installed in Lampedusa (see Figure 7.3). As such, on the island, internal 
                                                          
51 Trion is the last FRONTEX operation launched from the island on November 1st 2014, deploying ‘three open sea patrol vessels, two coastal patrol vessels, two coastal patrol boats, two aircraft, and one helicopter’ (FRONTEX, 2015). 
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and external security logics blurred. The radars installed there served both for the 
working of the EU external border,52 as well of the MARSUR project funded by the 
European Defence Agency ‘to enhance the exchange of data and information for the 
conduct of maritime [Common Security and Defence Strategy] CSDP-operations’ (EDA, 
2012).  
 
Figure 7.3: Approximate location of radars deployed to guard the EU external border in Lampedusa (@ Google Map - elaborated by the author) 
 
It was confusing to see soldiers carrying out police work while it was also not clear 
whether law enforcement and their facilities on the island might also be serving 
military purposes. Uniforms seemed to have no distinction in the eyes of locals, as 
expressed by Sandro, Mariano’s father:  
Over the last 20 years more and more police arrived on this island. Today it is like to be under siege. The Americans at the Loran barracks were less than 20 and came to the village only for a few hours a day. There were also a few Italian soldiers from the Air Force base but they also spent most of their time as 
                                                          
52 ‘[The] All Eyes 2013 […] project […] covered current developments in sensors and platforms, broadband communication and data fusion systems, as well as integrated system solutions for border surveillance. One of the main objectives was to connect the activities so that they can be of use in Frontex Joint Operations (sea and land). This project addressed the area of border surveillance and detection technologies, looking into the functionality, feasibility and capabilities of remotely piloted aircraft, radar and ground detection sensors as well as into the integration and exploitation of the data they collect with and within existing border control systems’ (FRONTEX, 2013: 67). 
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soldiers in their base. Now everyone is everywhere. The Police, Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, soldiers… Have you ever noticed how many helicopters and airplanes fly from the island’s airport each day? It is an invasion!  
Like other islanders, Sandro turns the narrative of the border in Lampedusa upside 
down. Seen from the island, police and army forces deployed there to defend Europe 
from migrant ‘invasion’ (de Haas, 2008) were not seen a protective presence. They 
were rather perceived as invading forces that had occupied the island and, using 
Francesca’s expression, had ‘polluted local landscapes’ (see Plate 7.13 and 7.14).  
 
Plate 7.13: One of the radars of the Italian Air Force in 2014 (@ Francesca del Volgo) 
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Plate 7.14: One of the Italian Navy ship patrolling the border in 2013, in front of the island’ port mouth in 2012 (@ Francesca del Volgo) 
 
The EU external border was structured in Lampedusa as a complex and multi-
layered apparatus whose functions spread over a vast maritime and land area. With 
the island and its massive seas at its core, border management of this area relied on 
hundreds of officials and their surveillance and defence devices. The border 
resembled a system of concentric circles (see Figure 7.4) which aimed to monitor, slow 
down and steer migration, rather than actually stopping it (Mezzadra and Neilson 
2012).  
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Figure 7.4: Visual representation of the EU external border and its border functions as they spread over the island and the sea surrounding it 
 
This border worked in parallel to everyday life on the island, constituting an 
intrusive apparatus that had reshaped Lampedusa’s geographic and social landscape, 
and through steering migrants to the island, it had simultaneously, and paradoxically, 
de-securitized the Island. Curiously indeed, this increasing militarisation of the border 
on the island did not transfer into an increasing securitisation of everyday life in 
Lampedusa. Rather, quite the opposite had occurred. 
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7.4. Securitizing the border by de-securitizing the island 
In section 7.1 above, I introduced some non-EU related elements of Lampedusa’s 
borderness. The ambivalent institutional management of Lampedusa and its 
inhabitants was confirmed by the gradual de-securitisation of life on the island as it 
developed in parallel with the increasing securitisation of Europe’s border. The 
current mayor of Lampedusa, Giuseppina Nicolini, clearly summarized this 
inconsistent situation: 
My only real priorities for this island are to fight illegal buildings and to provide my citizens with respectable education and healthcare facilities and services… The border here has led only to more police and journalists… Immigration on this island is deliberately highlighted to create a permanent state of emergency beyond which nothing else matters anymore.  
The political use of Lampedusa resembled what can be defined as a formal – or 
discursive - centrality, since it seemed to have very little direct positive impact on the 
local population, and was matched by a distinct marginality found in the everyday 
lives of the islanders. Moreover, the progressive securitisation of the border in 
Lampedusa was coupled with the de facto de-securitisation (Roe, 2004) of several 
other domains of daily life on the island. Giuseppe explained: 
Why do we have all these policemen and soldiers here, if in such a small community people keep building themselves their first, second and even a third house where they wish, irrespective of having any official permit? In addition, why then are they here if everyone fishes and sells their catches without any license to do so? How is it possible that here, where even ministers have come for their parades, we do not have a decent ferry connection to mainland Sicily?  
The invasive and militarized border, brimming with defence devices installed on 
and around the island, as well as the hundreds of officials in uniform crowding 
Lampedusa’s streets all over the year, were in Lampedusa in order to police migrants, 
while neglecting everything else happening there. 
When accompanying Pietro and Tonino fishing, I was surprised at how both of 
them kept fishing without a professional fishing licence and how they had gone well 
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beyond the allowed maximum fishing distance from the island, despite the 
Coastguard repeatedly passing close to the vessel. At a certain point, for instance, we 
were stationed a few hundred meters from one of the navy ships patrolling the 
Mammellone as part of the Italian Fishing Surveillance Operation (see Plate 7.15). 
Pietro and Tonino did not move and kept fishing for almost one hour.  
 
Plate 7.15: Italian Navy ship at a few hundreds of meters from Pietro’s vessel, 20 miles south from Lampedusa in 2013 (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author) 
 
When I asked why we were not moving, Pietro answered: 
The Coastguard, the navy, the Carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza are here to catch migrants: they do not care about us, unless they have very little to do that day… During winter however, we go fishing only with the good weather, which is when boat migrants attempt their journeys… When we go fishing, we are sure that all these [patrolling] forces will only care about boat migrants. 
By securitising Europe’s outer boundary in Lampedusa, the discursive mantle of a 
‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2003) and obfuscated legality (Mountz, 2011) 
extended all over the island and its surrounding seawaters. Yet, the hyper-securitized 
border not only contrasted with under-securitized life on the island, but it was also 
part of the origin of it. Paola explained in some detail: 
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I collected several proofs of the institutional commitment to suspend the rule of law in Lampedusa with the excuse of the border… Several individuals of the last municipal administration… committed serious irregularities during their mandate. [After years of protests] the provincial authority nominated an inspector with the power of resolving the local administration in case s/he detected any irregularity… After… more than two years of wait, the inspector finally published a report53 denouncing several criminal conducts. However, she concluded the report with what… summarizes perfectly the relation between the machinery of the border and the rule of law on this island. I [will] read from the original document. ‘Given that the administration demonstrated the ability of maintaining good relations and efficient cooperation with both national and Communitarian authorities while at the same time reassuring the local population during the serious emergency of 2011… I nominate a superintendent’. In other words, she did not take any decision – although she was entitled to – and [instead] nominated a superintendent [as] an unclear and unspecified legal figure… ‘in order to remove the irregularities carried out by the administration’. I am a lawyer and I work for this public administration: for what I am concerned, the role of superintendent does not exist within the Italian legal system! The figure of the superintendent reminds me of the White Man54 of the Tarantino’s movie Reservoir Dogs: that man that you call when you need to clean up the traces of your criminal activities. To confirm the superintendent’s exceptional function, over the two months he spent in Lampedusa, he did not take any single action against the former administration.  
The document Paola refers to makes official what most interviewees said they 
experienced daily. The machinery of the border aiming at securitizing the European 
space had been also a prop from which to justify and generate the de-securitisation 
of the island. As national institutional actors resorted to a series of illicit practices to 
manage the border, a system of connivance with local institutions was generated. 
With local authorities involved in unlawful activities as well, a sort of equilibrium was 
created, where no institutional actor felt safe in denouncing the criminal activities of 
the other. The same logic seemed to apply for common citizens involved in a variety 
of illicit conducts – e.g. illegal fishing and illegal building.  
Nonetheless, the EU border in Lampedusa was not made only of detention 
centre(s), officials and patrolling and surveillance technologies. A further invasive 
dimension of the island’s borderness was embedded at a discursive level, related to 
                                                          
53http://www.scribd.com/doc/82861656/Commissariamento-Comune-di-Lampedusa-e-Linosa [Accessed by the author on March 12, 2014] 
54 Contrary to what stated by Paola, the role is that of Mr Wolf in Trantino’s movie Pulp Fiction. 
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the central role that Lampedusa played within the framework of media and political 
representation of EU border regime.  
 
7.4. The televised border: politics, media and the borderization of Lampeudsa 
The presence of national and international media and political representatives was 
pervasive and intrusive in Lampedusa and it intensely shaped locals’ everyday life. It 
was a major factor ensuing from Lampedusa’s borderization and it was played out 
along two binary juxtapositions. The first combination opposed the centrality of the 
island within a media and political narrative of the border, to islanders’ day-to-day 
experience of marginality in relation to the making up of such a narrative. The other 
combination was concerned with the apparently incompatible representations of the 
island as the most symbolic loci of implementation of Europe’s border and migration 
regimes on the one side, and Lampedusa as the southernmost Italian tourist 
destination on the other (Cosenza, 2011).  
This final section of the chapter analyses these two dichotomies in order to provide 
a comprehensive sense of how the island’s centrality within media and political 
production and reproduction of the border affected islanders’ lives and their 
perception and experience of Lampedusa.   
 
7.4.1. Living at the core of the media and political narrative of the border: televising 
the border by silencing islanders 
Since Europe’s external border had landed in Lampedusa, the island was literally 
placed at the centre of a surreal media-political panopticon attracting to Lampedusan 
journalists, activists, artists and academics from all over the world - myself included. 
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It was an unusual situation for a population of just 6,000 inhabitants that until a few 
years ago had experienced significant isolation. Yet the EU border had produced a 
pervasive and ever-present consciousness amongst the locals of being the inhabitants 
of the frontier dividing Europe from Africa. Such intense mediatisation of Lampedusa 
had put locals under the global spotlight and produced a pressure for them to perform 
the border in line with the outside world’s expectations. 
A single episode on the island provides some illustration. In July 2013, for the first 
time, I saw the Lampedusa of the tourist season. One morning I went to visit Pietro on 
his vessel while he was waiting to embark tourists and take them around Lampedusa. 
Overnight, a group of Eritreans detained on the island decided to protest against the 
government and they had camped out in the church square, demanding immediate 
deportation to mainland Italy without fingerprinting.55 While I was chatting with 
Pietro, the first tourists arrived for the tour. After the initial greetings, a woman 
lamented the presence of too many migrants in front of the church. She said she had 
seen them protesting in the morning news of the national public broadcaster Rai 1. 
She also added that her daughters in Milan had called her to check whether everything 
was fine on the island. At that point Pietro, who up to that moment had not 
mentioned the protests, acted as if he was seriously concerned and begun lamenting 
the hardships of living on an island ‘permanently invaded by Africans’. He said 
immediately to his deckhand Gianfranco to go and check how things were going in the 
                                                          
55 The Dublin Convention establishes that asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the first EU member state where they arrive, that then becomes the only one where they will have the right to reside. Asylum seekers arriving on the island tend to refuse applying for asylum in Italy to move somewhere else in Europe and apply for asylum abroad. However, if their fingerprints are taken from authorities in Italy, then their data will be introduced in the Schengen Information System – SIS - and they will not be allowed to apply for asylum anywhere else than in Italy (Brouwer, 2004). 
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church square, while he kept complaining with the tourists about these newcomers 
and their disrespectful attitudes.  
This event had surprised me. I could very clearly remember Pietro acting in a 
diametrically opposite way during winter when we were sitting at one of the village 
main road’s bars on a late evening of November 2012. As used to happen every day 
around that time, the Carabineiri’s van was around the island looking for migrants 
who had left the centre during the day. The van stopped a few meters from us and a 
police officer got out shouting aggressively at a group of young migrants who were 
walking a few meters from there. Apparently, the migrants could not make sense of 
what was happening and they hesitated to stop and reply until the police officer 
started running toward them with considerable aggression. At that point Pietro and 
some other Lampedusans who were sitting at the bar stood up and physically stopped 
the police officer, suggesting he had to act more respectfully with migrants. After all 
– they said - it was certainly not the migrants’ responsibility if they were still on the 
island after they had arrived months before. Reminding Pietro of this previous event, 
he recognized his shift in attitude and admitted that what he was saying to tourists 
was meant to satisfy their expectations. It was not, as he told to me later, what he 
really thought. However, he added, tourists were customers and customers were 
always right.     
The paradox between Pietro’s experience of the border – during winter – and 
Pietro’s performing of it – during summer - mirrored the tension that islanders 
experienced as a result of the opposition between media and political mainstream 
representation of the island as today’s icon of Europe’s border and migration regimes, 
and islanders’ substantial marginality within this process of progressive borderization 
of their island. The media had presented and represented Lampedusa to the rest of 
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the world through a lens that left little or no space for the islanders’ voices or self-
representation. Nonetheless, this intense representation of the island had gradually 
become hegemonic, whereby the island functioned as a stage for a global audience in 
which migrants and institutional actors – especially rescuing forces – were the main, 
if not the sole, characters of the plot. Lampedusans played just the role of background 
actors, only occasionally called into the scene or left outside of it, depending on media 
and political agendas. The islanders’ limited part in representing their island to the 
outside world suppressed their full self-expression, and channelled their public 
actions somehow within the limits of mainstream and official narratives on 
Lampedusa. By leaving locals at its margins, the intense mediatisation of Lampedusa 
had put islanders under the global spotlight and produced a pressure for them to 
perform the border in line with the outside world’s expectations (cf. Goffman, 1951). 
As marginalized subjects whose voice was hardly heard, Lampedusans were, in this 
way, subjects and objects of the border (Maggio, 2007). Politicians of any rank, from 
the former president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, to the 
president of the French party Front National, Marie Le Pen or the Italian prime 
ministers – from Silvio Berlusconi to Gianni Letta and Matteo Renzi – had all visited 
the island under the gaze of considerable media fanfare. The timing of these visits 
followed a regular path: they happened during or immediately after any border-
related emergency and/or in the proximity of major electoral rounds. I was myself in 
Lampedusa when, on January 2013 – less than one month before the Italian general 
elections, the former president of the Italian senate, Livia Turco, visited the island with 
a delegation of candidates of the centre-left wing Democratic Party, of which she was 
a member. On that occasion, a colleague of the University of Palermo who was in 
touch with the island’s mayor helped organize the visit and she asked me to take the 
candidate, Cécile Kyenge, around the island. Kyenge would soon become the first 
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black Italian minister in the following Letta government. My plans were to give her 
the opportunity to speak with islanders about their lives on the island and their 
experiences with boat-migrants and the border. After all, I thought it was already 
somewhat peculiar that it was me taking her around the island instead of an islander. 
However, I could not follow my programme. Cécile had her own plan for the visit. 
Instead, I made with her what, for many on the island, was ‘the migrants’ tour’. We 
went first to the local cemetery where tens of migrants are buried behind nameless, 
numbered gravestones. Then, on our way to the local migrant identification and first 
aid centre, we stopped at the ‘cemetery of boats’: a field where all migrants’ boats 
were left to rot although they remained guarded by soldiers as corpus delicti (see Plate 
7.16).  
 
Plate 7.16: The graveyard of migrants’ boat and a jeep of the Italian Navy guarding it to forbid anyone to enter in 2013 (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu - elaborated by the author) 
 
Other than the mayor and the vice-mayor of the island, Cécile and the other 
political candidates had very little interaction with any Lampedusans. My impression 
was that they had used the island to project a certain political message to national 
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voters concerned with migrants and the migration regime. Later, during the 
afternoon, a short press conference open to the public was held at the island’s City 
Hall. Again, the discussion concentrated on boat migrants, their stay on the island, 
and the need to find a solution for the identification and first aid centre’s almost 
chronic overcrowding. Once candidates had finished their speeches in front of the few 
islanders and several cameras and journalists, a question and answer session lasted 
less than 20 minutes, after which the entire delegation left to catch the last flight 
leaving Lampedusa that day.  
Sebastiano, a retired local fisher, attended the press conference with me. This was 
his view: 
Do you understand what happens here? Politicians come before the elections and speak about solutions to the problems of Lampedusa. However, they do not spend a word about our real problems on this island. They all come here and spend good words regarding how the border and migrants’ detention must be managed… However, over the last 20 years we could not see any significant change: the policy has been always the same. Militarisation and detention: that is it! Politicians come here exclusively to get some of the visibility that this island can provide: they promise everything they can or they cry for the deaths that their policies have generated, and then they leave. They come to speak to the cameras, not to us. We are invisible here. We do not count on this island: even migrants come before us!  
In this game of visibility, played at the expense of both migrants and islanders, the 
media had also largely silenced or marginalized islanders’ voices. Migrants, their 
arrivals on the island, the dangerous and heroic rescue operations, and the deaths of 
migrants, constituted the dominant material for newspapers and TVs in Lampedusa. 
The islanders were simply spectators in this border play (Cuttitta, 2014).  
More than this, the islanders were witnesses to two parallel border spectacles in 
Lampedusa. One was the border that they witnessed and experienced every day first-
hand on their island. The other was the one that islanders watched on television or 
read about in newspapers and on web pages. These two borders – the experienced 
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and the represented – did not, however, necessarily correspond. Within this situation, 
the marginal presence – if not the almost complete absence – of islanders’ 
representations of the border in Lampedusa had a profound impact on the island 
community.  
For such an isolated and small community, accounts of the island in national and 
international news and newspapers unavoidably become major topics for discussion 
(Greenlaw, 2002). Media narratives were a source of contested self-representation, 
producing tensions within the local community. Islanders were attracted to having the 
possibility of speaking to the entire world from the border stage established on their 
island, while at the same time they were effectively excluded from it. This discursive 
centrality had modified their self-perception and identity, making Lampedusa no 
longer a forgotten periphery but, rather, a televised centre. Yet beyond this discursive 
illusion, islanders experienced their marginality with respect to this discursive 
centrality. Lampedusans felt both attraction and revulsion for media and politics 
dispossessing them of their self-representation and remaking their identities. World 
broadcasters and politicians during ‘their parades’ on the island – as Lampedusans 
defined them - were at the same time the gatekeepers to the outside world and were 
seen by the islanders as massively distorting what was really happening on the island.  
For a community whose economy had become almost completely based in 
tourism, (mis-)representations of their island constituted a major concern. 
Conversely, however, the intensely mediated borderization of Lampedusa, according 
to some, had made the island more attractive to tourists. This was Francesca’s view: 
Contrary to what most people think, apart from [2011], tourism has grown incessantly since migrants started arriving here. Boat migrants made the name of Lampedusa becoming popular all over the world… Now everyone knows that this island exists. 
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From this angle, the borderization of Lampedusa had ‘the power of juxtaposing in 
a single real place different spaces and locations that are incompatible with each 
other’ (Foucault, 1997: 333). Lampedusa is the island of migrants’ deaths and of a 
chronic humanitarian crisis, while being at the same time a paradise tourist 
destination, and Lampedusans experienced this implicit tension daily, as the local 
priest Father Stefano pointed out : 
The overwhelming media and political attention on Lampedusa… is an opportunity to make the name of this island known all over the world, while it is at the same time one of the most frustrating side-effects of the border since islanders have almost no voice or visibility within it. 
Politicians used the island as a stage to project their views, programmes and 
promises about border and migration policies. Mainstream media played along with 
the political game and did little else than reproduce the institutional narrative of the 
border, setting the basis for and reinforcing the political exploitation of Lampedusa 
and its population. Within this situation, the iconic value of Lampedusa as the border 
island par excellence stands out. Surprisingly and almost inexplicably, by seeing the 
tiny island so frequently within the media, tourists somehow discovered it as a 
popular destination.  
Looking at the island’s airport passenger traffic statistics, it could not be said that 
the migrants’ arrivals had fully negatively affected the island’s tourist industry. Quite 
to the contrary, they had contributed to turning Lampedusa into a mass tourism 
destination (see Chart 7.2). Moreover, the constant inflow of people going to the 
island because of the border – from journalists to soldiers, law enforcement officials, 
artists, academics and so like – had also helped keep tourist facilities busy all over the 
year, even outside the tourist season – generating what Friese (2012) defines as a 
‘border economy’.  
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Chart 7.2: Boat migrants landing and airport passengers traffic in Lampedusa per year (data of the Italian Ministry of the Interior (in Cuttitta, 2012: 26) and the Italian Civil Aviation Authority,56 elaborated by the author) 
 
Too many times, I heard locals lamenting how the constant display of Lampedusa’s 
borderness in the media did nothing other than damage the image of the island for 
potential tourism. Tourist destinations rely on ideal images projected to potential 
visitors, and, in Lampedusa, ‘the border spectacle’ complicated this relation (Cuttitta, 
2012; De Genova, 2013). At the same time, however, most people in Lampedusa had 
experienced a significant growth of tourism since the EU border landed on their island 
(Cosenza, 2011).  
                                                          
56 http://www.enac.gov.it/la_comunicazione/pubblicazioni/index.html [Accessed on April 3, 2015] 
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Since the island’s economy had turned to tourism, several islanders had got 
wealthier. Thus the border spectacle that made the island known all over the world 
and, in a way, decisively contributed to boosting the local tourist economy, 
simultaneously exposed islanders to potential dramatic economic consequences and 
bought to light the fragility of an economy based almost exclusively on seasonal 
tourism. Islanders thus experienced a tension of benefiting from the visibility that 
came with the border, while suffering from misrepresentation and marginality.  
As their island had become the centre by being the margin, the islanders’ 
simultaneous centrality and marginality had blurred. Lampedusans way to the centre 
was for them to pass through their own marginalisation so that the island space 
generated a constant tension amongst two irreducible opposites. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
The border in Lampedusa worked as a sort of parallel entity, developing and 
structuring on the island in a manner quite detached from the islanders themselves. 
The EU external border would have been imposed regardless of islanders and their 
daily lives. Thus with Europe’s outer border conceived to target boat-migrants and 
securitize the EU southern maritime frontier, such complex and multi-layered security 
apparatus had the effect in Lampedusa of substantially de-securitizing everyday life 
on dry land as well as at sea. Yet, as we have seen, Lampedusans played a central role 
throughout the institutionally driven process of borderization of their island. 
EU driven borderization significantly affected Lampedusans’ lives. Border functions 
were distributed over a vast maritime area and on the island, constituting a complex 
apparatus with which Lampedusans interacted in various ways. These interactions 
were either active – i.e. when rescuing migrants at sea, or passive – i.e. when watching 
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as spectators the mediatisation of their island. These interactions had pervasive 
impacts on islanders’ perception and experience of the maritime and isolated land 
they inhabited. At sea, legal, economic and practical calculations had largely replaced 
the maritime ethic of mutual support. Similarly, life on the increasingly militarized 
island had framed the islanders’ perception of being progressively marginalized on 
their own (is-)land. 
The EU border produced a formal and discursive centrality matched by a real 
marginality in the everyday lives of the island’s inhabitants. Today’s Lampedusa 
represents an icon of the contemporary European border regime, and after two 
decades of intense borderization, it was as if Lampedusa had come to exist solely 
because of the EU external border established on it. Lampedusans had almost 
disappeared from the sight of non-islanders’ gaze. The border became the dominant 
lens through which the world looked upon Lampedusa. This projected image had 
curiously boosted the local tourist economy by making the island known worldwide, 
while representing simultaneously what islanders perceived as the major threat for 
that same economy that had become  central for most households. 
As I discuss in the next chapter, these transformations of everyday life in 
Lampedusa, combined with the major changes that the CFP produced on the island, 
had deeply mutated the island’s social fabric, fishers’ individualities, and their 
perception and experience of the island’s geography. Curiously, however, the 
outcomes of decades of Europeanisation of life in Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal, led to 
quite different results in terms of fishers’ organisations on each island. 
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8.  OF FISHERS AND THE EU 
‘On the island, the change that I may have noticed is an economic one. With economics, the character of a people can change. The character of people does not change overnight after meeting a group of immigrants… It is not that someone changed us. Rather, it has been something that has changed us’ (Professor Fragapane) 
 
The Common Fishery Policy (CFP) and the European external border management 
generated a variety of effects in Lampedusa and Fuerteventura. The implementation 
of rules, directives and regulations related to these two Communitarian policy frames 
activated several processes that transformed the local economic as well as 
sociocultural fabric on the islands and challenged the locals’ ethics and self-
understanding. However, despite being exposed to very similar EU policy steering, the 
final outcomes of decades of Europeanisation of the two fisheries differed 
significantly when I visited the islands. An analysis of how these differences developed 
allows for the bringing to the surface the limits of Communitarian governance as it 
does not necessarily end up in common outcomes when applying to different 
historical, social, economic and cultural settings. Watching European integration from 
this bottom-up angle, it becomes clear that EU governance needs to take account of 
the historical foundations that it sits on – or else Communitarian policies will have 
varied unintended outcomes. 
This chapter begins by thus concentrating on the most significant transformations 
experienced by the two small-scale fisheries and shows how they organized 
differently and experienced diverse economic and environmental conditions. When I 
conducted my fieldwork, the professional small-scale fishery in Lampedusa was 
destined to slowly disappear as the island’s economy turned completely to tourism. 
However, in Gran Tarajal, the organisation of the fishermen’s association-led fishery 
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was to become environmentally sustainable and economically profitable, and had 
developed alongside the local tourist industry.  
In the second part of this chapter I then use the Spanish case to better understand 
the transformations taking place in Lampedusa. The aim of comparing the two cases 
was to better identify those micro-dynamics characterizing the specific geographical, 
social, cultural, economic and historical island spaces through which EU governing 
technologies were applied, (Rose et al, 2009) which had led the two fisheries to 
organize so differently.  
I conclude with an in-depth analysis of the transformations that the EU had 
activated in Lampedusa and which had led to a dramatic change in local sociocultural 
fabric. In this way, I finally demonstrate that the Europeanisation of the Italian island’s 
maritime space mutated fishers’ relation with and use of the sea surrounding 
Lampedusa in a series of unpredictable ways.  
 
8.1 Lampedusa: we fish until we die 
Today’s fishery in Lampedusa was a relic of the flourishing fishing industry of the past. 
The youngest local professional fisher – Carlo – was in his forties and only two canning 
industries remained open on the island: one imported frozen bluefish from outside 
Lampedusa while the other worked about one month per year as it relied on locally 
caught bluefish. Arguably, EU governance produced several of the conditions for this 
profound transformation of the local economy to take place. Yet, Lampedusan fishers’ 
inability to implement any coordinated strategy did not help them to successfully 
adapt the workings of local fishery to the transforming regulations and the decreasing 
volume of available fish stocks.  
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8.1.1. A fishery without a market 
With the globalisation of fish markets (Swartz et al., 2010), the local canning industry 
declining and the increasing number of local fishers abandoning professional fishing,   
Lampedusa’s fish market lost relevance, and fish traders from mainland Italy stopped 
buying fish directly on the island. During my fieldwork, all catches were sold to eight 
local wholesalers. According to my analysis and observations, these wholesalers took 
advantage of the fishers having to rely on them, and they colluded to set the prices 
they would pay. As Francesco stated: 
Wholesalers are those who have ruined our job. They made the fish-market collapse promising better purchase prices to individual fishers. [However,] as soon as fish markets closed down they started paying our catches less and less… In small villages such as Porto Empedocle or Lampedusa, local fish traders can very easily meet and fix the prices so that fishers remain with no options than to accept what they offer them… Nowadays we all have our own trader. [With] a fish market on the island, there would be more competition to buy our catches and the prices would automatically increase. 
When Francesco said that each fisher had his own wholesaler, he meant exactly 
the opposite. Indeed, given the power relations in place and the deteriorated 
economics of small-scale fishery, it was rather the traders who ‘owned’ the fishers.  
I met the economist Pipitone who studied Sicilian fisheries at the Institute for 
Costal Marine Environment of the Italian National Research Council (IAMC-CNR57) of 
Mazara del Vallo, where we had a long talk about Sicilian fishery. According to him, 
the relation between small-scale fishers and fish traders had a typical line of 
development in the region: 
When small-scale fishers cannot access a proper fish market, they have to rely on middlemen or wholesalers. Automatically losing their negotiating and economic power, they become de facto employees of the wholesalers… Small-scale fishery by nature is not a stable business [as it] fluctuates according to 
                                                          
57http://www.iamc.cnr.it/IAMC/home [Accessed on July 19, 2015] 
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many variables such as the conditions of the sea and even fate. Fishers’ incomes mirror such a trend and fluctuate as well... However, both vessels and fishing gears require constant maintenance so that fishers deal with fixed expenses… In bad times, fishers go into debt with fish traders as their closer commercial partners: wholesalers provide credits… that most probably fishers will not be able to pay back short-term. This is when fish traders start pretending portions of property rights of the fishing vessels for themselves. They do so until fishers pay them back or until they get the whole boat and fishers became – also on paper - their employees. Throughout this process, that can last years, fishers are obliged to sell their catches exclusively to this or that wholesaler. 
The low profitability of small-scale fishers decreased their negotiating power with 
wholesalers, which in turn further decreased the professional fishery’s lucrativeness. 
In Lampedusa, the negative effects of the lack of a proper fish market were worsened 
by a further variable: the island’s geographic isolation – which meant economic 
isolation as well. Because of the indirect access to the wider Sicilian market, local 
wholesalers simply sold Lampedeusian fish to other wholesalers in Porto Empedocle 
who then transported them to Palermo and Catania’s markets. 
Traders in mainland Sicily play with the issue and lower their prices so that wholesalers in Lampedusa do the same with ‘their’ fishers… Often, traders in Porto Empedocle say that boxes got damaged during the journey from Lampedusa. Since there is no Lampedusan there to check, there is little space for contestation: they pay less, our wholesalers have to lower the price, and who loses the most is always the fisher… Everyone tries to take advantage of the other in a game where the weaker ones are by far the local small-scale fishers. (Francesca) 
With no fish market on the island, the local tourist industry that developed 
alternatively – rather than complementarily – to small-scale fishery, was not 
sufficiently large to provide a big enough internal market to sell catches locally. On 
top of this, most local tourist facilities sold frozen fish coming from outside Lampedusa 
since it was cheaper than local fresh fish. Only few on the island tried to reverse such 
a paradoxical situation. 
Gianni, a Lampedusan in his sixties, returned to the island after having worked for 
restaurants and hotels in the north of Italy. He had opened a restaurant that he ran 
together with his son, Bernardo. The restaurant was one of the two on the island 
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mentioned by the international organisation Slow Food,58 that actively valorised and 
promoted the consumption of local products. The other was Nicola’s restaurant. 
Gianni explained his outlook: 
Today we try to preserve the traditional food that until up to 30 years ago constituted the basis of the island’s diet and economy. Every time that the only purse seine remained on the island - the Nardina – went for mackerel and sardines and sell them to other fishers as live bait, we buy as many fish boxes as we can… Today no one fishes bluefish here [also because] no restaurant or hotel offers bluefish to tourists. They rather offer all those more fashionable species such as swordfish, grouper and amberjacks. Fishers have to go much further away from the island to catch them while most of the times it is simply frozen fish coming from outside… After we got the recognition of Slow Food, more customers come to our restaurant to the extent that at times it becomes difficult to offer to the all of them bluefish… Think what could happen if all restaurants of the island would start operating as we do? There might be a new possibility for bluefish fishing in Lampedusa – at least in summer. 
The lack of a local market had increased the economic difficulties that local fishers 
faced in Lampedusa. In particular, their impossibility to sell products to the highest 
bidder or to rely on a profitable internal market, made fishery on the island much less 
profitable than it could have been. In turn, low profits increased internal 
segmentation among the fishers, making it very difficult for the local fishing sector to 
organize and plan against the economic onslaught. 
 
8.1.2. Low profits, substantial segmentation 
The absence of a fish market on the island lowered fishermen’s profits and increased 
their dependency on subsidies, which had the unintended effect of decreasing fish 
stocks. If catches generated lower revenues, fishers would have to fish more, further 
lowering fishery’s profitability, activating one of the many vicious circles negatively 
                                                          
58 ‘Slow Food is a global, grassroots organization, founded in 1989 to prevent the disappearance of local food cultures and traditions, counteract the rise of fast life and combat people’s dwindling interest in the food they eat, where it comes from and how our food choices affect the world around us’ (Slow Food, 2015). 
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affecting Lampedusa’s fishing sector. Although fishers are often seen as naturally 
inclined to overexploit fishes as open access resources, (Gordon, 1954) several 
fishermen in Lampedusa acknowledged the urgency of implementing effective 
conservation policies. However, they also recognised the impossibility to agree over 
any coordinated action, given their economic condition and ensuing competitiveness.  
We all recognize the necessity to implement biological rest periods59 systematically… They are possibly the best measures we can apply to let the fish stocks to breed, fishes to grow, and us to fish more. [Everyone] is very much aware of this. However, there is no way we can make them happen because there will always be this or that fisher who goes fishing despite the ban, being him either a recreational or a professional fisher… One of us going fishing invalidates the other fishers’ effort to temporarily stop fishing. (Piero) 
Beyond economic precariousness, this splitting up of local fishery was derived also 
from several other elements. Among them, there was fishery’s dependency on 
subsidies. Such a dependency had framed the fishers’ reliance on politics and 
consequent political nepotism, especially in a region whose political life had been 
historically characterized by widespread patronage, and on an island where fishery 
constituted for years the main – if not the only – local economic activity employing 
almost all islanders (Boissevain, 1966). Through time, fishers – and with them their 
families - affiliated themselves to this or that politician who had promised them access 
to subsidies. As subsidies remained in place, these affiliations lasted through time and 
created opposed factions within the same fishery, whilst also promoting corruption 
among local politicians. 
On top of this already complicated situation, in contrast to the past, local small-
scale fishers operated using a variety of fishing gears to  fish in diverse parts of the 
island’s waters and at different times of the day. As Nicola told me: 
                                                          
59 Biological rest periods are temporary bans of any fishing activity over a certain area or concerning a specific fleet. They are explicitly supported by the EU (EP, 2014) and managed, set and compensated at the regional or national levels. 
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We are less than 100 fishers and we cannot agree on anything… If we cannot find a common ground for claiming our rights, there will be no improvement of our conditions. [Everyone] has different interests and urgencies so far that everyone goes fishing in different areas, at different times of the day… If we decide to ban the fishing of, let say, squid over a certain time, then fishers living out of that fishing will feel themselves unjustly penalized compared to the others… On the other hand, each fisher does not necessarily know the main problematics other fishers deal with: this despite the fact that we all fish in the same waters or at a few miles one from the other. 
Fishers’ inability to find agreement lowered the profitability of fishery, and it often 
led to the market being overwhelmed with the same fish species, decreasing the price 
wholesalers would pay. 
Mimmo worked aboard of Alfonso’s vessel Sara. He told me his view about how 
fishers should organize: 
The mistake most fishers do is clear to my eyes. If you go fishing and you are lucky enough to fish 50 boxes of catches, you should stop fishing and come back on dryland and sell your catches at the best price. You will sell your boxes for ten Euros each instead of risking to sell them at seven Euros. It is a very basic economic rule, I guess! Given professional fishers’ actual relatively deprived economic condition and the unfair competition of recreational fishery, everyone is desperate to get the most out of the sea... If I do not fish 100 boxes of red mullet today, someone else would do that in my place! 
The low profitability of the professional small-scale fishery combined with political 
patronage that had segmented Lampedusa’s fishery into several factions, had 
restricted the fishers coming together to reach any collective agreement. This 
competitive and difficult economic situation meant more and more people leaving the 
profession. Young locals were not interested in joining the professional fishing fleet, 
and local small-scale professional fishery was starting to disappear. Surprisingly, 
however, facing very similar governing pressures, the fishers in Gran Tarajal had 
organized very differently and were able to turn small-scale fishery into an 
environmentally and economically sustainable industry. 
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8.2. Gran Tarajal: we fish for living 
From the 1990s, Gran Tarajal’s tiny fishery succeeded in setting and implementing 
effective self-management to protect the maritime ecosystems where they worked, 
while also guaranteeing the economic sustainability of their jobs. Through a variety of 
good practices based on ‘behaviour-oriented corpuses of local’ (Ruddle, 2000: 288) 
culture, the Gran Tarajal Fishermen’s Association planned, implemented and enforced 
a series of conservation policies while constantly monitoring their outcomes. Juan 
Ramon who fished in Gran Tarajal since he was 16, explained me the emergence of 
the association:  
I am the president of the Fishermen’s Association of Gran Tarajal since August 1993: we have elections every four years. Soon, I will be in charge for 20 years. There are more or less 40 vessels’ owners associated and we set fishing rules ourselves. Actually, we prohibited the use of trawlers, longlines and we heavily reduced the use of fishing pots: we prohibited them for eight years and now we only allow the use of a limited number of pots of a specific size, over limited areas and for just six months a year… Our main concerns regard European policies on professional fishery… Our decision to set up our own fishing regulations demonstrates primarily that fishers are the first interested in keeping the sea alive and, secondly, that fishers know better than anyone else the sea where they work. No one imposed us to regulate ourselves this way: but we did it anyway! It is an investment to grant ourselves a future. 
Where Gran Tarajal fishers’ regulations overlapped with existing EU norms, the 
fishermen’s standards tended to be more restrictive than Communitarian ones. In 
particular, besides prohibiting a series of fishing gears whose use the CFP authorizes, 
minimumcatch  sizes set locally were bigger than those imposed by the EU. 
Working in Gran Tarajal for generations, local fishers knew when to catch or rest 
local fish species. As Hugo – a 45 year old local fisher – pointed out:  
We work here from many years and most of us grew up in Gran Tarajal: we started fishing with our fathers since we were kids. It is clear that no one better than us… knows when one fish must be caught or not. [Thus,] we have met several times, we negotiated a lot, and finally we decided to establish our own minimum sizes instead of those that authorities imposed us. 
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Rita Diaz Hernandez, the provincial councillor for fishers, further described local 
fishers’ self-management: 
Fuerteventura’s fishermen associations… and especially the one of Gran Tarjal, have been pioneers regarding the protection of marine resources… They spontaneously introduced seasonal fishing bans for the first time on this island despite the fact that they were not compensated in any form by institutions… They did it anyway! Besides, they only use lines: a very selective fishing gear with low environmental impact.  
In terms of environmental policies, fishermen in Gran Tarjal were positioned at the 
forefront. To reach today’s level of organisation, the association’s president played a 
central role that several on the island – both fishermen and concerned institutional 
actors – clearly recognized as important. Juan Ramon explained:  
Legally speaking, the association already existed for many years: anyway, it really started to operate in 1993 when I took charge of it. At that time there was none of the facilities we have now: since then we created all the infrastructures you can see [from the dry dock to the icemaker machine]. This became possible thanks to a dramatic transformation that I promoted and that certainly constitutes the pillar of this association: in fact, we have ensured that gradually all our catches were sold exclusively through and by the association. Before each associate sold his own catches to fish traders at much lower prices… It was not easy for me to convince the others that it was better for the all of us to stay united and stop selling fish individually… Luckily, as soon as the first started to associate, the others realized how advantageous it was… Before, fish traders decided the price: today, we make our price and we reinvest the greater profits for our own use. Today fishermen do not have to worry for anything more than unloading their catches at the association once they come back on dryland: our employees will take care of the catches and all administrative issues. 
The president of the Fishermen’s Association of Gran Tarajal had subverted the 
traditional modus operandi of local small-scale fishery. At the time he began his 
struggle to transform the working of the local fishery, fishers used to commercialize 
the entirety of their catches through traders. The economic advantages of over 20 
years of direct commercialisation of the catches spilled over to several other areas of 
fishers’ daily activities, quickly taking Gran Tarajal’s fishery away from an internal 
competitive market with low prices to a situation where the fishers cooperated and 
successfully organized an economic and environmentally sustainable fishery. 
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8.2.1. – Gran Tarjal: sharing for competing 
Depending on the period of the year and the market’s demand, the Fishermen’s 
Association of Gran Tarajal fixed the price per kilogram of catches for each fish species 
they fished and traded. By selling catches directly, fishers renounced a small 
percentage of their profits equal for all members, which was reinvested in the 
association. These investments provided administrative assistance, facilities and 
equipment. The association also commercialized their catches by profiting from the 
association’s fish shop and restaurant, while most of the fish were sold to one of the 
main supermarket chains on the island.  
Having the opportunity to access a bigger internal market and efficiently exporting 
the surplus to the neighbouring islands, while benefiting from higher profits per 
catches, the association activated a virtuous circle. Indeed, through the association, 
Gran Tarajal’s fishermen provided themselves with facilities that reduced operational 
costs and allowed for further investments. The most important of these were an ice 
machine, a new and up to date refrigerator truck to transport the catches, a gantry 
crane to take vessels in and out the water, and individual rooms to store fishing 
equipment (see Plates 8.1 to 8.3).  
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Plate 8.1: Gran Tarajal Fishermen Association’s fishing vessels crane (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu elaborated by the author) 
 
 
Plate 8.2: Gran Tarajal Fishermen Association’s individual rooms to store fishing equipment (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu elaborated by the author) 
 
204  
 
 
Plate 8.3: Gran Tarajal Fishermen Association’s refrigerator truck to transport the catches (@ Lorenzo Sibiriu elaborated by the author) 
 
The association also had an office with two full-time employees to assist fishermen 
with bureaucratic issues, making their work much simpler and creating the conditions 
for the local fishery to become profitable. In turn, economic profitability facilitated  
the right circumstances to implement effective and more restrictive conservation 
policies that, in the long-term, had made the local fishery even more profitable and 
environmentally sustainable – at least when combined with effective policies to limit 
and control illegal activities of the local booming recreational fishing sector.  
Pedro, a 53 year old fisher that I met at the association, provided me with an 
example of how local fishers regulated their activities: 
In [April] we decided to establish a cap for individual catches: a maximum of 200 kilograms of fish each of us can catch per day… [April] is not a good period to sell fish since the market’s demand is quite low. Thus, in order to not sell fish at a lower price than the usual, we prefer to leave it in the water and fish it later when prices will increase.   
Although there was no obligation for fishermen to become members of the 
association, there were no professional fishermen not registered as members. 
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There is no obligation to join us… If you want to fish professionally without becoming one of our members you can do it: it is your own free choice. However, non-members will have to pay for the services we provide to our members… This is to say that you will have to buy your own ice, pay to use the crane, and so on. (Juan Ramon) 
Gran Tarajal’s Fishermen’s Association’s governance of the fishery was not 
questioned by any fishermen that were so hard to convince 20 years before, when the 
association began its action. Decisions were taken collectively, based on periodic 
meetings, while the many advantages deriving from being organized were shared 
equally among members. It was for these reasons that even those fishermen landing 
more catches did not complain about contributing more than others to the finances 
of the association. The individual advantages appeared to overcome the burdens of 
sharing. Alvaro, who was amongst the oldest active fishers in Gran Tarajal, explained: 
I use to fish every day I can: this because I am one of the “old ones” who knows what real fishing is. Nowadays, I am almost the only one that goes fishing every day the sea allows… I know that, financially speaking, I am probably the one contributing the most to the association. However, I do not personally care: do you have any idea of how it was to be a fisherman here before this association started to work properly? It is still hard for me to think how easier the whole thing became. I do not have to bother myself anymore selling my catches… I do not pay to get my boat out of the water for the periodic maintenance… I do not buy even the ice anymore! 
Several advantages derived from the adoption of the Gran Tarajal Fishermen’s 
Association organisational model. Communal practices had increased the fishery’s 
profitability for each fisher. Yet it is important to underline one last benefit produced 
by the organisational model applied by the Fishermen’s Association of Gran Tarajal in 
reducing competition and increasing interdependence. Alvaro highlighted this: 
Here we respect the rules… We work so close to each other that it would be very difficult to go unnoticed doing something unusual… How can I come back here after I have done something the association prohibits? There is no way no one will spot me: there is too much closeness and interdependence among us. Think for instance to unauthorized species: the only way we have to sell our fish is through the association, right? Then, the association does not sell illegal catches. Thus there is no way I can sell them unless I do it by myself. However, believe me, if I leave the association with a box of fish in the car, people here will spot me immediately. 
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In Gran Tarajal, local governance of fishery was developed by empowering local 
fishers in setting their own fishing rules. Such an organisational model was based on 
intense interdependence and cooperation that favoured the economic and 
environmental performances of the fishermen’s association. Indeed, the working of 
Gran Tarajal’s Fishermen’s Association also created the conditions for effective – and 
completely inexpensive – informal social controls to be in place. 
 
8.3. Same steer, different responses. How Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal’s fisheries 
responded differently to European governance. 
The reasons why, despite very similar formal EU governance mechanisms, fishers on 
the two islands undertook these very different routes lie in the differences 
characterizing the history as well as the sociocultural and economic fabrics of 
Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal. In this section I confront the two case studies to highlight 
some of those local peculiarities that, by interacting with EU governance, produced 
such different outcomes on the two islands.  
 
8.3.1. When the EU gets local: the role of local society, economy, history and 
geography 
Contrary to the situation on the Italian island, when the first big fishing vessels for 
oceanic fishery reached Fuerteventura in the early 1970s, the island’s core economic 
sector was not fishing, but agriculture. Although the maritime element played a 
central role in the organisation of everyday life, fishers and fishery contributed only 
marginally to structure Gran Tarajal’s economy and local culture. At the core of Gran 
Tarajal’s economic life was the production of tomatoes, which attracted a workforce 
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from all over the island (Suaréz, 2007). In Fuerteventura, to become a fisher did not 
necessarily constitute locals’ favourite job prospects, and sailing and fishing skills were 
not an economic necessity.  
In Lampedusa, instead, fishery did not represent just the core economy of the 
island: it also constituted the islanders’ identity and self-perception. Bluefish fishing 
and canning determined the rhythm of the days, with men fishing overnight and 
women canning during daylight between April and September. Lampedusans 
perceived themselves as people of the sea as far as it was from the sea that they 
extracted their primary source of nourishment and labour. To become a good captain 
was the most prestigious achievement that young uneducated locals could aspire to, 
while being a fisher represented an almost unescapable option for local children 
(Greenlaw, 2002). Consequently, the increasing number of fishers that had left fishery 
for tourism generated much greater tensions in Lampedusa compared to Gran Tarajal, 
preventing Lampedusan fishers from organising collectively. Yet a series of other 
major differences characterized the economies of Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal when 
the first effects of Communitarian management of fishery started to be felt and 
experienced by fishers on the two island. 
In Gran Tarajal, the economically successful story of the local cooperative of 
tomatoes producers provided possibly a model for local fishers (Suaréz, 2007). On the 
contrary, the flourishing of the mackerel industry in Lampedusa, as based on private 
enterprises and the (over-)exploitation of workers, provided a diametrically opposite 
labour organisation model of reference for Lampedusans. If fishers in Gran Tarajal had 
experienced first-hand the benefits of working as part of a cooperative - they would 
have probably been less keen to join Juan Ramon’s project. 
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Besides, as Gran Tarajal’s Fishermen’s Association reached economic sustainability 
in the 1990s, fishery turned into a relatively attractive job option for local young while 
the tomato economy was still the mainstay of employment on the small port village. 
With the first tourist facilities built in both the north and south of the island rather 
than in Gran Tarajal, the Spanish port town turned only partially into a tourist spot. 
Moreover, as fishery constituted only a relatively marginal economy before, as well 
as after, the EU integration of Spain, the changing economy of Gran Tarajal did not so 
much break apart pre-existing communal practices. The shift towards tourism did not 
have the same impact in terms of altering the entire local sociocultural fabric as it had 
done so on the Italian island.  
As for Lampedusa, indeed, as much as in the past, the fishing industry monopolized 
local economic and social life, and today no corner of the island remained untouched 
by intense touristification. For instance, the only village on the island developed and 
expanded where, in 2012, almost 60,000 tourists spent one or more nights on an 
island, counting not even 6,000 inhabitants (Contino, 2013). Tourist economy also 
took over the physical spaces of the local fishing industry, such as canning warehouses 
and fishers’ tool sheds, as they were turned into holiday apartments or restaurants 
and bars. This dramatic development in Lampedusa might help to explain why 
Lampedusan fishers’ were not able to organize local fishery in an environmentally and 
economically sustainable way.  
Lampedusan fishers’ strategies at sea seemed in fact to respond to the short-term 
calculation of profit-maximisation. This different time horizon applied by fishers on 
the two islands – as fishers in Gran Tarajal relied on long-term strategies of profit 
maximisation through the implementation of effective and restrictive conservation 
policies - was most likely an outcome of the rapid and pervasive touristification of 
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Lampedusa’s economy. Since Lampedusa turned into a popular tourist destination, 
Lampedusan fishers made up their wages only partly through fishing. As fishing 
started playing only a relative role in securing a decent life for Lampedusans, islanders 
began taking less care of local stocks, since they could rely on the local tourist industry 
to earn a living. On the contrary, in Gran Tarajal, professional fishers who earned a 
good living from fishing, clearly cared more for the health of their only or main source 
of income.  
Yet there were also geographical elements that played a role in addressing so 
differently islanders’ responses to EU governance on the two fishing villages. Indeed, 
given the greater size of Fuerteventura compared to that of Lampedusa, and as the 
Spanish island could rely on more stable air and maritime connections with the other 
islands of the archipelago, fishers in Gran Tarajal could access a much larger market 
to sell their catches than Lampedusan fishers. Greater commercial possibilities 
certainly played a role in maintaining the profitability of fishery in Gran Tarajal, 
generating the conditions for local fishery to remain attractive to potential new 
fishers. 
 
8.4. From a fishing island in the middle of the Mediterranean to a tourist 
destination at the centre of Europe’s outer border. 
What more than 50 years of the intense Europeanisation of Lampedusa and its fishery 
produced in Lampedusa was a substantial marginalisation of the traditional fishing 
and maritime culture of the island. Yet locals’ transforming relationships with their 
sea, combined with the borderization of Lampedusa and its surrounding waters, had 
mutated islanders’ perception of the geography of their island. I now outline the most 
significant features of this transformation. 
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One of the most important outcomes of EU governance on Lampedusa was that 
communal everyday practices had been replaced by much more atomized and 
competitive logics. When the Italian island counted on a relatively flourishing bluefish 
canning industry, although living conditions remained relatively deprived, ‘none went 
to sleep hungry’.60 Given the isolation of Lampedusa and the organisation and working 
of the local fishing industry, islanders relied on each other while working, as well as 
for coping with everyday life. During the months of bluefish fishing, canning factories 
and fishers worked synergistically so that they could maximize their production. As for 
winter, those that did not leave the island shared the relatively scarce available 
provisions. On the ‘mackerel island’, then, Lampedusans lived a largely self-supportive 
and mostly communal way of life where they experienced, interiorized and produced 
the local labour market and economy. The difficulties of living an isolated life in the 
middle of the sea had obliged islanders to rely on each other (Enns, 2008).  
Yet, professional fishers that used to work together as employees of the same 
fishing vessel owners, today competed among each other either individually or as part 
of smaller crews of up to three to four fishers. Although competition existed before 
the Italian island became part of the EU, as I have demonstrated, the CFP contributed 
to exacerbating individualistic attitudes in Lampedusa by transforming professional 
fishery from within. While Lampedusa was the ‘mackerel island’, competitiveness and 
performance depended on collective efforts, either within the walls of the canning 
industries, or on board of the fishing vessels catching bluefish. Today’s increased 
competition to catch fish is played out by single fishers or units of few individuals who 
often owned the vessels and relied on technology that not everyone was able to afford 
                                                          
60 Maria. 
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–instead of the fishing and sailing skills everyone could acquire through practice and 
experience.  
However, it must be noted that such a change in the fabric of the Lampedusa 
community had begun already when fishers started leaving the island to work aboard 
of the big vessels for oceanic fishing. In contrast to when Lampedusan fishers 
remained in Tunisia for months before the bluefish fishing season, when islanders 
went fishing in the Atlantic, they could not take their families along. When fishers’ 
international mobility from Lampedusa and Tunisia’s shores (Friese, 2010) expanded 
westwards and transformed into a global and solitary venture that fishers undertook 
to access regular –and much higher – salaries, the island’s community was drawn 
apart and islanders began less and less to rely on one another. Additionally, the inflow 
of money coming from the large salaries of those fishers working in the Atlantic had 
made winters much easier to overcome without relying on shared resources. 
On dry land, the booming of the tourist industry and the ensuing illegal building of 
tourist residences had also reconfigured local economic – and then social – relations 
along competitive lines. Gianni highlighted this: 
Differently from when everyone used to work in the canning industry, today we do not live anymore as a community: communal living does not exist anymore on this island. Today everyone made his or her own closed circle both economically as well as socially. You have your holiday apartment and you run it with your family or even individually - and that is it! Before there was only fishing and everyone was a fishermen as much as everyone needed fishermen to work. Today nothing remains of that communal spirit: it disappeared or transformed into something else. 
A tension had emerged between the realities of fishing and tourism which 
distinguished the ethics of the sea from the competitiveness of tourism. Although the 
island’s elders expressed substantial criticisms towards a younger generation that had 
abandoned fishery in favour of tourism, empirical data and observations suggest that 
it was the local elders themselves who had initiated this process by being the first to 
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invest in the tourism sector. There was thus not necessarily a generational element 
involved but, rather, the impossible coexistence between two partially incompatible 
value systems. As we have seen, growing from these initial investments, tourism on 
the island boomed throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and continued growing, ignoring 
most of the existing regulations, with those quickest to construct new buildings and 
collude with the local authorities becoming the most successful tourism 
entrepreneurs. In order to earn a living from tourism, islanders acted independently 
through competing for the tourist trade.  
With this economic shift, the seafarers’ norms of mutual assistance and reciprocity 
became almost obsolete in ensuring livelihood in the new context of a growing mass 
tourism industry. While fish represented a common factor of production that had 
unified the locals taking part in the process of its commodification – from fishing to 
canning - now tourists became the resource ‘to catch’ – facilitating the transformation 
of an enormous amount of cubic meters on the island into privately owned holiday 
accommodations. Hence, elder fishers’ nostalgia for the fishing Lampedusa of the past 
resembled a sort of self-apology as elder fishers were in fact those who turned to 
tourism and left professional fishery. As much as they valorised the island’s past values 
by criticizing the island’s present ‘ways of living’, most of them knew that with the 
next round of subsidies they might have also decided to scrap their vessels and start 
fishing illegally – if they did not already do that in winter while receiving their 
unemployment benefits. 
To add to these developments, the establishment and working of the European 
external border produced further tensions in Lampedusa and its surrounding 
seawaters. As I suggested in chapter seven, the functioning of the border at sea had 
challenged the fishers’ maritime ethic, forcing them to rely on economic and judicial 
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cost-benefits calculations vis-à-vis the rescuing of boat migrants in distress or in the 
fishing of their bodies – or parts of them. While the maritime culture was eroded at 
sea, the mediatisation of Europe’s border in Lampedusa and the centrality of the 
island within the national as well as European political arena, transformed life on dry 
land. Locals seem often to become actors in the spectacle of the border (Huysmans, 
2000; De Genova, 2013; Cuttitta, 2014) permanently staged on their island, 
performing it so as to satisfy non-islanders expectations and often in opposition to 
what islanders experienced first-hand. Again, fishers’ ethics and their empathy 
towards the shipwrecked was confronted by mainstream media and the political 
border narrative of migrants’ securitisation. Accordingly, since Schengen expanded to 
include Lampedusa, islanders’ experience and perception of the geography of their 
island transformed as well. In the minds of many Lampedusans, the Lampedusa 
located in the middle of Europe’s border had progressively substituted the island 
located in the middle of the Mediterranean. To explain such a process, the symbolic 
events of 2011 represent a kind of ultimate watershed leaving behind the old 
communalistic fishing Lampedusa as a safe port and refuge for seamen in the middle 
of the Mediterranean, for the touristic but militarized island at the core of Europe’s 
border of today. 
Indeed, if on the one hand the cultural ties that bound the island with North Africa 
played a role pushing locals to assist Tunisian migrants during the early months of the 
year, following 2011, Tunisians in Lampedusa had become intrusive and dangerous 
neighbours. At the same time, it was as if sub-Saharan immigrants counterbalanced 
this rapid reversal and took the place of Tunisians in the 'heart of Lampedusans'. As 
an example, referring to the two migrants walking along the pier of the old port, from 
the door of his tool shed, Giuseppe told me: 
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I know that they are good guys: they must be Eritreans! Although I go to Tunisia often, in Lampedusa I only have issues with Tunisians. I have problems only with those who take the boats and come here thinking that they can do everything they want. 
The attitude among many locals towards sub-Saharan migrants and asylum seekers 
on the island was semantically different from the empathy felt by many towards those 
Tunisians who reached Lampedusa during the first few months of 2011. The 
newcomers were no longer the island’s geographical – and cultural - neighbours, with 
whom to share recent history - and to join in protesting against institutional failures. 
As Maria – a worker of the canning industry - and many others on the island told me, 
those reaching Lampedusa by boat were ‘desperate people fleeing wars and 
deprivations’. After the screening of the violent scenes of September 2011, the 
islanders’ relation with those strangers coming from the sea transformed into a sort 
of moral obligation rather than the expression of cultural vicinity. As Lampedusans 
became increasingly accustomed to performing the border, their relations with boat 
migrants transformed into a conscious exhibition of hospitality that islanders 
displayed to the outside world – rather than an emphatic reaction towards a suffering 
neighbour and human being. Locals’ attitudes towards the newcomers changed from 
an everyday experience and cultural neighbour to a somewhat more detached and, at 
times, paternalistic attitude towards more culturally distant – or diverse - individuals.  
Pushed to the margins of the island’s economy and sociocultural milieu, many 
fishers turned the page: magically, Tunisians suddenly became the enemy, both on 
land and at sea. Within this border narrative, the death of Lampedusa’s bluefish 
canning industry – and with it of the island’s fishery - was not attributed to the actions 
of Lampedusa’s fishers who had abandoned professional fishing for the more lucrative 
and less tiring tourism sector. Nor was it seen that the local professional fishery was 
under strain because of the many ‘retired’ fishers that continued to fish without 
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permits to the detriment of the few licensed fishermen remaining on the island. The 
blame, instead, was passed to Tunisian fishers that were scapegoated, as they 
provided a simpler and clearer target for anxieties than the complex social events I 
have described. 
The EU border had thus exacerbated the dynamics of local sociocultural 
transformation that the CFP had begun to activate on the island. The working of the 
border provided the basis of local fisher’s vocabulary of motives (Wright Mills, 1940) 
– the unfair and aggressive competition of Tunisian fishers – to justify their choice of 
abandoning fishing for the more lucrative tourist industry. Given these major 
transformations, it was of little surprise that the fishery on the Italian island was 
unable to organize and thus seemed destined to disappear. 
 
8.5. Conclusion 
European integration had produced very similar pressures on the fishing communities 
of the two islands. Yet, the outcomes differed significantly between Lampedusa and 
Gran Tarajal. If on the Italian island, professional fishery’s destiny was to disappear, in 
the Spanish fishing village, local fishers’ good practices turned a fishery that 20 years 
ago was in the same conditions as contemporary fishery in Lampedusa, into a 
profitable and sustainable economic sector. Besides Juan Ramon’s charisma and 
vision, the reason for such a successful story lay in the history, economy, society and 
geography of Gran Tarajal. As the president of the Spanish fishermen’s association 
stressed, the local governance of their fishery had developed quite independent from 
any Communitarian regulation or directive. 
As for Lampedusa, the dramatic marginalisation of fishery on an island whose 
economy was centred on the fishing industry up to less than 30 years ago, produced 
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a deep reconfiguration of the entire local sociocultural fabric. Tourist economy, as it 
developed in Lampedusa, produced almost inextricable tensions, with pre-existing 
value systems rooted into the fishing and Mediterranean past of the island. On top of 
this major economic and sociocultural transformation, the EU external border had 
exacerbated tensions and contributed to moving Lampedusans’ self-perceived 
geography of their island from the middle of the Mediterranean into the core of 
Europe’s outer border at sea. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Since the Italian and Spanish memberships of the European Union (EU), fishers’ 
everyday lives in Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal had transformed profoundly. As I have 
shown, throughout more than five decades of Communitarian management of fishery 
and almost 20 years of intense borderization of Lampedusa, both islands’ economies, 
cultures and society had changed dramatically. Surprisingly, however, the outcomes 
of these EU driven processes were very different in Lampedusa and Fuerteventura. I 
now summarize these changes and provide a reflection on the tensions that EU 
governance had produced in Lampedusa, and on the role that ground-level sociologies 
of the EU must play within the frame of European studies. I conclude with a final note 
on governmentality, as it was an extremely helpful tool in discerning the processes by 
which governmental logics operated, but only a limited one to explain all the changes 
that EU integration had brought to the islands. 
  The first wave of European subsidies to fishery in the late 1950s started 
challenging the cohesion of Lampedusa’s local community. Due to the increasing 
mechanisation of fishery and the expansion of industrial fisheries, over the 1960s, 
many Lampedusans – fishers included – left their island and emigrated to bigger Italian 
fishing ports. In the 1970s, with the introduction of the structural policies that 
preceded the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) of 1983, more islanders continued to leave 
both Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal. Fishers who had rarely – if ever - left their families 
and friends before, begun to embark on vessels for oceanic fishing and left their island 
for months to go fishing in the high seas. While these fishers experienced a new and 
global mobility and the simultaneous deskilling of their profession, local community 
ties started being undermined by these prolonged absences and the inflow of capital 
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coming from the high wages that fishers earned on board of the oceanic fishing 
vessels. 
When these fishers returned to their islands in the early 1990s, they invested 
locally what they had earned during the long fishing campaigns. Many fishers who had 
never owned a boat finally turned themselves into vessel owners and captains. As 
both islands’ small-scale fishing fleets were updated and became more productive 
than ever before, the local artisanal small-scale fisheries of the past effectively 
became commercial versions of themselves and local fishers begun competing for 
much smaller amounts of catches. At the time, local fish stocks had already been 
overfished for decades and had decreased significantly. 
Counting on more productive fisheries, but much impoverished fishing grounds, 
with the CFP that, since 1983, increasingly focused on conservation policies, small-
scale fisheries on the two islands lost further profitability. Limitations in fishers’ access 
to maritime resources were designed and implemented almost indiscriminately on 
small- and big-scale fisheries – even though the former had only marginally, if not 
insignificantly, overfished, compared to their industrial counterparts. While these 
measures increased small-scale fishery operational costs, the 1992 structural policies 
made it even more attractive for fishers to leave their profession. As the EU begun 
subsidizing the dismantling of existing vessels and the withdrawal of professional 
fishing licenses, both islands’ fisheries experienced a pouring of previously 
professional fishers into the then booming local tourist industry. However, even 
though subsidies aimed at decreasing the exploitation of maritime resources, 
observations in Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal suggest a rather different view. On the 
islands, many of those who dismantled their vessels and/or withdrew their licenses 
bought themselves a new boat and went fishing illegally - introducing their catches in 
219  
 
the local markets – and turning themselves into the small-scale fishers’ main 
commercial competitors, as well as further endangering the health of local fishing 
grounds. Hence, in spite of the CFP’s official goals of ensuring an ‘environmentally, 
economically and socially sustainable’ (EC, 2015) fishery, up until the 1990s, the CFP 
had produced rather the opposite effect in Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal. 
Communitarian governance made professional small-scale fishing more expensive 
and it de facto activated a series of vicious circles that pushed even more professional 
fishers to leave their legal, regulated and monitored work activity, leading to 
considerable overfishing in local waters. 
However, thanks to the initiative of Juan Ramon and the organisational structure 
of the Fishermen’s Association of Gran Tarajal, such negative loops were at least partly 
broken in the small Spanish port town. As local fishers had set a series of good 
practices that they developed autonomously from any EU regulation, the present and 
future of their local professional small-scale fishery was safeguarded. Yet, in 
Lampedusa, with the local fishery experiencing profound segmentation, the most 
negative and unpredicted outcomes of EU governance of fishery had prevailed on 
local fishers’ ability to organize themselves and turn their fishery into a profitable and 
sustainable one.  
The shift of the local fishing economy towards tourism had in fact produced much 
greater tensions on the Italian island than on the Spanish one. While Lampedusa was 
the ‘mackerel island’, fishing was at the core of Lampedusans’ identity: consequently, 
the transformation of the local economy implied a much deeper alteration of local 
culture and of islanders’ self-perception. Moreover, in contrast to Gran Tarajal, whose 
local economy was still partly centred on the tomato production, the development of 
the tourist industry in Lampedusa was extremely pervasive for locals and especially 
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fishers. On the Italian island, the tourist industry took over even the physical spaces 
of the local fishing industry as they were transformed into touristic facilities. 
What remained of the old fishing industry in Lampedusa when I visited it was 
largely symbolic, as it mainly served to attract tourists by projecting the image of a 
typical Mediterranean fishing island. Fishers’ tool sheds, fish traders’ warehouses and 
the canning industries scattered along the old port and made of pumice stones were 
abandoned or turned into restaurants or holiday houses and apartments. The small 
and coloured fishing vessels crowding the island’s marina were used only during 
winter to go fishing. In summer, their main function was that of taking tourists around 
the island during most of what was the bluefish fishing season until a few decades 
previously. Only a few of Nicola’s handmade fishing pots served for fishing: yet I often 
found them hanging on the walls of the dining rooms of the island’s restaurants. Even 
fishers were not anymore professional fishers as most of them had become 
recreational fishers and tourist operators. As to seal the final transformation of the 
island economy – and with it, of the local sociocultural life - Lampedusa turned 
somehow into a sort of  post-industrial symbolic fishing community rather than an 
actual one (cf. Featherstone, 1990). 
On top of this already dramatic transformation, the establishment and 
management of the European external border on the Italian island and its surrounding 
seawaters exacerbated social changes and strains within the local community. While 
the seawaters and the island were progressively militarized by means of thousands of 
officers and a series of border surveillance and control apparatuses deployed there, 
Lampedusans paradoxically experienced the increasing de-securitisation of their 
everyday life and witnessed frequent institutional illicit conducts – all of which had 
undermined European and national institutions’ legitimacy on the island. As life on 
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dry land was impacted by the establishment and the working of the European external 
border, fishers’ perception and experience of local seawaters changed dramatically. 
Rescuing operations for boat migrants forced fishers to reconfigure the most basic 
principles of maritime ethics – such as rescuing people at sea – vis-à-vis legal and 
economic calculations. Moreover, at a more discursive level, since politics and media 
started staging a permanent migrant emergency from Lampedusa, tensions were 
aggravated. With Europe’s outer border ‘landing’ in Lampedusa, this once isolated and 
self-sufficient community was progressively turned into the most symbolic and 
controversial loci of Europe’s border regime, expropriating islanders of their own 
identity and self-representation. The rock that for centuries had served seafarers from 
all corners of the Mediterranean as a safe port - the Lampedusa located at a few hours 
sailing from the coasts of both North Africa and Sicily - was taken away from its sea to 
be placed at the core of the EU border and migration regimes. 
European integration had thus contributed to the breaking up of historical and 
maritime communal practices in Lampedusa and had undermined islanders’ 
traditional ways of living. In the minds of many islanders, the small Italian isle was 
displaced from the sea and the marginal geography in which it was located. Islanders 
adapted to this transformation and progressively abandoned their communal ways of 
living in favour of more individualized everyday practices. The old ‘living alone 
together’ – as islanders overcame their isolation by sharing resources – typical of life 
in small and detached communities, was gradually replaced by a ‘living altogether 
alone’, as the growing tourist economy pushed islanders to share little more than the 
soil of their island, over which they competed amongst each other for individual profit. 
Throughout this process, the relation of islanders to their historical neighbours in the 
Tunisian shore had also mutated, as Tunisians turned into the island fishery’s demon 
– the cause of all problems. 
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The diverging trajectories experienced by these two European fisheries 
demonstrate the importance of developing a sociology of EU governance from a 
ground-level perspective, including the influence of the sea and the maritime cultural 
element. Looking at Communitarian governance from the everyday life of the 
islanders made it possible to bring to the surface the many ways through which 
individuals adapted to EU provisions or circumvented them, as well as providing a 
view on the most tangible strategies through which institutional actors and systems 
actually governed. If governing from a distance depends on the empirical realisation 
of governing technologies and the ways in which they are translated on the ground 
into actual choices and enactments, then a comprehensive understanding of 
governance must focus also on the ways institutional actors implement policies , and, 
ultimately, how ordinary citizens interact within these constraints.  
The unexpected outcomes that EU policies generated in Lampedusa and 
Fuerteventura, as I have shown, can be seen as a key part of the machinery of 
European governance which was generated from and through it. Communitarian 
governance had a somewhat diffuse effect, only having limited impact depending on 
islanders’ willingness to adapt or react to, as well as circumvent, governing 
technologies. As such, the many and unpredictable ways in which governing 
technologies and individuals played out on the ground must be included within the 
picture to comprehend what governance actually is and how it operates. Here, then, 
governmentality results being a valuable theoretical concept to deconstruct macro 
notions of governance, and it allows identification of the processes through which 
governance actually operates. Yet, pushing the study of governmentality towards 
individuals simultaneously challenges dominant understandings of governmentality 
itself.  
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In Lampedusa and Gran Tarajal, governmentality could indeed only partly explain 
the effects of EU governance in transforming everyday life. Governance and its 
technologies do not land in a sociocultural vacuum: rather the opposite. On both 
islands and their surrounding seawaters, governmentalities interacted with other 
forms of community and individual self-government, which developed and operated 
alongside, inside, and outside of them. The initiative of Juan Ramon and the 
organisation of Gran Tarajal’s Fishermen’s Association provided alternative forms of 
self-government for local fishers. Moreover, the Mediterranean historical geography 
of Lampedusa had also played a role in addressing islanders’ initial reactions to the 
arrivals of thousands of Tunisians in 2011 – when islanders for months expressed their 
hospitality towards their historical maritime neighbours. On both islands, islanders 
had evaded scarcely legitimate Communitarian policies on fishery, to the extent that 
conservation policies had generated the conditions for fish stocks’ overexploitation – 
rather than their protection. Governmentality thus works better as a sort of 
theoretical utensil for the study of the interactions between governance and the 
governed individuals, rather than as an encompassing explanatory framework for the 
analysis of the ways in which governance is produced and reproduced by people 
(Walters, 2011).   
In terms of EU mechanisms of governance as they affected the two islands, what 
can be seen is that institutional commands from above had actually had numerous 
unintended consequences that served to contradict a number of the aims the EU. Yet, 
as I have demonstrated, the Europeanisation of everyday life in Lampedusa and 
Fuerteventura produced substantial transformations on the two islands. Seen from 
the eyes of fishers, the steering of European integration thus activated both pervasive 
and unintended but somwhat uncontrollable processes. From this maritime 
perspective, significant aspects of EU enterprise comes under question. 
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